This article traces the philosophical idea of self-perception from the times of ancient Stoicism to the thirteenth century by analyzing the views of Seneca, Augustine, and Olivi. The central argument is that they defend the same idea according to which self-preservation and the appropriate use of one’s body requires awareness thereof, despite the obvious contextual differences and the uncertainty of direct historical connections between the authors. They think that this kind of self-awareness does not belong only to human beings, because (...) irrational animals need to perceive their bodies, the functions of their bodily parts, and to perceive themselves as living beings in order to act appropriately and survive. The attribution of self-perception to animals is based on a distinction between the experiential awareness of the soul and the intellectual understanding of its essence, a distinction postulated by all three authors. The philosophical affinities between their views show that ideas that originate in Stoic thought were transmitted, directly or indirectly, to medieval philosophical psychology. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the narrative aspect of Seneca’s idea of self-transformation. It compares Seneca’s viewpoint with some modern notions of the narrative self to highlight some parallels and significant differences between the ancient and modern conceptions and it establishes the reading of some parts of De Brev. Vit. in the context of other passages as concerned with the narrative self. The paper argues, amongst other points, that in Ep. 83.1–3, Seneca extends the practice of meditatio (ethically directed self-examination) by (...) incorporating the construction of a narrative self into this process, in dual roles, as examiner and examined. It concludes that Seneca expected us to avail ourselves of a similar self-assessment based on a dialogue with philosophical texts. (shrink)

This thesis aims to illuminate Seneca’s criticisms of Neronian Rome through a novel exploration of the philosopher’s collection of moral letters – the so-called Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium. Noting the glaring absence of court politics in these letters the thesis identifies themes of dissimulation and veiled criticism, penned by Seneca in a concealed manner to ensure his safety during a time of dire political unrest. The first chapter establishes the cultural context of this collection by examining how they fit in (...) with the practice of elite Roman letter writing. This line of inquiry stems from a longstanding question in the scholarship as to whether the Epistulae Morales are letters in the earnest sense, or merely a literary-philosophical exercise contrived by Seneca. The chapter concludes that the letters can be seen as genuine, exchanged with their addressee. They were, however, also written for the wider senatorial class who are clearly the subject of Seneca’s moral discussions. The second chapter examines the circumstances which preceded the writing of these letters in order to identify points of political tension under Nero’s reign. Drawing on the Neronian books of Tacitus’ Annals and earlier Senecan treatises, this chapter identifies themes of political ideology which shaped the ongoing altercations between senate and emperor during Nero’s rule. With the political tensions identified, the third chapter unearths the underhanded ways in which Seneca criticises Nero’s reign throughout the letters. Additionally, this chapter showcases a range of techniques employed by Seneca to disguise his criticisms in order to maintain deniability and avoid persecution. The fourth and final chapter examines Letters 14 and 18 in detail, illustrating the techniques discussed in the preceding chapter and bringing to light Seneca’s veiled criticisms of Nero’s regime. The pair of case studies demonstrates that Senecan criticisms are present throughout the collection, and are apparent in both letters with overt political themes and those which are, at first glance, seemingly mundane and commonplace. (shrink)

Los recientes estudios historiográficos sobre la idea de “perdón” han aportado datos valiosos sobre este término de la filosofía académica. Su uso mundano expresa una mentalidad y unas prácticas socialmente regladas muy específicas. Los resultados de esta investigación permiten afirmar que dicha noción existía en el seno de la sociedad greco-romana, de manera que el “perdón al enemigo” no es una innovación total de la cultura judeo-cristiana, sino más bien una consecuencia de la previa romanización. El presente artículo trata de (...) mostrar cómo la escuela estoica es el principal exponente de esta difusión cultural del “perdón al enemigo” desde sus inicios. (shrink)