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Games theory and philosophical disagreements.J. Wayne Smith - 1983 - Philosophical Papers 12 (2):12-27.details
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Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science.Vincenzo Crupi & Stephan Hartmann - 2009 - In Friedrich Stadler et al (ed.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 87--98.details
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Social network structure and the achievement of consensus.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2012 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (1):26-44.details
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Modeling the social consequences of testimonial norms.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2371-2383.details
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Network Epistemology: Communication in Epistemic Communities.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (1):15-27.details
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The epistemic significance of consensus.Aviezer Tucker - 2003 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):501 – 521.details
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The Current Status of the Philosophy of Biology.Peter Takacs & Michael Ruse - 2013 - Science & Education 22 (1):5-48.details
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Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):17-45.details
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Computational modeling in philosophy: introduction to a topical collection.Simon Scheller, Christoph Merdes & Stephan Hartmann - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-10.details
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All agreed: Aumann meets DeGroot.Jan-Willem Romeijn & Olivier Roy - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):41-60.details
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Radical Pooling and Imprecise Probabilities.Ignacio Ojea Quintana - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-28.details
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Social aspects of scientific knowledge.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):447-468.details
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When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared knowledge from mere agreement.Boaz Miller - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.details
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Strategy and the pursuit of truth.Christoph Merdes - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):117-138.details
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Reliability of testimonial norms in scientific communities.Conor Mayo-Wilson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (1):55-78.details
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The language of taste.Keith Lehrer & Adrienne Lehrer - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (6):752-765.details
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Personal and social knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):87 - 107.details
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Arational belief convergence.Charles Lassiter - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6329-6350.details
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Deliberation and disagreement: Problem solving, prediction, and positive dissensus.Hélène Landemore & Scott E. Page - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (3):229-254.details
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Deliberative Exchange, Truth, and Cognitive Division of Labour: A Low-Resolution Modeling Approach.Ulrich Krause & Rainer Hegselmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):130-144.details
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Institutional virtue: how consensus matters.Anita Konzelmann Ziv - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):87-96.details
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Modelling individual expertise in group judgements.Dominik Klein & Jan Sprenger - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (1):3-25.details
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Des préférences individuelles aux préférences collectives: ambiguïtés du concept de préférence dans le contexte des théories du choix collectif.J. Nicolas Kaufmann - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (1):53-.details
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A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement.Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.details
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The philosophical scandal of the wrong kind of religious disagreement.Peter Forrest - 2009 - Sophia 48 (2):151-166.details
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What is the “Equal Weight View'?Branden Fitelson & David Jehle - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):280-293.details
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Goldman and the foundations of social epistemology.J. Angelo Corlett - 1994 - Argumentation 8 (2):145-156.details
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When experts disagree.David Coady - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):68-79.details
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Support for Geometric Pooling.Jean Baccelli & Rush T. Stewart - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (1):298-337.details
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Jury Theorems for Peer Review.Marcus Arvan, Liam Kofi Bright & Remco Heesen - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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The Epistemology of Disagreement: Why Not Bayesianism?Thomas Mulligan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):587-602.details
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