- Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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Rhesus monkeys are radical behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.details
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Experiencia y cuerpo animado en el espectro autista. Evaluando los alcances y límites del DSM-5.Andrés Felipe Villamil Lozano - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3):137-156.details
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Experiencia y cuerpo animado en el espectro autista. Evaluando los alcances y límites del DSM-5.Andrés Felipe Villamil Lozano - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3):137-156.details
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The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
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Development of social emotions and constructive agents.Aaron Ben Ze'ev & Keith Oatley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):124-125.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.details
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Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
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The pretense debate.Stephen Stich & Joshua Tarzia - 2015 - Cognition 143:1-12.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
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Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.details
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Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.details
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Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.details
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Disenshrining the Cartesian self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.details
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On leaving your children wrapped in thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.details
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Solving belief problems: toward a task analysis.Daniel Roth & Alan M. Leslie - 1998 - Cognition 66 (1):1-31.details
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Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.details
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Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.details
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Omitting the second person in social understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.details
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Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.details
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Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.details
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Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.details
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Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.details
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Ontogeny, evolution, and folk psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.details
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First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.details
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A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.details
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Social relations and understanding the intentional self.Annerieke Oosterwegel - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):136-136.details
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Understanding that looking causes knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135-135.details
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The role of concepts in perception and inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.details
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Developmental evidence and introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.details
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Four-year-old humans are different: Why?Katherine Nelson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134-135.details
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Mismatching categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.details
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Heuristics and counterfactual self-knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.details
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But what is the intentional schema?Adam Morton - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-134.details
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Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.details
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Self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and kinesthetic-visual matching.Robert W. Mitchell - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-133.details
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Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.details
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The fallibility of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.details
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Functionalism can explain self-ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.details
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Three inferential temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.details
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Pretending and believing: issues in the theory of ToMM.Alan M. Leslie - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):211-238.details
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Domain specificity in conceptual development: Neuropsychological evidence from autism.Alan M. Leslie & Laila Thaiss - 1992 - Cognition 43 (3):225-251.details
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Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.details
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Does the autistic child have a metarepresentational deficit?Susan R. Leekam & Josef Perner - 1991 - Cognition 40 (3):203-218.details
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