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  1. How apes get into and out of joint actions.Emilie Genty, Raphaela Heesen, Jean-Pascal Guéry, Federico Rossano, Klaus Zuberbühler & Adrian Bangerter - 2020 - Interaction Studies 21 (3):353-386.
    Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others (Clark, 2006; Grice, 1975), which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and to be unique to humans (Tomasello, 2014). The theoretical and empirical bases for (...)
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  • How apes get into and out of joint actions : Shared intentionality as an interactional achievement.Emilie Genty, Raphaela Heesen, Jean-Pascal Guéry, Federico Rossano, Klaus Zuberbühler & Adrian Bangerter - 2020 - Interaction Studies 21 (3):353-386.
    Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others (Clark, 2006; Grice, 1975), which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and to be unique to humans (Tomasello, 2014). The theoretical and empirical bases for (...)
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  • Sequence organization and timing of bonobo mother-infant interactions.Federico Rossano - 2013 - Interaction Studies 14 (2):160-189.
    In recent years, some scholars have claimed that humans are unique in their capacity and motivation to engage in cooperative communication and extensive, fast-paced social interactions. While research on gestural communication in great apes has offered important findings concerning the gestural repertoires of different species, very little is known about the sequential organization of primates’ communicative behavior during interactions. Drawing on a conversation analytic framework, this paper addresses this gap by investigating the sequential organization of bonobo mother-infant interactions, and more (...)
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  • Playful expressions of one-year-old chimpanzee infants in social and solitary play contexts.Kirsty M. Ross, Kim A. Bard & Tetsuro Matsuzawa - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • ‘Unwilling’ versus ‘unable’: Do grey parrots understand human intentional actions?Franck Péron, Lauriane Rat-Fischer, Laurent Nagle & Dalila Bovet - 2010 - Interaction Studies 11 (3):428-441.
  • Chimpanzees are mindreaders: On why they attribute seeing rather than sensing.Robert Lurz & Vincent Andreassi - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (6):814-841.
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  • There Is No Special Problem of Mindreading in Nonhuman Animals.Marta Halina - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (3):473-490.
    There is currently a consensus among comparative psychologists that nonhuman animals are capable of some forms of mindreading. Several philosophers and psychologists have criticized this consensus, however, arguing that there is a “logical problem” with the experimental approach used to test for mindreading in nonhuman animals. I argue that the logical problem is no more than a version of the general skeptical problem known as the theoretician’s dilemma. As such, it is not a problem that comparative psychologists must solve before (...)
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  • Contrasting the Social Cognition of Humans and Nonhuman Apes: The Shared Intentionality Hypothesis.Josep Call - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2):368-379.
  • Meaning and Ostension in Great Ape Gestural Communication.Richard Moore - 2016 - Animal Cognition 19 (1):223-231.
    It is sometimes argued that while human gestures are produced ostensively and intentionally, great ape gestures are produced only intentionally. If true, this would make the psychological mechanisms underlying the different species’ communication fundamentally different, and ascriptions of meaning to chimpanzee gestures would be inappropriate. While the existence of different underlying mechanisms cannot be ruled out, in fact claims about difference are driven less by empirical data than by contested assumptions about the nature of ostensive communication. On some accounts, there (...)
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  • Communicative Signaling, Lateralization and Brain Substrate in Nonhuman Primates: Toward a Gestural or a Multimodal Origin of Language?Adrien Meguerditchian & Jacques Vauclair - 2014 - Humana Mente 7 (27).
    Language is a complex intentional, syntactical and referential system involving a left-hemispheric specialization of the brain in which some cerebral regions such as Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas play a key-role. Because nonhuman primates are phylogenetically close to humans, research on our primate cousins might help providing clues for reconstructing the features of our ancestral communicative systems. In the present paper, after emphasising the tight relation between gestures and language in humans, we underlie the specific significance of communicative gestures and of (...)
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