This paper offers an interpretation of Plato's Cratylus 427d1-431c3 that supports a reading of the dialogue as a whole as concluding in favour of a conventionalist account of naming. While many previous interpretations note the value of this passage as evidence for Platonic investigations of false propositions, this paper argues that its demonstration that there can be false (or incorrect) naming in turn refutes the naturalist account of naming; that is, it shows that a natural relation between name and nominatum (...) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for reference. Socrates secures this outcome by using demonstratives and their concomitants to show how any putative natural imitative link between name and object may be overridden. Furthermore, Socrates' employment of demonstratives and context-dependent statements in his case-studies of false naming speaks in favour of a reading of this passage as primarily focussing on naming rather than on propositions in general. (shrink)

Pretendemos mostrar que, no Górgias, diálogo dedicado à crítica da retórica, as frequentes alusões de Sócrates à compleição do corpo, bem como o uso recorrente de metáforas corpóreas para referir-se ao que, por analogia, passa-se com a alma servem de ferramenta retórica para fazer frente à retórica de Górgias. Desse modo, ao mesmo tempo em que chamamos atenção para a maneira como Platão se vale das armas do adversário justamente para atacá-lo, ressaltamos o papel imprescindível do corpo como evidência da (...) alma na filosofia platônica. Com isto, nosso intuito é reforçar a vertente interpretativa segundo a qual Platão pode ser entendido mais como um pensador que parte dos problemas prementes de seu tempo para daí nos conduzir a reflexões filosóficas – no diálogo em questão, as consequências políticas de uma paidéia pautada numa retórica sofística –, do que como um filósofo comprometido apenas com uma metafísica transcendente. (shrink)

The photograph of Ai Weiwei’s middle finger set against the backdrop of Tiananmen Square has become an icon of politically subversive art. But can we see beyond the middle finger? Here I argue that current theories of political aesthetics operate on an oversimplified dichotomy between two competing paradigms of political art, and that this threatens a more nuanced engagement with contemporary artistic practices. In the first part, I re-examine both the antagonistic relation between art and politics exemplified in Plato's verdict (...) against poetry as a socially corrosive form of imitation as well as the instrumental relation of art and politics developed in Friedrich Schiller’s conception of aesthetic education as a means of social and political reform. Then, drawing on recent work by the controversial Chinese artist, I argue for a model of political art that can account for the more complex interrelation of criticism and cultural affirmation evident in a growing body of politically-oriented art. (shrink)

The question, what measures to address the shortage of transplantable organs are ethically permissible? requires careful attention because, apart from its impact on medical practice, the stance we espouse here reflects our interpretations of human freedom and mortality. To raise the number of available organs, on utilitarian grounds, bioethicists and medical professionals increasingly support mandatory procurement. This view is at odds with the Catechism of the Catholic Church, according to which ‘[o]rgan donation after death is a noble and meritorious act’ (...) but ethically impermissible absent consent. Those who concur with this position, but would oppose conscription on independent philosophical grounds, have not yet found a voice in the Western tradition comparable in strength to the utilitarian basis of the policy’s support, for Kantian and Aristotelian ethics, too, lend themselves to a requirement that we make our organs available to others when they can no longer serve ourselves. One finds an ethical wedge against conscription in an unexpected philosophical locale: the ‘fundamental ontology’ of Heidegger’s Being and Time, where pertinent individual choices arc protectively over what happens post mortem. Heidegger’s perspective on this issue thus meshes, not with other philosophical voices, but with Catholic doctrine—a surprising convergence of atheistic and theistic approaches to our flourishing whose ground I address in the article’s conclusion. (shrink)