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Ramsey's Legacy

Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2005)

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  1. Smile When You’Re Winning: How to Become a Cambridge Pragmatist.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2017 - In Sheryl Misak Huw Price (ed.), The Practical Turn: Pragmatism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century. British Academy.
    The aim of this paper is to trace the development of a particular current of thought known under the label ‘pragmatism’ in the last part of the Twentieth century and the beginning of the Twenty-first. I address three questions about this current of thought. First, what is its actual historical development? Second, does it constitute a single, coherent, philosophical outlook? Third, in what form, if any, does it constitute an attractive philosophical outlook. In the course of addressing these questions I (...)
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  • The Particular–Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?Fraser MacBride - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):565-614.
    Is the assumption of a fundamental distinction between particulars and universals another unsupported dogma of metaphysics? F. P. Ramsey famously rejected the particular – universal distinction but neglected to consider the many different conceptions of the distinction that have been advanced. As a contribution to the piecemeal investigation of this issue three interrelated conceptions of the particular – universal distinction are examined: universals, by contrast to particulars, are unigrade; particulars are related to universals by an asymmetric tie of exemplification; universals (...)
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  • Davidson on Value and Objectivity.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (2):203–217.
    According to one version of objectivism about value, ethical and other evaluative claims have a fixed truth-value independently of who makes them or the society in which they happen to live (c.f. Davidson 2004, 42). Subjectivists about value deny this claim. According to subjectivism so understood, ethical and other evaluative claims have no fixed truth-value, either because their truth-value is dependent on who makes them, or because they have no truth-value at all.
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  • On the Interpretation of Decision Theory.Samir Okasha - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-25.
  • Substitution in a Sense.Robert Trueman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3069-3098.
    The Reference Principle states that co-referring expressions are everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. On first glance, looks like a truism, but a truism with some bite: transforms difficult philosophical questions about co-reference into easy grammatical questions about substitutability. This has led a number of philosophers to think that we can use to make short work of certain longstanding metaphysical debates. For example, it has been suggested that all we need to do to show that the predicate ‘ is a horse’ does (...)
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