Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

Meta-analytic results show that board gender diversity is modestly associated with firm performance, but there is notable heterogeneity among findings. Board gender diversity allows access to women’s perspectives, potentially helping boards, but diversity can also trigger biases that exclude women directors, such that boards do not integrate meaningful perspectives. Addressing this problem, we leverage the categorization-elaboration model, contact theory, and critical mass theory to build new theory as to how men directors can serve as allies to women directors to better (...) leverage diverse perspectives. We empirically test how considerations that reduce out-group categorization and bias against women moderate the board gender diversity-firm performance relationship. Our results show that gender diverse boards perform better with more formal contact among men and women director colleagues, and that gender diverse boards with more men directors who only have prior experience working with token-women, perform worse. Our work helps explain how and why board gender diversity can improve or detract from firm performance. This extends the literature by illustrating the important consequences that occur when firms do (or do not) have men directors who are likely to be allies of gender diversity. (shrink)

After the approval of a code of ethics, the creation of a permanent board‐level ethics committee is the next step in the institutionalization of business ethics. This study explores how the board's structure and demographic characteristics explain the decision to form an ethics committee. The analysis is based on the constituents of the Standard and Poor's Europe 350 index. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that ethics committees are more likely to be found in firms with a lower presence of (...) executive directors and of directors holding MBA degrees. However, we also observe that boards chaired by executive directors seem to favor the creation of an ethics committee. Additionally, as we had anticipated, firms with stronger agency conflicts seem to be more willing to create committees. The analysis conducted with segmented samples reveals that the model has greater explanatory power when applied to firms from common‐law and French civil‐law countries than when applied to firms from the German–Scandinavian civil‐law area. Finally, our results indicate that a firm's country of origin is a more influential factor in explaining the decision to create an ethics committee than the industry to which it belongs or even the magnitude of its agency conflicts. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.