Recent progress in neurosciences has improved our understanding of chronic disorders of consciousness. One example of this advancement is the emergence of the new diagnostic category of minimally conscious state (MCS). The central characteristic of MCS is impaired consciousness. Though the phenomenon now referred to as MCS pre-existed its inclusion in diagnostic classifications, the current medical ethical concepts mainly apply to patients with normal consciousness and to non-conscious patients. Accordingly, how we morally should stand with persons in minimally conscious state (...) remains unclear. In this paper, I examine whether the notion of human dignity could provide us with guidance with the moral difficulties MCS gives rise to. More precisely, I focus on the question of whether we are justified in holding that persons in minimally conscious state possess human dignity. (shrink)

In this article, I present a new interpretation of the pro-life view on the status of early human embryos. In my understanding, this position is based not on presumptions about the ontological status of embryos and their developmental capabilities but on the specific criteria of rational decisions under uncertainty and on a cautious response to the ambiguous status of embryos. This view, which uses the decision theory model of moral reasoning, promises to reconcile the uncertainty about the ontological status of (...) embryos with the certainty about normative obligations. I will demonstrate that my interpretation of the pro-life view, although seeming to be stronger than the standard one, has limited scope and cannot be used to limit destructive research on human embryos. (shrink)

Confronted with an article defending conclusions that many people judge problematic, philosophers are interested, first of all, in clarifying exactly what arguments are being offered for the views in question, and then, second, in carefully and dispassionately examining those arguments, to determine whether or not they are sound. As a philosopher, then, that is how I would naturally approach the article ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’, by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva. Very few philosophical publications, however, have evoked (...) either more widespread attention, or emotionally more heated reactions, than this article has. Because of that, I am going to proceed, initially, in a different fashion, and rather than focusing upon the specific arguments that Giubilini and Minerva offer for their conclusions, I am going to suggest that there are crucial background issues that need to be placed on the table, that any thoughtful reader needs to consider. I shall then go on to discuss how philosophers approach the topic of abortion, and attempt to arrive at sound conclusions concerning its moral status. Finally, I shall offer my assessment of the article by Giubilini and Minerva.What is philosophy? Philosophy and the Socratic challengeMany philosophy journals, because of their focus on intellectual questions that are quite remote from central human concerns, and also likely to involve, sooner or later, some difficult technical issues, have a readership that consists almost entirely of professional philosophers. This is not so, however, in the case of journals concerned with ethical questions, and especially issues of an applied sort, such as are addressed in ‘After-birth abortion’, where interested readers will include, for instance, professional philosophers, and individuals who work in the healthcare and legal professions, and whose philosophical training may well have been very limited. I want to begin, therefore, with some discussion of the nature of philosophy. The importance of …. (shrink)

The President’s Council on Bioethics has addressed the moral status of human preembryos in its reports on stem cell research and human therapeutic cloning. Although the Council has been criticized for being hand-picked to favor the right-to-life viewpoint concerning human preembryos, it has embraced the idea that the right-to-life position should be defended in secular terms. This is an important feature of the Council’s work, and it demonstrates a recognition of the need for genuine engagement between opposing sides in the (...) debate over stem cell research. To promote this engagement, the Council has stated in secular terms several arguments for the personhood of human preembryos. This essay presents and critiques those arguments, and it concludes that they are unsuccessful. If the best arguments in support of the personhood of human preembryos have been presented by the Council, then there are no reasonable secular arguments in support of that view. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In ‘The Pro‐Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defence’, Patrick Lee argues that the right to life is an essential property of those that possess it. On his view, the right arises from one's ‘basic’ or ‘natural’ capacity for higher mental functions: since human organisms have this capacity essentially, they have a right to life essentially. Lee criticises an alternative view, on which the right to life arises from one's ‘developed’ capacity for higher mental functions (or development of some (...) other accidental property). I argue that his criticisms of this alternative view are misguided or self‐defeating, and that there are good reasons to hold we have a right to life accidentally rather than essentially. (shrink)

Das Potenzialitätsargument (PA) ist das wohl wichtigste Argument der Gegner der verbrauchenden Embryonenforschung und des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs. Weil schon der frühe Embryo eine potenzielle Person sei, so das Argument, besitze er bereits den moralischen Status einer Person. Mit der Möglichkeit, aus differenzierten somatischen Zellen „ethisch unproblematische“ induzierte pluripotente Stammzellen (iPS-Zellen) zu gewinnen, schien diese PA-Problematik zumindest für die Forschung umgangen. Indessen zeigen neuere wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse, dass auch aus pluripotenten Zellen neue Organismen erwachsen können. Der Beitrag argumentiert dafür, dass nach der Logik (...) von PA nicht nur iPS-Zellen, sondern auch die somatischen Zellen, aus denen diese entstehen, als potenzielle Personen mit Würde und Lebensrecht anzusehen wären. Aufgrund dieser Implikationen ist PA auch nicht als Argument für ein Lebensrecht von Embryonen geeignet. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDas Potenzialitätsargument ist das wohl wichtigste Argument der Gegner der verbrauchenden Embryonenforschung und des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs. Weil schon der frühe Embryo eine potenzielle Person sei, so das Argument, besitze er bereits den moralischen Status einer Person. Mit der Möglichkeit, aus differenzierten somatischen Zellen „ethisch unproblematische“ induzierte pluripotente Stammzellen zu gewinnen, schien diese PA-Problematik zumindest für die Forschung umgangen. Indessen zeigen neuere wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse, dass auch aus pluripotenten Zellen neue Organismen erwachsen können. Der Beitrag argumentiert dafür, dass nach der Logik von PA (...) nicht nur iPS-Zellen, sondern auch die somatischen Zellen, aus denen diese entstehen, als potenzielle Personen mit Würde und Lebensrecht anzusehen wären. Aufgrund dieser Implikationen ist PA auch nicht als Argument für ein Lebensrecht von Embryonen geeignet. (shrink)

Could it be that if a fetus is not a person abortion is still immoral? One affirmative answer comes in the form of ‘The Impairment Argument’, which utilizes ‘The Impairment Principle’ to argue that abortion is immoral even if fetuses lack personhood. I argue ‘The Impairment Argument’ fails. It is not adequately defended from objections, and abortion is, in fact, a counterexample to the impairment principle. Furthermore, it explains neither what the wrong-making features of abortion are nor what features of (...) fetuses ground their supposed moral significance. By presupposing the fetus lacks personhood and providing no alternate account of the basis of fetuses’ moral significance, there is nothing to constitute abortion’s wrongness. Attempts to modify it fail for the same reasons. Thus, the impairment argument fails to show abortion is immoral. (shrink)

Mitochondrial replacement techniques are designed to allow couples to have children without passing on mitochondrial diseases. Recently, Giulia Cavaliere and César Palacios-González argued that prospective parents have the right to use MRTs to pursue genetic relatedness, such that some same-sex couples and/or polygamous triads could use the process to impart genetic relatedness between a child and more of its caregivers. Although MRTs carry medical risks, Cavaliere and Palacios-González contend that because MRTs are identity-affecting, they do not cause harm to an (...) existing human being, and our intuitions otherwise arise from the non-identity problem. Here, I review several attempts to address the non-identity problem, and propose a solution to the problem. Furthermore, I argue that regardless of one’s stance on whether MRTs are identity-affecting, the use of MRTs to pursue genetic relatedness alone falls outside the scope of the medical profession, as they involve substantive medical risk for no medical benefit. (shrink)

Many people believe human fetuses have the same moral status as adult human persons, that it is wrong to allow harm to befall things with this moral status, and thus voluntary, induced abortion is seriously morally wrong. Recently, many prochoice theorists have argued that this antiabortion stance is inconsistent; approximately 60% of human fetuses die from spontaneous abortion, far more than die from induced abortion, so if antiabortion theorists really believe that human fetuses have significant moral status, they have strong (...) moral obligations to oppose spontaneous abortion. Yet, few antiabortion theorists devote any effort to doing so. Many prochoice theorists argue that to resolve this inconsistency, antiabortion theorists should abandon their opposition to induced abortion. Here, I argue that those who do not abandon their opposition to induced abortion but continue to neglect spontaneous abortion act immorally. Aristotle argues that moral responsibility requires both control and awareness; I argue that once an antiabortion theorist becomes aware of the frequency of spontaneous abortion, they have a strong moral obligation to redirect their efforts towards combating spontaneous abortion; failure to do so is morally monstrous. (shrink)

Many people have moral qualms about embryo research, feeling that embryos must deserve some kind of protection, if not so much as is afforded to persons. This paper will show that these qualms serve to camouflage motives that are really prudential, at the cost of also obscuring the real ethical issues at play in the debate concerning embryo research and therapeutic cloning. This in turn leads to fallacious use of the Actions/Omissions Distinction and ultimately neglects the duties that we have (...) towards future persons. (shrink)

Many people have moral qualms about embryo research, feeling that embryos must deserve some kind of protection, if not so much as is afforded to persons. This paper will show that these qualms serve to camouflage motives that are really prudential, at the cost of also obscuring the real ethical issues at play in the debate concerning embryo research and therapeutic cloning. This in turn leads to fallacious use of the Actions/Omissions Distinction and ultimately neglects the duties that we have (...) towards future persons. (shrink)

BackgroundBreakthroughs in animal studies make the topic of human application of ectogenesis for medical and non-medical purposes more relevant than ever before. While current data do not yet demonstrate a reasonable expectation of clinical benefit soon, several groups are investigating the feasibility of artificial uteri for extracorporeal human gestation.Main textThis paper offers the first comprehensive and up to date discussion of the most important pros and cons of human ectogenesis in light of clinical application, along with an examination of crucial (...) ethical (and legal) issues that continued research into, and the clinical translation of, ectogenesis gives rise to. The expected benefits include advancing prenatal medicine, improving neonatal intensive care, and providing a novel pathway towards biological parenthood. This comes with important future challenges. Prior to human application, important questions have to be considered concerning translational research, experimental use of human fetuses and appropriate safety testing. Key questions are identified regarding risks to ectogenesis’ subjects, and the physical impact on the pregnant person when transfer from the uterus to the artificial womb is required. Critical issues concerning proportionality have to be considered, also in terms of equity of access, relative to the envisaged application of ectogenesis. The advent of ectogenesis also comes with crucial issues surrounding abortion, extended fetal viability and moral status of the fetus.ConclusionsThe development of human ectogenesis will have numerous implications for clinical practice. Prior to human testing, close consideration should be given to whether (and how) ectogenesis can be introduced as a continuation of existing neonatal care, with due attention to both safety risks to the fetus and pressures on pregnant persons to undergo experimental and/or invasive procedures. Equally important is the societal debate about the acceptable applications of ectogenesis and how access to these usages should be prioritized. It should be anticipated that clinical availability of ectogenesis, possibly first as a way to save extremely premature fetuses, may spark demand for non-medical purposes, like avoiding physical and social burdens of pregnancy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Lee claims that foetuses and adult humans are phases of the same identical substance, and thus have the same moral status because: first, foetuses and adults are the same physical organism, and second, the development from foetus to adult is quantitative and thus not a change of substance. Versus the first argument, I contend that the fact that foetuses and adults are the same physical organism implies only that they are the same thing but not the same substance, much (...) as living adults and their corpses are the same thing (same body) but not the same substance. Against Lee's second argument, I contend that Lee confuses the nature of a process with the nature of its result. A process of quantitative change can produce a change in substance. Lee also fails to show that foetuses are rational and thus have all the essential properties of adults, as required for them to be the same substance. Against the pro‐choice argument from asymmetric value (that only the fact that a human has become conscious of its life and begun to count on its continuing can explain human life's asymmetric moral value, i.e. that it is vastly worse to kill a human than not to produce one), Lee claims that foetus's lives are asymmetrically valuable to them before consciousness. This leads to counterintuitive outcomes, and it confuses the goodness of life (a symmetric value that cannot account for why it is worse to kill a human than not produce one) with asymmetric value. (shrink)

The debate concerning abortion abounds in miraculous narratives. Judith Jarvis Thomson has contrived the most celebrated set among related ones, to wit the “violinist analogy,” the “Good Samaritan” narrative, and the “Henry Fonda” allegory, by virtue of which, she intends, on the one hand, to argue that women’s right to autonomy outweighs the alleged fetus’s right to life, and on the other, to prove that no positive moral duties can be derived towards other persons alone from the fact that a (...) moral agent is ascribed certain rights. What this short paper endeavors to prove is that Thomson’s argumentation by analogy is a weak one, since neither the number nor the relevance of similarities invoked is adequate or satisfactory, while crucial parameters concerning the morality of abortion are being totally overlooked. (shrink)

Abstract. We argue that all human beings have a special type of dignity which is the basis for (1) the obligation all of us have not to kill them, (2) the obligation to take their well-being into account when we act, and (3) even the obligation to treat them as we would have them treat us, and indeed, that all human beings are equal in fundamental dignity. We give reasons to oppose the position that only some human beings, because of (...) their possession of certain characteristics in addition to their humanity (for example, an immediately exercisable capacity for self-consciousness, or for rational deliberation), have full moral worth. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, what makes human beings persons rather than things, is their rational nature, and human beings are rational creatures by virtue of possessing natural capacities for conceptual thought, deliberation, and free choice, that is, the natural capacity to shape their own lives. (shrink)

Perhaps I am wrong to take this article personally, but when the authors refer to Cassandras “voicing concern about a post-Roe degradation of pregnant persons’ right to chart their own medical cour...

Speciesist or biological accounts of moral status can be defended by showing that all members of Homo sapiens have a moral status conferring property. In this article, I argue that the most promising defense locates the moral status conferring property in the relational property of being biologically tied to other humans. This requires that biological ties ground moral obligations. I consider and reject the best defenses of that premise. Thus, we are left with compelling evidence that biological ties and membership (...) in a biological category like “species” ground neither moral obligations nor moral status. Because it is crucial to account for the moral significance of family bonds, I conclude by describing the sense in which biological ties matter morally. (shrink)

We argue that all human beings have a special type of dignity which is the basis for (1) the obligation all of us have not to kill them, (2) the obligation to take their well-being into account when we act, and (3) even the obligation to treat them as we would have them treat us, and indeed, that all human beings are equal in fundamental dignity. We give reasons to oppose the position that only some human beings, because of their (...) possession of certain characteristics in addition to their humanity (for example, an immediately exercisable capacity for self-consciousness, or for rational deliberation), have full moral worth. What distinguishes human beings from other animals, what makes human beings persons rather than things, is their rational nature, and human beings are rational creatures by virtue of possessing natural capacities for conceptual thought, deliberation, and free choice, that is, the natural capacity to shape their own lives. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article, I reply to criticisms of Dean Stretton of the pro‐life argument from substantial identity. When the criterion for the right to life proposed by most proponents of the pro‐life position is rightly understood – being a person, a distinct substance of a rational nature – this position does not lead to the difficulties Stretton claims it does.

From the standpoint of a Christian philosopher, heeding the teaching and exhortations of Pope John Paul II and previous popes, I examine three directions in which the recent philosophical debate has developed. In the last seven or eight years there has been 1) a renewed focus on the biological issue of when a human individual comes to be, 2) new arguments for the proposition that personhood is a characteristic acquired after birth, and 3) refinements of the early argument of Judith (...) Thomson. Replying to these developments, I defend, on philosophical grounds, the pro-life position. I argue that a distinct, whole (though immature) human individual comes to be at conception, that he or she is a person, with full moral worth, from the moment he or she comes to be, and the mothers and fathers have a special responsibility to their children which entails (at least) that they ought not to choose to abort them. I conclude by briefly indicating, from the standpoint of Christian faith, why Christian philosophers should vigorously pursue this debate. (shrink)

Medical stem cell research is currently the cause of much moral controversy. Those who would confer the same moral status to embryos as we do to humans consider that harvesting such embryonic cells entails sacrificing embryos. In this paper, the author analyses critically the arguments given for such a perspective. Finally, a theory of moral status is outlined that coherently and plausibly supports the use of embryonic stem cells in therapeutic research.

Hendricks’ The Impairment Argument (TIA) claims that it is immoral to impair a fetus by causing it to have fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Since aborting a fetus impairs it to a greater degree than causing it to have FAS, then abortion is also immoral. In this article, I argue that TIA ought to be rejected. This is because TIA can only succeed if it explains why causing an organism to have FAS impairs it to a morally objectionable degree, entails that (...) abortion impairs an organism to a morally objectionable and greater degree than causing FAS, and satisfies The Impairment Principle’s ceteris paribus clause. In order to do all three things, TIA must presuppose some theory of well-being. Even then, no theory of well-being accomplishes all three tasks that TIA must in order to succeed. However, even if this is false and TIA can meet all three objectives by presupposing some theory of well-being, it would not do very much to advance the debate about the morality of abortion. As I argue, TIA would essentially restate well-established arguments against abortion based on whatever theory of well-being it must presuppose in order to be successful. (shrink)

In her important and well-known discussion “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” Mary Anne Warren regrets that “it is not possible to produce a satisfactory defense of a woman’s right to obtain an abortion without showing that the fetus is not a human being, in the morally relevant sense.” Unlike some more cautious philosophers, Warren thinks that we can definitively demonstrate that the fetus is not a person. In this paper, Warren’s argument is critically examined with a focus (...) especially on the question of the foundation and the boundaries of the moral community. The fundamental thesis of the paper is that Warren’s approach is flawed for at least four reasons: (1) that being a person is not as obviously central to having full moral rights as Warren assumes, (2) that her exclusivism regarding moral status has dubious moral consequences independent of the abortion issue, (3) that it is not clear that a fetus is not a person, even on Warren’s own criteria, and (4) her criteria for personhood are themselves suspect. (shrink)

Ken Himma argues that a human being becomes a moral person at the commencement of brain activity. In response to Himma, the author offers brief comments on Himma’s project, an alternative account of the human person that maintains that a human being is a human person by nature as long as it exists, and a counterexample to Himma’s position that shows it cannot account for the wrongness of the purposeful creation of anencephalic-like children. The author concludes with replies to two (...) challenges to his position. (shrink)

ABSTRACT William Hurlbut, a Stanford University bioethicist and member of the President's Council on Bioethics, recently proposed a solution to the current impasse over human embryonic stem cell research in the United States. He suggested that researchers could use genetic engineering and somatic cell nuclear transfer (i.e. cloning) to develop human ‘pseudo‐embryos’ that have no potential to develop fully into human persons. According to Hurlbut, even thinkers who typically ascribe high moral status to human embryos could approve of destroying these (...) ‘pseudo‐embryos’ for the sake of harvesting human embryonic stem cells. This essay argues, first, that an argument based on the ‘paradox of the heap’ (an argument that many ‘pro‐life’ thinkers employ in order to defend the notion that human embryos have high moral value from the moment of conception) challenges the ethical legitimacy of Hurlbut's proposal. Second, the paper argues that this conflict may illustrate a reductio ad absurdum for this ‘pro‐life’ argument itself rather than being a problem for Hurlbut's proposal. As a result, the paper challenges the ‘pro‐life’ strategy of arguing that one should respond to uncertainty about the moral status of developing embryos by being morally ‘cautious’ and granting all human embryos full moral status from the moment of conception. It appears that one is faced with a complex series of choices (about where to draw the moral line between entities that are human persons and entities that are not), and a strict moral ‘cautiousness’ about this series of choices may ultimately lead to absurdity. (shrink)

A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...) well-being level. (shrink)

A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...) well-being level. (shrink)

Secular arguments for equal and exclusively human worth generally tend to follow one of two strategies. One, which has recently gained renewed attention because of a novel argument by S. Matthew Liao, aims to directly ground worth in an intrinsic property that all humans have in common, whereas the other concedes that there is no morally relevant intrinsic difference between all humans and all other animals, and instead appeals to the membership of all humans in a special kind. In this (...) article, I argue that both strategies necessitate drawing a line that is both arbitrary and implausibly opens a moral gulf between individuals whose difference from one another in terms of empirical reality is entirely unremarkable, providing reasons to reject them that go beyond the standard objections in the literature. I conclude that, if all humans are to be included in the community of equals, we must lay to rest the idea that we can do so without also including a wide range of non-human animals. (shrink)

This article presents an argument for veganism, using a formal-axiomatic approach: a list of twenty axioms are explicitly stated. These axioms are all necessary conditions to derive the conclusion that veganism is a moral duty. The presented argument is a minimalist or core argument for veganism, because it is as parsimonious as possible, using the weakest conditions, the narrowest definitions, the most reliable empirical facts and the minimal assumptions necessary to reach the conclusion. If someone does not accept the conclusion, (...) logical consistency requires that s/he should be able to point at axiom on which s/he disagrees. The argument exposes hidden assumptions and provides a framework for an overview of the philosophical literature on animal rights and vegetarianism / veganism. (shrink)

The substance view is an account of personhood that regards all human beings as possessing instrinsic value and moral status equivalent to that of an adult human being. Consequently, substance view proponents typically regard abortion as impermissible in most circumstances. The substance view, however, has difficulty accounting for certain intuitions regarding the badness of death for embryos and fetuses, and the wrongness of killing them. Jeff McMahan’s time-relative interest account is designed to cater for such intuitions, and so I present (...) a proposal for strengthening the substance view by incorporating McMahan’s account – the Dual-Aspect Account of the morality of killing. I show that it resolves some important issues for the substance view while preserving its central premise of moral equality for all human beings. I then compare the Dual-Aspect Account with McMahan’s Two-Tiered Account of the morality of killing, which he derives from his time-relative interest account. (shrink)

Prolife theorists typically hold to the claim that all human beings possess equal moral status from conception and consequently possess a right to life. This, they believe, entails that abortion is impermissible in all circumstances. Critics characterize this as an extreme anti-abortion position, as it prima facie allows no exceptions, even in cases of rape. Here, I examine whether the prolife claim regarding equal moral status is compatible with a more attractive moderate stance that permits an exception in the case (...) of rape. I show that Judith Jarvis Thomson's analysis of rights can be used to modify the prolife position in this way, but that doing so involves concessions that prolife theorists are unlikely to find acceptable. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to offer support for the substance view of persons, the philosophical anthropology defended by Patrick Lee in his essay. In order to accomplish this the author presents a brief definition of the substance view; argues that the substance view has more explanatory power in accounting for why we believe that human persons are intrinsically valuable even when they are not functioning as such, why human persons remain identical to themselves over time, and why it (...) follows from these points that the unborn are human persons; and responds to two arguments that attempt to establish the claim that the early human being is not a unified substance until at least fourteen days after conception. (shrink)

This article is a response to Barbara Forrest’ 2011 Synthese article, “On the Non-Epistemology of Intelligent Design.” Forrest offers an account of my philosophical work that consists almost entirely of personal attacks, excursions into my religious pilgrimage, and misunderstandings and misrepresentations of my work as well as of certain philosophical issues. Not surprisingly, the Synthese editors include a disclaimer in the front matter of the special issue in which Forrest’s article was published. In my response, I address three topics: (1) (...) My interest in Intelligent Design (ID) and public education and why as a Thomist I have grown more skeptical and explicitly critical of ID over the years, (2) the sorts of philosophical mistakes with which Forrest’s article is teeming, and (3) my Christian faith, religious exclusivism, and interfaith dialogue. (shrink)

We share Minkoff et al.’s (2024) concern regarding the potential disavowal of pregnant patients’ right to refuse medical interventions, without or against their explicit consent, aimed at preservin...

The ascendancy of Christian activism in bioethical policy debates has elicited a number of responses by critics of this activism. These critics typically argue that the public square ought to embrace Secular Liberalism, a perspective that its proponents maintain is the most just arrangement in a pluralist society, even though SL places restraints on Christian activists that are not placed on similarly situated citizens who hold more liberal views on bioethical questions. The author critiques three arguments that are offered to (...) defend SL: the golden rule contract argument, the secular reason argument, and the err-on-the-side-of-liberty argument. The author concludes that each of these arguments fail to support SL. (shrink)

En este artículo presento una clasificación de las teorías éticas acerca del aborto provocado. En esa clasificación utilizo dos criterios que, aunque inseparables, se pueden tratar relativamente disociados uno del otro. En primer lugar, presento las teorías ordenadas según el estatuto ontológico y ético que otorgan a los gametos, cigotos, preembriones, embriones, fetos y neonatos, y discuto las teorías basadas en la idea de potencialidad. En segundo lugar, me refiero a las teorías centradas en la libertad de la madre. En (...) las consideraciones finales reconozco explícitamente el partidismo de la teoría de teorías propuesta. (shrink)

According to a diverse and widely popular family of moral theories, there is a class of individuals – typically humans or persons – who have the very same, full moral status. Individuals not falling into that class count for less, or not at all, morally speaking. In this article, I identify two problems for such theories, the mapping problem and the problem of misgrounded value, and argue that they are serious enough to be decisive. I will then propose an alternative (...) account of full and equal moral status that avoids those problems. In grounding full moral status in phenomenal consciousness, it preserves the idea that you and I are equal, but at the same time radically expands the community of moral equals. I conclude by discussing some practical implications of my proposal. (shrink)

This dissertation explores some objections to natural law theory- many of which are also leveled against contemporary naturalism. Despite the way the natural law tradition has fallen into disrepute in much of the American academy, this dissertation defends a classical Thomistic approach to natural law from some modern and contemporary criticisms. It begins with a brief explanation of the theory of natural law that will be defended from these contemporary objections. Chapter three examines G.E. Moore and David Hume's classical problems (...) posed to natural law, along with some contemporary defenders of Moore's position. These arguments are purported to undermine using human nature as a basis for ethics. Chapter four considers how moral relativism, especially the form given by Gilbert Harmon and David Wong, offers a unique challenge to natural law that must be answered and one that seems to undermine any ethical theory than any account relying on human nature. Chapter five explores the relation between neo-naturalism and natural law. Although neo-naturalism is a position often thought of as opposed to natural law, the two share many similarities in the positions they oppose. The last chapter examines how natural law reasoning is used in making medical decisions. The overarching thesis is that, insofar as natural law is coherent and answers many major criticisms, the proposal to reexamine this ethical theory stands as viable. (shrink)