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  1. Comprehension, Demonstration, and Accuracy in Aristotle.Breno Zuppolini - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (1):29-48.
    according to aristotle's posterior analytics, scientific expertise is composed of two different cognitive dispositions. Some propositions in the domain can be scientifically explained, which means that they are known by "demonstration", a deductive argument in which the premises are explanatory of the conclusion. Thus, the kind of cognition that apprehends those propositions is called "demonstrative knowledge".1 However, not all propositions in a scientific domain are demonstrable. Demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles, whose knowledge is called "comprehension".2 If the knowledge (...)
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  • Aristotle’s Critique of Plato’s Theory of Innate Knowledge.David Bronstein - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):126-139.
    In Posterior Analytics 2.19, Aristotle argues that we cannot have innate knowledge of first principles because if we did we would have the most precise items of knowledge without noticing, which is impossible. To understand Aristotle’s argument we need to understand why he thinks we cannot possess these items of knowledge without noticing. In this paper, I present three different answers to this question and three different readings of his argument corresponding to them. The first two readings focus on the (...)
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  • The Origin and Aim of Posterior Analytics II.19.David Bronstein - 2012 - Phronesis 57 (1):29-62.
    Abstract In Posterior Analytics II.19 Aristotle raises and answers the question, how do first principles become known? The usual view is that the question asks about the process or method by which we learn principles and that his answer is induction. I argue that the question asks about the original prior knowledge from which principles become known and that his answer is perception. Hence the aim of II.19 is not to explain how we get all the way to principles but (...)
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  • Scientifically Minded : Science, the Subject and Kant’s Critical Philosophy.Johan Boberg - unknown
    Modern philosophy is often seen as characterized by a shift of focus from the things themselves to our knowledge of them, i.e., by a turn to the subject and subjectivity. The philosophy of Immanuel Kant is seen as the site of the emergence of the idea of a subject that constitutes the object of knowledge, and thus plays a central role in this narrative. This study examines Kant’s theory of knowledge at the intersection between the history of science and the (...)
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  • Aristotle, Metaphysics Λ Introduction, Translation, Commentary A Speculative Sketch Devoid God.Erwin Sonderegger - manuscript
    The present text is the revised and corrected English translation of the book published in German by the Lang Verlag, Bern 2008. Unfortunately the text still has some minor flaws (especially in the Index Locorum) but they do not concern the main thesis or the arguments. It will still be the final version, especially considering my age. It is among the most widespread and the least questioned convictions that in Metaphysics Lambda Aristotle presents a theology which has its basis in (...)
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  • The Three Faces of the Cogito: Descartes (and Aristotle) on Knowledge of First Principles.Murray Miles - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (2):63-86.
    With the systematic aim of clarifying the phenomenon sometimes described as “the intellectual apprehension of first principles,” Descartes’ first principle par excellence is interpreted before the historical backcloth of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. To begin with, three “faces” of the cogito are distinguished: (1) the proto-cogito (“I think”), (2) the cogito proper (“I think, therefore I am”), and (3) the cogito principle (“Whatever thinks, is”). There follows a detailed (though inevitably somewhat conjectural) reconstruction of the transition of the mind from (1) (...)
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  • Conhecimento Prévio e Conhecimento Científico em Aristóteles.Carlos Alexandre Terra - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    Pretendemos averiguar como Aristóteles concebe a passagem do nosso conhecimento prévio do mundo ao conhecimento científico, avaliando os pressupostos e consequências de sua resposta ao paradoxo de Mênon e atentando para a metodologia científica defendida nos Segundos Analíticos. Quanto ao conhecimento preliminar necessário à edificação da ciência, procuraremos caracterizar seus tipos e também os meios pelos quais ele pode vir a ser adquirido por nós. Buscaremos estabelecer também as propriedades que o conhecimento científico deve possuir em relação à sua necessidade, (...)
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  • Ontological Underpinnings of Aristotle's Philosophy of Science.Breno A. Zuppolini - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Campinas, Brazil
  • O Problema da Apreensão dos Princípios no Livro II dos Segundos Analíticos de Aristóteles.Carlos Alexandre Terra - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    Our purpose is to study Aristotle?s solution, in the second book of the Posterior Analytics, for the problem of the apprehension of the principles of science. We attend to the relations between the concepts of induction (epagoge) and intelligence (nous) found in the chapter 19, which seems to confirm that the acquisition of the principles is reached by a process of empirical observation. We examine the method, proposed in chapters 13 to 17, for the right formulation of definitions, which seems (...)
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  • Indução e Ciência em Aristóteles.Tomás Roberto Troster - 2015 - Dissertation, University of São Paulo, Brazil
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  • Aristotle's Foundationalism.Breno Andrade Zuppolini - 2016 - Dissertatio 44:187-211.
    For Aristotle, demonstrative knowledge is the result of what he calls ‘intellectual learning’, a process in which the knowledge of a conclusion depends on previous knowledge of the premises. Since demonstrations are ultimately based on indemonstrable principles (the knowledge of which is called ‘νοῦς’), Aristotle is often described as advancing a foundationalist doctrine. Without disputing the nomenclature, I shall attempt to show that Aristotle’s ‘foundationalism’ should not be taken as a rationalist theory of epistemic justification, as if the first principles (...)
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  • Circular Justification and Explanation in Aristotle.Owen Goldin - 2013 - Phronesis 58 (3):195-214.
    Aristotle’s account of epistēmē is foundationalist. In contrast, the web of dialectical argumentation that constitutes justification for scientific principles is coherentist. Aristotle’s account of explanation is structurally parallel to the argument for a foundationalist account of justification. He accepts the first argument but his coherentist accounts of justification indicate that he would not accept the second. Where is the disanalogy? For Aristotle, the intelligibility of a demonstrative premise is the cause of the intelligibility of a demonstrated conclusion and causation is (...)
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  • Aristotle on Induction and First Principles.Marc Gasser-Wingate - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16:1-20.
    Aristotle's cognitive ideal is a form of understanding that requires a sophisticated grasp of scientific first principles. At the end of the Analytics, Aristotle tells us that we learn these principles by induction. But on the whole, commentators have found this an implausible claim: induction seems far too basic a process to yield the sort of knowledge Aristotle's account requires. In this paper I argue that this criticism is misguided. I defend a broader reading of Aristotelian induction, on which there's (...)
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  • Nous and Aisthēsis: Two Cognitive Faculties in Aristotle.Adriana Renero - 2013 - Méthexis:103-120.
    In disagreement with Claudia Baracchi’s controversial thesis that there is a “simultaneity and indissolubility” if not an “identity” of intelligence (nous) and perception (aisthēsis) at the core of Aristotle’s philosophy, I will argue that Aristotle maintains a fundamental distinction between these cognitive faculties. My goal in this paper is to examine specific parts of two central and complex passages, VI.8, 1142a12-30 and VI.11, 1143a33-b15, from the Nicomachean Ethics to show that Baracchi’s view is unpersuasive. I will show that Aristotle considers (...)
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  • Aristotle on Episteme and Nous: The Posterior Analytics.Murat Aydede - 1998 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):15-46.
    According to the standard and largely traditional interpretation, Aristotle’s conception of nous, at least as it occurs in the Posterior Analytics, is geared against a certain set of skeptical worries about the possibility of scientific knowledge, and ultimately of the knowledge of Aristotelian first principles. On this view, Aristotle introduces nous as an intuitive faculty that grasps the first principles once and for all as true in such a way that it does not leave any room for the skeptic to (...)
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  • Essence and Necessity, and the Aristotelian Modal Syllogistic: A Historical and Analytical Study.Daniel James Vecchio - unknown
    The following is a critical and historical account of Aristotelian Essentialism informed by recent work on Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. The semantics of the modal syllogistic are interpreted in a way that is motivated by Aristotle, and also make his validity claims in the Prior Analytics consistent to a higher degree than previously developed interpretative models. In Chapter One, ancient and contemporary objections to the Aristotelian modal syllogistic are discussed. A resolution to apparent inconsistencies in Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is proposed and (...)
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  • O problema do conhecimento dos primeiros princípios em Aristóteles: indução, inteligência, dialética e diaporemática.Carolina Muranaka Saliba Barreto - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    Essa dissertação de mestrado cuida do problema do conhecimento dos primeiros princípios em Aristóteles, mais precisamente, das vias de acesso adequadas a provê-lo. Dada a primordialidade de um tal conhecimento, erige-se a questão de método: por qual via estaria garantido o acesso àquilo que constitui todo o fundamento e “razão para” do edifício do conhecimento filosófico e científico? Aristóteles, nos Segundos Analíticos, atribui à indução (epagoge) e à inteligência (nous) este papel, mas nos Tópicos o filósofo menciona que a dialética (...)
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  • V Katerem Pomenu Je Mišljenje »Resničnejše« Kot Znanstveno Vedenje? Težavna Primerjava V Aristotelovi An. Post. II 19.Matteo Cosci - 2016 - Filozofski Vestnik 37 (3).
    Aristotel na samem zaključku Druge analitike zapiše: »nič ne more biti skladno z resnico bolj od znanstvenega razumevanja, razen mišljenja «. Ta trditev bi lahko bila problematična, če upoštevamo aristotelsko načelo izključenega tretjega, ki pravi, da med resnico in zmoto ne obstajajo vmesne stopnje. Dejansko Aristotelova logika ne pušča prostora za naraščajoče resnice, tako da je treba to domnevno višjo resnico razumeti na bolj posreden način. Po kritični obravnavi nekaj zadevne literature bo pomen Aristotelovega izraza alēthésteron razumljen na naslednje načine: (...)
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  • Axiomatización, demostración y análisis en Acerca del Cielo.Manuel Berrón - 2012 - Signos Filosóficos 14 (27):9-42.
    Examino Acerca del cielo (De caelo) I 2 con el fin de mostrar allí la presencia de la demostración científica. Este desarrollo pretende aportar nueva evidencia en favor de la no discrepancia entre teoría y praxis científica en Aristóteles (Barnes, 1969) y de relativizar la interpretación de que el método real y únicamente usado es la dialéctica (cuyo antecedente se remonta a Owen, 1980). Además, siguiendo la propuesta hermenéutica de Gotthelf (1987) y Detel (1993 y 1997), mostraré de qué modo (...)
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  • Galileo's Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress.N. Jardine - 1976 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 7 (4):277.
  • Comments on Tuominen,'Back to Posterior Analytics II 19: Aristotle on the Knowledge of Principles'.J. H. Lesher - 2010 - Apeiron 43 (2-3):145-154.