A growing body of work in free speech theory is interested in the nature of counterspeech, i.e. speech that aims to counteract the effects of harmful speech. Counterspeech is usually defined in opposition to legal responses to harmful speech, which try to prevent such speech from occurring in the first place. In this paper we challenge this way of carving up the conceptual terrain. Instead, we argue that our main classificatory division, in theorising responses to harmful speech, should be between (...) pro-discursive and anti-discursive responses. Some legal responses to harmful speech, so we argue, make a positive discursive contribution in their own right. That is, legal restrictions on harmful speech can have a function that is importantly similar to speech that aims at countering the effects of harmful speech. (shrink)

In May, 2016 the Diet passed a law on the “Promotion of efforts to eliminate unfair discriminatory speech and behaviour against people originating from outside Japan”, widely referred to as ヘイトスピーチ法 (_Heito Supiichi Hō_ /Hate Speech Law). For some residents of Japan it had been a long time coming. Without any laws specifically prohibiting racially discriminatory speech or writing, aggrieved parties had hitherto been forced to resort to indirect lines of protection. In 1999, for example, a Brazilian national ejected from (...) a jewelry shop displaying a poster saying “No foreigners allowed” obtained a favourable ruling citing Japan’s ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and in 2013 an injunction for defamation and obstruction of business was granted on behalf of a school for children of North Korean descent repeatedly subjected to provocative demonstrations. But others questioned the need to reinforce limits on freedom of expression even in the face of aggressive taunts, with some claiming that incidents of racial discrimination in Japan lacked the historical, entrenched and violent dimensions that had prompted hate speech laws in Europe and elsewhere. When the text of the proposed law became public there was also debate about its utility as such an abstract measure seemed inapplicable to many potential victims and lacked punitive sanctions. Against this criticism it could be argued that the law went about as far as the government could expect to go if it were to get it passed; that it appears to be curtailing a particularly aggressive form of hate speech; and that it has ushered in a number of more specific initiatives, especially at local level. This study will begin with the 2016 text itself, drawing on the semiotic framework of Systemic Functional Grammar to explore how it prioritises general principles over specific regulations. This textual analysis will be followed by a contextual account of why the Law was constructed as it was, how it has influenced awareness of hate speech, and where it fits in with an existing genre of non-coercive legislation in Japan. (shrink)

Our time is marked by a resurgence of hate that threatens to increase oppression. Social media has contributed to this by acting as a medium through which hate speech is spread. How should we model the spread of hate? This article considers two models. First, I consider a simple contagion model. In this model, hate spreads like a virus through a social network. This model, however, fails to capture the fact that people do not acquire hatred from a single infectious (...) contact. Instead, it builds up in a person's beliefs and attitudes through time until the infection reaches a level where the subject themselves becomes a generator of hate speech. Second, to accommodate this, I consider an alternative model known as complex contagion. I argue that not only is a complex contagion model more explanatory and predictive, but it can be used to explain why certain features of social media cause it to be a promoter of hate. I conclude by sketching some mitigation strategies. (shrink)

One way to silence the powerless, Langton has taught us, is to pre-emptively disable their ability to do things with words. In this paper I argue that speakers can be silenced in a different way. You can let them speak, and obscure the meaning of their words afterwards. My aim is to investigate this form of silencing, that I call retroactive distortion. In a retroactive distortion, the meaning of the words of a speaker is distorted by the effect of a (...) subsequent speech act by a different speaker. After introducing this notion, I explore some reasons why retroactive distortions can be difficult to challenge and argue that, besides constituting a communicative injustice, they can eliminate topics from public consideration and therefore erode public debate. (shrink)

According to the influential “expressive” argument for hate speech laws, legal restrictions on hate speech are justified, in significant part, because they powerfully express opposition to hate speech. Yet the expressive argument faces a challenge: why couldn't we communicate opposition to hate speech via counterspeech, rather than bans? I argue that the expressive argument cannot address this challenge satisfactorily. Specifically, I examine three considerations that purport to explain bans’ expressive distinctiveness: considerations of strength; considerations of directness; and considerations of complicity. (...) These considerations either fail to establish that bans are expressively superior to counterspeech, or presuppose that bans successfully deter hate speech. This result severely undercuts the expressive argument's appeal. First, contrary to what its proponents suggest, this argument fails to circumvent the protracted empirical controversies surrounding bans’ effectiveness as deterrents. Second, the expressive argument appears redundant, because bans are expressively distinctive only insofar as hate speech is already suppressed. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

This article surveys the classic and contemporary literature on the nature and limits of freedom of expression (or free speech). It begins by surveying the main philosophical justifications for free speech, before moving to consider the two most discussed topics in the free speech literature: hate speech and pornography. The article offers some brief reflections on the large number of arguments which have been offered on these topics. Three newer battlegrounds for free speech are examined at the end: no platforming, (...) fake news and online shaming. (shrink)