The following paper analyzes some epistemological categories from anthropological problem of understanding a “strange” form of life. To do this, it is taken the philosophical social program of Peter Winch and in particular his critique of classic anthropology “Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande” by Evans-Pritchard. Winch, following Wittgenstein, represents a true paradigm shift within the analytic tradition of social science, which shows some similarities with hermeneutics, philosophy and intercultural ethics and pragmatism. In this context, the problem of the (...) multiplicity of forms of life and the respective “commensurability” of standards of rationality it is taken. In response to the charge of “relativism” from his theoretical proposal, it can be said that there are two categories of anthropological and social analysis that would allow or that would guide intercultural understanding: formal analogies and limiting notions. Finally, these categories are contrasted with the perspective of Karl-Otto Apel. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is twofold. Firstly, it aims to study the problems arising from the notion of rule proposed by Peter Winch in The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy to account for all meaningful behavior. On the one hand, it will analyze the problems in the argument posed by Winch in order to state that all meaningful behavior is governed by rules. On the other hand, it will focus on the problems concerning (...) his conception of rules and rule-following, with specific emphasis on pointing out the issues that arise from the criterion posed by Winch in order to determine when a rule is being followed. Secondly, it aims to reassess Winch’s proposal and reformulate, accommodate and define his notion of rule in an intentional account of meaningful behavior, thus solving the problems presented. In addition, it will provide a criterion that allows to determine when a rule is being followed. (shrink)