The reception of the translations of Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian works at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century promoted a new understanding of the sciences as specialized fields of knowledge. The huge amount of translations required a new organization of knowledge, which included novel subjects and categories. Among these there is a very special case, namely the pseudo-Aristotelian De plantis, translated from Arabic into Latin and then back into Greek to be re-translated into Latin again. De plantis was included (...) in the new curriculum in Ripoll 109, and constituted the main source for botanical studies until the sixteenth century. Throughout this paper we will explore the reception and impact of De plantis in both the Arabic and the Latin traditions. We aim to show its foundational role in the development of botany as a theoretical discipline within the natural sciences. (shrink)

The struggle to delineate the relationship between theology and logic flourished in the thirteenth century and culminated in two condemnations in early 1277, one in Paris and the other in Oxford. To see how much and what kind of effect ecclesiastical actions such as condemnations and prohibitions to teach had on the development of logic in the Middle Ages, we investigate the events leading up to the 1277 actions, the condemned propositions, and the parts of these condemnations connected to modal (...) and temporal logic specifically. We show that because of the specific motivations late thirteenth-century and fourteenth-century logicians had when working in modal and temporal logic, the effect of the 1277 condemnations on the development of those branches was much smaller than might have been supposed. (shrink)

This paper aims to uncover the explanatory profile of an idealized version of Karl Ernst von Baer’s notion of individuation, wherein the special develops from the general. First, because such sequences can only be exemplified by a multiplicity of causally-related events, they should be seen as the topics of historical why-questions, rather than initial condition why-questions. Second, because historical why-questions concern the diachronic unity or genidentity of the events under consideration, I argue that the von Baerian pattern elicits a distinctive (...) response to such questions, wherein we are inclined to simultaneously affirm and reject the temporal unity of these events. I buttress this claim by considering non-biological expressions of the von Baerian principle, drawn from institutional history and literature. In the second half of the paper, I consider the implications of my findings for ontogenetic and phylogenetic sequences. I argue that the explanatory profile of von Baer’s principle neatly describes the distinctive speciation events that characterize deep metazoan phylogeny, as described by Stuart Newman. I also argue that parallel considerations should move us to accept a sense in which ontogenetic stages are not diachronically unified. (shrink)

Introducción a la lectura del De aeternitate mundi El De aetemitate de Siger es un texto polémico, origen y parte de diversos equívocos producidos en un escenario de importantes contiendas doctrinales y profundos cambias históricos. Como introducción a su lectura intentaré caracterizar muy brevemente algunos de dichos equívocos y después, aun más brevemente, las líneas generales de la contienda en la que se encuadran. Al fin, expondré sinteticamente los criterios adaptados para la traducción, agregando en último término uma bibliografia básica (...) organizada por temas. Ya en el título encontramos un primer equívoco, porque no se trata de um Tractatus, como lo conoce la tradición, sino de una Reportatio, es decir, uma versión escrita basada en una exposición oral. Un segundo equívoco se encuentra también en el título. El escrito no trata de la eternidad del mundo sino de otro tema, mucho más acatado: la eternidad de la especie humana. Esto podría parecer una diferencia menor, pero no lo es: este texto le valieron a Siger la acusación de herejía y la consecuente reclusión en la corte papal donde fue asesinado. Dicha herejía consistia en negar, siguiendo rigurosamente la filosofia aristotélica, el carácter creado del mundo, negación que ninguna lectura atenta podrá encontrar en este escrito. El lector encontrará en cambio el tratamiento de un tema puntual en un detallado trabajo erudito, conciso, claro y sagaz que desarrolla sólo uno de los modos de producción de los seres expuestos por Aristóteles en Metafísica Z, VII. Por lo que la acusación, más allá de los fines que persiguiera en su momento, constituye uma clara tergiversación de los términos en que este escrito plantea el problema. (shrink)

Aquinas’ famous comments in his early Scriptum on the Sentences (In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3) regarding the intellect’s apprehension of essence and esse have traditionally been interpreted as grounding Aquinas’ doctrine on the judgment of esse. For Aquinas, it appears, what the intellect apprehends in a simple concept is essence. Since esse, for him, is not an essence, it cannot, on the received view, be the object of conceptualization. Therefore, esse is grasped by the intellect only (...) in judgment. The claim that no genuine concept of esse is possible, however, is inconsistent with Aquinas’ theory of signification. A term’s signification is constituted, at least in part, in its “signing relation” with some “concept” in the mind. If, as on the traditional reading, there is no concept of esse, the term ‘esse’ is left without signification. To respond that the term ‘esse’ signs, not a concept, but the judgment in which esse is apprehended is in direct conflict with Aquinas’ claim elsewhere that no term, including ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, signifies a judgment. I propose an alternative interpretation to In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, one that allows for the possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse. The alternative reading explains Aquinas’ remarks there in light of the theoretical context of the discussion, in particular the theory of propositions and their objects. I show how and why Aquinas develops a distinctive theory of the object of the proposition, that it is concerned with “the esse of a thing” as a complex. Although this complex includes the simple act of being, as for the traditional position (contrary to its major critics), it cannot be reduced to anything simple. Despite the Sentences’ affirmation of a real distinction between a thing’s esse and essence, to which correspond two different operations of the intellect, it does not follow that the human intellect cannot conceive esse, just as it conceives essences, in a simple conception. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta algunas de las visiones filosóficas más influyentes sobre la memoria, la verdad y la justicia en el Medioevo cristiano. En todasellas están presentes, en proporción diferente, las dos tradiciones dominantes, el neoplatonismo y el aristotelismo. San Agustín, Avicena y Tomás de Aquino encarnan perspectivas crecientemente desplatonizadas sobre la memoria. En cuanto al concepto de verdad, tanto el modelo teocéntrico de Agustín como el adecuacionista de Tomás son expresiones de una corriente principal que declina en el siglo XIV. (...) Finalmente, mientras que Agustín introduce de modo crítico la definición ciceroniana de la justicia, basada en la teoría grecorromana de la ley natural, Aquino coordina sistemáticamente teísmo cristiano, ley natural y naturalismo político aristotélico. (shrink)

For Aristotle, prudence or practical wisdom is a virtue of thought that is practical rather than theoretical and deliberative rather than intuitive. It is the intellectual virtue that perfects reasoning in regard to decision making in the realm of human action. To have this virtue is to be good at thinking about how to live a fulfilled life as a whole, and to be successful in so doing. The prudent person is the only one who is truly just, courageous and (...) temperate, and the good person is truly good only if he is prudent. According to Aristotle, there is a fundamental connection between prudence and moral virtue. This connection depends on the pre-existence of certain natural qualities. Although Aristotle stresses the importance of prudence and the ethical life, he holds that the human person - endowed as he is with the divine element of reason - is capable of an even higher way of life. This is the life of contemplation, the life dedicated to the appreciation of truth, the life that is closest to the way of life of the gods. For St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle is the Philosopher. In treating of prudence, Aquinas follows Aristotle very closely especially in his Commentary on Aristotle’s 'Nicomachean Ethics He teaches that prudence is a virtue of the practical intellect that is related in a particularly close way to the moral virtues. In order to be morally good, a person needs the moral virtues, and these in turn need the judgment of prudence. Aquinas’s interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of prudence are more accurate than, and indeed represent improvements on, those advanced by other leading authorities ofh;s time, including St. Albert the Great in his Super Ethica. In ways that are significant, he changes and develops some of Aristotle’s teachings on prudence in both his Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics ’ and in some of his more theological works, e.g., his Summa Theologiae. For example, Aquinas holds that Aristotle’s conception of ultimate end or human flourishing - by Aristotle’s own statement - can only be realized in an imperfect way in this life. (shrink)