ABSTRACT In his 1981–82 lectures The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Michel Foucault claims that a significant portion of the modern historiography of ancient philosophy tends to discredit the ethical framework of epimeleia heautou (“care of the self”). The thematic analysis of knowledge in the historiography of ancient philosophy overshadows the theme of care of the self. Taking Foucault’s claim as a point of departure, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, the paper provides a genealogy of the early Hellenistic (...) Academy, from Polemo to Arcesilaus. Second, the paper demonstrates that for Arcesilaus, the alleged pioneer of what modern historiography has designated the Academy’s epistemological scepticism, philosophy is not restricted to a continual search for knowledge at a theoretically rarefied level of challenging arguments or discursive statements. This paper situates Arcesilaus’ opposition to early Stoic epistemology within the framework of Academic epimeleia heautou, and defends the thesis that under Arcesilaus the Hellenistic Academy undergoes a shift in the practice of care of the self. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical response to the claims of Sivin and Lloyd and Mattice to the effect that Greek and Roman philosophy was characterised by a predominance of combat metaphors. Drawing on Plato and Plutarch, as well as contemporary studies led by Nussbaum, I argue that a host of different metaphors was demonstrably used in the Greek tradition to describe philosophy and its subjects, led by the therapeutic or medicinal metaphor of philosophy as ‘therapy of desire’ or of desiderative (...) opinion. I propose that it was the sophists like Protagoras, at least as they are depicted by Plato, who sought to conceive of philosophising as a strategic, warlike activity. In conclusion, I reflect on the invisibility of the medicinal metaphor, outside of certain dedicated studies in the history of ideas, in contemporary thinking about Western philosophy and its past. (shrink)

In Plato's Euthydemus, Socrates claims that the possession of epistēmē suffices for practical success. Several recent treatments suggest that we may make sense of this claim and render it plausible by drawing a distinction between so-called “outcome-success” and “internal-success” and supposing that epistēmē only guarantees internal-success. In this paper, I raise several objections to such treatments and suggest that the relevant cognitive state should be construed along less than purely intellectual lines: as a cognitive state constituted at least in part (...) by ability. I argue that we may better explain Socrates' claims that epistēmē suffices for successful action by attending to the nature of abilities, what it is that we attempt to do when acting, and what successful action amounts to in the relevant contexts. These considerations suggest that, contrary to several recent treatments, the success in question is not always internal-success. (shrink)

L’idée d’appropriation (oikeiōsis) constitue un concept fondamental de l’éthique stoïcienne. On en souligne l’efficacité polémique dans la controverse opposant les Stoïciens aux Épicuriens sur la fin (telos) naturelle ainsi que la portée théorique dans l’explication du développement moral et social de l’homme. Outre les difficultés rencontrées pour cerner les contours et la consistance théoriques de l’appropriation, son statut est également fortement débattu : s’agit-il d’une invention stoïcienne ou bien en trouve-t-on l’équivalent ou les linéaments dans la philosophie péripatéticienne ? Tout (...) en rappelant les incertitudes entourant la généalogie de cette idée, on entreprendra de se tourner vers le traitement philosophique du propre (oikeion) dans certains textes d’Aristote et de Platon, pour voir s’il contient des déterminations pertinentes pour comprendre l’appropriation. Cet examen sera l’occasion de s’interroger sur ce qui a pu passer du propre à l’appropriation et sur les difficultés auxquelles s’expose la confrontation de deux notions au statut conceptuel inégal. (shrink)

Scholarship on ancient skepticism has undergone a remarkable renaissance in the last three decades. Specialists in ancient philosophy have explored the complex history of the Greco‐Roman skeptical traditions and discussed difficult philological and exegetical issues. But they have also assessed the philosophical significance of the various ancient skeptical outlooks. In this first paper, I provide a general presentation of this area of study, while in the two subsequent articles I will focus on some of the topics that have been the (...) object of much attention in the recent literature on ancient skepticism. (shrink)

Les chapitres I 4 et IV 3 des Mémorables, où Socrate expose une téléologie anthropocentrique et une conception élaborée de la providence divine qui gouverne l’univers, ont exercé une profonde influence sur les stoïciens. Les Anciens ont reconnu cette influence, mais les Modernes ont tardé à la reconnaître, tantôt parce qu’ils ont considéré que ces chapitres des Mémorables étaient en réalité des interpolations d’origine stoïcienne, tantôt parce qu’ils ont attribué à Diogène d’Apollonie la téléologie exposée par Socrate. Fort heureusement, les (...) commentateurs récents ne cherchent plus à déposséder Xénophon de la paternité de ces deux chapitres et l’on peut donc tenter de déterminer quelle fut leur postérité chez les stoïciens. L’étude qui suit s’applique à mettre en lumière les nombreux recoupements que l’on observe entre le texte des Mémorables (I 4 et IV 3) et le livre II du De natura deorum de Cicéron, où Balbus expose longuement la théologie stoïcienne. Il appert que l’influence des Mémorables sur ce texte de Cicéron est beaucoup plus considérable qu’on ne l’a reconnu jusqu’à maintenant. (shrink)

The essay examines the description of virtue as a craft that governs the proper use of possessions in Plato’s Euthydemus and Stoicism. In the first part, I discuss Socrates’ parallel between wisdom and the crafts in the Euthydemus, and the resulting argument concerning the value of external and bodily possessions. I then offer some objections, showing how Socrates’ craft analogy allows one to think of possessions as good and ultimately fails to offer a defense of virtue’s sufficiency for happiness. In (...) the second part, I examine the Stoics’ craft analogy and note a number of differences from Socrates’ account in the Euthydemus. These include the Stoic claim that external advantages never make any contribution to happiness, even when properly used, and the claim that, unlike other crafts, wisdom does not require any external possessions in order to be exercised and yield benefit and happiness. I then place these differences against the backdrop of the debate regarding virtue’s sufficiency for happiness and argue that the Stoic craft model of virtue fares better than its Socratic antecedent. (shrink)

In his refutation of skepticism in book IV of De rerum natura, Lucretius uses argumentative methods typical of Epicurus: the περιτροπή is in many ways similar to that used by the philosopher in book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως, the same book where, in a passage dedicated to the criticism against determinists, can be found a reference to the criterion of the πρόληψις, that Lucretius exploits in his refutation. Moreover, Lucretius develops a strong demonstration concerning the irrefutability of αἴσθησις as a (...) criterion of truth, which finds significant points of contact with a large fragment, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius and generally traced back to the Canon of Epicurus. The last argument used by the poet is a pragmatic one: for the skeptic it would be impossible to live. The argument is similar to the praxis-based argument used by Epicurus in the Περὶ φύσεως against the partisans of determinism. But the pragmatic argument goes back to a very ancient layer of anti-skeptical polemics, even prior to Epicurus and already present in book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Although later influences cannot be excluded, Lucretius appears to be a faithful witness of Epicurus. Probably in a lost section of the Περὶ φύσεως, the philosopher of Samos showed positions going against skeptical or proto-skeptical attitude, contemporary or earlier to the time of the philosopher, probably developed in a Democritean or a Socratic context. Epicurus’ ad hominem strategy is very close to that of the philosopher in the Principal Doctrines XXIII–XXV, and certainly follows Aristotle’ strategy in book Γ of Metaphysics against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction. In a similar way, Epicurus does not have one figure as the objective of his refutation but constructs a hypothetical dialectical opponent capable of embodying a series of philosophical tendencies judged by the founder of Kepos to be extremely dangerous not only for the correct exercise of thought but for the human being’s life itself. (shrink)

I show how the familiar Stoic paradoxes were developed by reflecting on Socrates.

L’article porte sur la façon dont Sextus, dans les derniers chapitres du Livre I des Esquisses pyrrhoniennes, répond aux argumentations qui tendent à rattacher le scepticisme à diverses philosophies plus anciennes. Après une étude de la nature et des sources de ces argumentations à partir du témoignage de Diogène Laërce et d’autres auteurs, et le constat que bien des questions à ce sujet ne peuvent que rester sans réponse, la majeure partie de l’article est consacrée à l’analyse des contre-arguments avancés (...) par Sextus. Dans presque tous les cas, il apparaît que Sextus s’oppose fermement à tout rapprochement du scepticisme avec d’autres philosophies. Cela est d’autant plus surprenant que la philosophie de l’Antiquité tardive manifeste une tendance marquée à se réclamer de prédécesseurs. L’attitude de Sextus s’explique par son désir de faire comprendre le plus clairement possible que le scepticisme, en réalité, n’a rien d’une philosophie au sens ordinaire du terme. La rareté, chez Sextus, des références à des prédécesseurs nommément désignés, y compris au sein de la tradition pyrrhonienne, peut aussi s’expliquer par le souhait de paraître complètement différent des philosophes tels qu’on les comprend habituellement. (shrink)

This thesis comprises a study of the ethical thought of Iris Murdoch with special emphasis, as evidenced by the title, on how morality is intimately connected to self-improvement aiming at perfection and how the study of fiction has an important role to play in our strive towards bettering ourselves within the framework set by Murdoch’s moral philosophy.