Een belangrijke en steeds terugkerende vraag in de geschiedenis van het wijsgerig denken met betrekking tot het probleem van het universele en individuele is: hoe is het mogelijk dat in een wereld van individuele dingen gezegd kan worden dat de dingen uniek zijn en nochtans gelijkenis met elkaar vertonen en dus kennelijk niet volstrekt uniek zijn. Hoe kunnen we één en dezelfde eigenschap toeschrijven aan onderscheiden dingen. Of zoals door sommigen bij voorkeur geformuleerd: Hoe kunnen we één en hetzelfde prediceren (...) van vele onderscheiden dingen. Sommigen menen dat dit naast het accepteren van particularia ons noopt te spreken over universalia. Naast het spreken over individuele mensen, paarden, bomen, stenen, rode dingen enz. bestaat er ook iets universeels, zoals mens-zijn, paard-zijn, boom-zijn, steen-zijn, roodheid enz., kortom datgene wat mensen, paarden, bomen, stenen, rode dingen enz. gemeenschappelijk hebben. De realisten zeggen, ondanks alle verschillen, dat universalia niet gereduceerd, niet herleid kunnen worden, tot particularia. De nominalisten aanvaarden, ondanks alle verschillen, alleen individuele dingen in de werkelijkheid, terwijl het universele slechts bestaat in de menselijke geest als woorden of als concepten. (shrink)

Recently, Jonathan Bennett has said some interesting, but mistaken, things about certain themes in Berkeley's philosophy. His comments are interesting because they direct us to a careful scrutiny of Berkeley's arguments and methodology in the often neglected Draft to the Introduction to the Principles, and mistaken because Bennett misinterprets these arguments and methodology. I would like to correct those mistakes because an understanding of Berkeley's Draft is helpful in interpreting the Introduction, which in turn is important for our understanding of (...) not only his philosophical methodology, but also for an adequate interpretation of some of his substantive philosophical claims. I will argue that Bennett misinterprets Berkeley's deleted comments and arguments concerned with two Lockean themes, classification and understanding, as presented in several passages from the Draft which did not appear in the published Introduction to the Principles. In both cases Bennett's confusion is a failure to grasp Berkeley's strategy and target in his attacks upon Locke and the theses he takes Locke to hold. Read in their unedited form the deleted passages not only indicate that Bennett misinterprets them, but they also are suggestive of some interesting philosophical comments on Berkeley's part. (shrink)

Arthur Pap’s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This role goes beyond the merely historical fact that Pap’s views of dispositional and modal concepts were influential. As a sympathetic critic of logical empiricism, Pap, like Quine, saw a deep tension in logical empiricism at its very best in the work of Carnap. But Pap’s critique of Carnap is quite different from Quine’s, and represents the discovery of limits beyond which empiricism cannot go, where there (...) lies nothing other than intuitive knowledge of logic itself. Pap’s arguments for this intuitive knowledge anticipate Etchemendy’s recent critique of the model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Pap’s work also anticipates prominent developments in the contemporary neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics championed by Wright and Hale. Finally, Pap’s major philosophical preoccupation, the concepts of necessity and possibility, provides distinctive solutions and perspectives on issues of contemporary concern in the metaphysics of modality. In particular, Pap’s account of modality allows us to see the significance of Kripke’s well-known arguments on necessity and apriority in a new light. (shrink)