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  1. The Mathematical Roots Of Russell’s Naturalism And Behaviorism.James Levine - 2008 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4.
    Recently, there has been a growing awareness that Russell’s post–1918 writings call into question the sort of picture that Rorty presents of the relation of Russell’s philosophy to the views of subsequent figures such as the later Wittgenstein, Quine, and Sellars. As I will argue in this paper, those writings show that by the early 1920’s Russell himself was advocating views—including an anti-foundationalist naturalized epistemology, and a behaviorist–inspired account of what is involved in understanding language—that are more typically associated with (...)
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  • On the “Gray’s Elegy” Argument and its Bearing on Frege’s Theory of Sense.James Levine - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):251–295.
    In his recent book, "The Metaphysicians of Meaning" (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so-called "Gray's Elegy" argument (the GEA) in "On Denoting", Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege's theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege's theory than against Russell's own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects (...)
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  • Denoting Concepts and Ontology in Russell's Principles of Mathematics.Wouter Adriaan Cohen - 2022 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 10 (7).
    Bertrand Russell’s _Principles of Mathematics_ (1903) gives rise to several interpretational challenges, especially concerning the theory of denoting concepts. Only relatively recently, for instance, has it been properly realised that Russell accepted denoting concepts that do not denote anything. Such empty denoting concepts are sometimes thought to enable Russell, whether he was aware of it or not, to avoid commitment to some of the problematic non-existent entities he seems to accept, such as the Homeric gods and chimeras. In this paper, (...)
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  • The short long life of Russell’s denoting concepts.Sorin Costreie - 2005 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):97-113.
    The goal of this paper is to discuss Russell’s Theory of Denoting Concepts, mainly to see clearly why he adopted it and, especially, why he abandoned it. With regard to TDC, I detect three kinds of problems: ontological (the denotation of empty denoting concepts), logical (the infinite regress of meaning in the case of denoting concepts) and epistemological (the relation between denoting concepts and acquaintance). I will not consider here the first point, but only the last two. The chapter will (...)
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