Holography is a fruitful concept in modern physics. However, there is no generally accepted definition of the term, and its significance, especially as a guiding principle in quantum gravity, is rather uncertain. The present paper critically evaluates variants of the holographic principle from two perspectives: their relevance in contemporary approaches to quantum gravity and in closely related areas; their historical forerunners in the early twentieth century and the role played by past and present concepts of holography in attempts to unify (...) physics. By combining these two perspectives a certain depth of focus is gained which allows us to draw some tentative conclusions about what might be reasonable aspirations and prospects for holography in quantum gravity. By the same token, we will have a brief and critical look at wider philosophical interpretations of the term. (shrink)

We commonly think of presumptions as second-best inferential tools allowing us to reach conclusions, if we must, under conditions of limited information. Scholarship on the topic across the disciplines has espoused a common conception of presumptions that defines them according to their function within the decisionmaking process. This focus on the “private” face of presumptions has generated a predominantly critical and grudging view of them, perpetuated certain conceptual ambiguities, and, most important, neglected the fact that what we refer to as (...) “presumptions” have distinguishing features other than the defeasibility and burden-shifting effects associated with their use as inferential tools. When a decisionmaker gives reasons for a conclusion, the decisionmaker often cites a presumption among the reasons for that conclusion; in this guise – their “public” face – presumptions display different, and uniquely valuable, features that remain hidden if we understand them only as aids to inference. This essay both surveys recent approaches to the critical analysis of presumptions in law, philosophy, and discourse studies, and offers an account of how we might begin to think about this other, public face of presumptions. (shrink)

Electronic publications are not accessible without technical aids and need constant, time consuming attention; a look back at the data media and data formats utilized in the past 25 years illustrates this. Recently, an increasing number of conferences and studies address the problem. Use of standard data formats, media and platform independence of data, as well as data centering instead of process centering are requirements for long-term availability. For the humanities, texts are not only the sources of information but also (...) objects of scholarly investigation. Therefore publication in a presentation format only is not sufficient. In addition to more sophisticated tools for analysis, search and navigation, a form of publication is required which does not focus on layout but gives easy access to the content and structure of the published document. Both for the creation and the scholarly evaluation of such documents, tools are required which offer additional functions compared to those provided by commercial publication and access tools. The necessary flexibility is guaranteed by the provision of basic functions of text data processing which do not anticipate or preclude any particular questions. This is illustrated by examples for the evaluation and preparation of digital texts. (shrink)

The paper examines three essays that Leibniz wrote in 1688, immediately after the composition of the Discourse on Metaphysics, one of his most organic philosophical works. The main topics which emerge from these essays are: the relationship between substance and accidents; the nature of accidents; and, more generally, the nature of abstract entities. Given that accidents' nature is that of changing, Leibniz sees how hard it is to give an account of the relationship between substance and accidents that does not (...) imply any change in the substance, when its accidents undergo a change. To find a way out of this problem, Leibniz assumes that abstract terms (whiteness, wisdom, etc.) do not name real properties or real parts of substances, and that any sentence containing real abstract terms can be rephrased as a sentence containing logical abstract terms, which do no imply any commitment to the existence of real properties. Coherently with this nominalistic attitude, Leibniz ends up, in the Theodicy and in his correspondence with Des Bosses, considering accidents as modes or internal modifications of the substance. (shrink)

In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor” ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that (...) the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more “recherché” thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment I will argue that Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments. For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make any such conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute application. (Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’, 1930/1959, p. 54). (shrink)