Alasdair MacIntyre's landmark book After Virtue, first published in 1981, begins with sobering words, the resonance of which has, in the three decades since then, been felt by many. We live in a wo...

This paper analyses the features of Kant’s view of memory, which Kant himself described explicitly in his lectures on anthropology and implicitly in the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. I shall offer a review of literature on Kant’s view of memory up to this day. I suggest that memory is a cognitive faculty that has the power to store and reproduce representations. Kant distinguishes among three different kinds of memorization which are relevant for human cognition. I offer (...) reasons to hold that imagination and memory must be differentiated by their functioning, although the first one grounds the second one. Finally, I hold that certain functions of memory need to be presupposed at a transcendental level, in which memory would play a fundamental function with regard to the possibility of experience. Resumen Este artículo analiza los rasgos de la concepción de la memoria de Kant, los cuales él describió explícitamente en sus lecciones sobre antropología e implícitamente en la edición A de la Crítica de la Razón Pura. Proporcionaré una revisión de la literatura sobre la concepción de Kant acerca de la memoria hasta el presente. Sugiero que la memoria es una facultad cognitiva que tiene el poder de almacenar y reproducir representaciones. Kant distingue tres tipos diferentes de memorización, los cuales son relevantes para el conocimiento humano. Asimismo, proporciono razones para sostener que la imaginación y la memoria deben ser diferenciadas por su funcionamiento, aunque la primera es el fundamento de la segunda. Finalmente, sostengo que ciertas funciones de la memoria necesitan ser presupuestas a un nivel trascendental, en el cual la memoria cumpliría una función fundamental con respecto a la posibilidad de la experiencia. (shrink)

Against the consensus that Heidegger reads his own philosophical views into Kant, I argue that Heidegger takes up the main question posed by the first Critique and attempts to identify Kant's best answer to it. Heidegger's method resembles those of Gadamer and Davidson. But by reading the first Critique as offering two conflicting strands of argument, he abandons their aim of maximizing truth, and his theory of error explains why Kant offers the less-promising strand. Heidegger thus provides a distinctive model (...) of charitable, reconstructive interpretation that avoids hermeneutic ventriloquism—a failure to recognize differences of view between interpreter and text. (shrink)

To what extent does the construction of any curriculum framework have to contain axiological assumptions? Educators have been made aware of tacit epistemological assumptions underlying existing curricular frameworks by the continual demands for their revision., ) suggested that curriculum policy should be centred around imagination; economic rationalists have suggested that it be made more functional and accountable than traditional university disciplines allow for. Is it possible, as ) suggests, to combine competing traditional ideologies of education in a complex postmodern pastiche (...) which can nonetheless provide standards of assessment and evaluation without presuming a grand narrative? ) suggests not. This paper examines the challenge of maintaining principled standards and recognising postmodern relativities, making particular reference to the notion of the sublime and the arts curriculum. (shrink)