Accurate perception of the emotional signals conveyed by others is crucial for successful social interaction. Such perception is influenced not only by sensory input, but also by knowledge we have about the others’ emotions. This study addresses the issue of whether knowing that the other’s emotional state is congruent or incongruent with their displayed emotional expression (“genuine” and “fake”, respectively) affects the neural mechanisms underpinning the perception of their facial emotional expressions. We used a visual adaptation paradigm to investigate this (...) question in three experiments employing increasing adaptation durations. The adapting stimuli consisted of photographs of emotional facial expressions of joy and anger, purported to reflect (in-)congruency between felt and expressed emotion, displayed by professional actors. A Validity checking procedure ensured participants had the correct knowledge about the (in-)congruency. Significantly smaller adaptation aftereffects were obtained when participants knew that the displayed expression was incongruent with the felt emotion, following all tested adaptation periods. This study shows that knowledge relating to the congruency between felt and expressed emotion modulates face expression aftereffects. We argue that this reflects that the neural substrate responsible for the perception of facial expressions of emotion incorporates the presumed felt emotion underpinning the expression. (shrink)

We posit a model of emotion and nonverbal behavior (NVB) that incorporates a perspective of consciousness. We leverage an understanding of the neural pathways innervating NVB to describe the complexity of its neural architecture and the links between those pathways and mental states. We suggest that all NVB are activated by both cortical and subcortical structures, allowing for unconscious, coordinated movements across multiple channels as well as conscious, less coordinated movements; that mental states are associated with both cortical and subcortical (...) structures; and thus that NVB will occur in multiple channels, both unconsciously and consciously, and differ across time. We discuss the implications of this model for future theory and research. (shrink)

In many evolutionary/functionalist theories, emotions organize the activity of the autonomic nervous system and other physiological systems. Two kinds of patterned activity are discussed: coherence, and specificity. For each kind of patterning, significant methodological obstacles are considered that need to be overcome before empirical studies can adequately test theories and resolve controversies. Finally, links that coherence and specificity have with health and well-being are considered.

Functional theories posit that emotions are elicited by particular goal-related situations that represented adaptive problems and that emotions are evolved features of coordinated responses to those situations. Yet little theory or research has addressed the evolutionary aspects of these theories. We apply five criteria that can be used to judge whether features are adaptations. There is evidence that sadness, anger, and anxiety relate to unique changes in physiology, cognition, and behavior, those changes are correlated, situations that give rise to emotions (...) are consistent, and emotions are complex. To date, there is little experimental evidence regarding whether discrete emotions resolve adaptive problems and do so relatively efficiently. Evidence supporting all criteria is required to claim that discrete emotions are evolved features. (shrink)

Achieving a high quality of life is dependent upon how individuals face adversity. Positive psychological interventions are well-suited to support coping efforts; however, experimental research is limited. The purpose of the current research was to examine whether different savoring interventions could increase important coping resources in response to a social-evaluative hassle. We completed an experimental mixed subject design study with a university student sample. All participants completed a hassle induction task and were then randomly assigned into different intervention groups. Positive (...) emotion ratings were collected at three points in time. Results revealed a significant time x intervention interaction effect, such that individuals in the savoring the moment intervention reported higher levels of positive emotions compared to individuals assigned to the true control group, guided imagery control group, and savoring through reminiscence intervention. Such findings represent a significant extension to savoring theory and offer support for savoring the moment exercises as a primary prevention strategy to bolster effective responses to social-evaluative hassles. (shrink)

In certain startling neurological and psychiatric conditions, what is ordinarily most intimate and familiar to us—our own body—can feel alien. For instance, in cases of somatoparaphrenia subjects misattribute their body parts to others, while in cases of depersonalization subjects feel estranged from their bodies. These ownership disorders thus appear to consist in a loss of any feeling of bodily ownership, the felt sense we have of our bodies as our own. Against this interpretation of ownership disorders, I defend Sufficiency, the (...) thesis that every experience of bodily awareness suffices for a feeling of bodily ownership. Since Sufficiency conflicts with a face‐value interpretation of these ownership disorders, the burden is on me to explain away the apparent tension. To do so, I identify and correct what I believe to be the fundamental mistake in the extant literature on the feeling of bodily ownership, namely the tendency to treat the notion of a feeling of bodily ownership as a single psychological construct. Instead, I distinguish the feeling of minimal ownership, the first‐personal character of bodily awareness, from the feeling of affective ownership, the distinctive type of felt concern we have for our bodies. I motivate this distinction by raising the disownership puzzle, the fact that subjects suffering from ownership disorders display an ambiguous set of symptoms, arguing the distinction I draw between minimal and affective ownership is just what is required to resolve the puzzle. (shrink)

The undoing hypothesis proposes that positive emotions serve to undo sympathetic arousal related to negative emotions and stress. However, a recent qualitative review challenged the undoing effect by presenting conflicting results. To address this issue quantitatively, we conducted a meta-analytic review of 16 studies ( N = 1,220; 72 effect sizes) measuring sympathetic recovery during elicited positive emotions and neutral conditions. Findings indicated that in most cases, positive emotions did not speed sympathetic recovery compared to neutral conditions. However, when a (...) composite index of cardiovascular reactivity was used, undoing effects were evident. Our findings suggest the need for further work on the functions of positive emotions. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 2, Page 132-160, April 2022. Autonomic nervous system activity is a fundamental component of emotional responding. It is not clear, however, whether positive emotional states are associated with differential ANS reactivity. To address this issue, we conducted a meta-analytic review of 120 articles, measuring ANS activity during 11 elicited positive emotions, namely amusement, attachment love, awe, contentment, craving, excitement, gratitude, joy, nurturant love, pride, and sexual desire. We identified a widely dispersed collection of studies. Univariate (...) results indicated that positive emotions produce no or weak and highly variable increases in ANS reactivity. However, the limitations of work to date – which we discuss – mean that our conclusions should be treated as empirically grounded hypotheses that future research should validate. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop an account of appreciation. I argue that appreciation is an epistemic emotion in which the subject grasps the object in an affective way. The “grasping” and “feeling” components implies that in appreciation, we make sense of the object by having cognitive control over it, are motivated to maintain the valuable epistemic state of understanding, and experience the “aha” or “eureka” moment. This account offers a unified account of the many types of appreciation, including the aesthetic, (...) the moral, and the epistemic. In all these cases, appreciation requires some other first-order emotions as prerequisite. (shrink)

Pain serves the protection of the body. Consequently, noxious stimuli or, more precisely, the thereby induced neurophysiological processes commonly lead to pain perception. Identical noxious stimuli, however, do not always translate into the same pain experience depending on multiple factors. To acknowledge this variability, the distinction between nociception as the neural process elicited by noxious stimuli and pain as subjective multifactorial experience is essential. During longer-lasting experimental pain and chronic pain, nociception and pain can substantially dissociate. Moreover, longer-lasting experimental pain (...) resembles chronic pain regarding certain perceptual features such as prolonged pain duration and intensity fluctuations. Thus, longer-lasting experimental pain offers the opportunity to gain new insights into both the differential neural representation of noxious stimuli and pain and the neuronal mechanisms associated with the state of longer- lasting pain. We applied 10 minutes of painful heat stimulation to the left and right hand of 39 healthy participants while we recorded continuous pain ratings, electroencephalography, and autonomic responses. Data were analyzed in three distinct projects aiming at different aspects of neuronal mechanisms underlying longer-lasting pain. Project 1 assessed whether stimulus intensity as proxy of nociception and pain intensity relate to distinct patterns of oscillatory brain activity. EEG recordings revealed that increases in stimulus intensity were reflected by suppressions of alpha and beta oscillations in sensorimotor areas contralateral to the stimulated hand. In contrast, increases in pain intensity were associated with enhanced gamma oscillations in the medial prefrontal cortex. More importantly, the encoding of stimulus intensity by alpha and beta oscillations in the sensorimotor areas was spatially specific, i.e. depended on the stimulus location, whereas the encoding of pain intensity by gamma oscillations in the medial prefrontal cortex was independent of stimulus location. Thus, prefrontal gamma oscillations might reflect higher- order aspects of noxious stimuli, such as salience, valence, and motivational aspects rather than precise sensory features. Project 2 investigated the relationship between stimulus intensity, pain intensity, autonomic responses, and brain activity. Skin conductance measures, as markers of sympathetic activity, co-varied more closely with stimulus intensity than with pain intensity. Correspondingly, skin conductance measures were related to suppressions of alpha and beta oscillations in the sensorimotor area contralateral to the stimulated hand. These finding suggest that skin conductance measures are in part directly elicited by nociceptive processes and, thus, at least partially independent of perceptual processes during longer-lasting pain. Hence, these observations corroborate concepts of pain in which sensory, motivational, and autonomic processes partially independently contribute to the experience of pain. Finally, project 3 incorporated the systematic and comprehensive assessment of oscillatory brain activity, functional connectivity, and graph- theory based network measures during the state of longer-lasting pain. Longer-lasting pain was associated with suppressions of oscillatory brain activity at alpha frequencies in addition to stronger connectivity at alpha and beta frequencies in sensorimotor areas. Furthermore, sensorimotor areas contralateral to stimulation showed increased connectivity to a common area in the medial prefrontal cortex at alpha frequencies and built a sensorimotor-prefrontal network during longer-lasting pain. This network might be involved in the integration of sensory, cognitive, and motivational-affective information and, consequently, in the translation of a noxious stimulus into a subjective pain experience. All three projects contribute to a better understanding of neuronal mechanisms underlying longer-lasting experimental pain, which serves as an experimental model for chronic pain. Since the treatment of chronic pain has remained insufficient and unsatisfactory, the current results might provide EEG-based targets for urgently needed new treatment approaches, such as non-invasive brain stimulation and neurofeedback. (shrink)