Switch to: References

Citations of:

When to Terminate a Charitable Trust?

Analysis 55 (1):12 - 13 (1995)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Rejecting Supererogationism.Christian Tarsney - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):599-623.
    Even if I think it very likely that some morally good act is supererogatory rather than obligatory, I may nonetheless be rationally required to perform that act. This claim follows from an apparently straightforward dominance argument, which parallels Jacob Ross's argument for 'rejecting' moral nihilism. These arguments face analogous pairs of objections that illustrate general challenges for dominance reasoning under normative uncertainty, but (I argue) these objections can be largely overcome. This has practical consequences for the ethics of philanthropy -- (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Does a discount rate measure the costs of climate change?Christian Tarsney - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (3):337-365.
    I argue that the use of a social discount rate to assess the consequences of climate policy is unhelpful and misleading. I consider two lines of justification for discounting: (i) ethical arguments for a "pure rate of time preference" and (ii) economic arguments that take time as a proxy for economic growth and the diminishing marginal utility of consumption. In both cases I conclude that, given the long time horizons, distinctive uncertainties, and particular costs and benefits at stake in the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Should we let people starve – for now?Dan Moller - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):240–247.
    Many philosophers believe that just as moral reasons do not diminish in force across space, so they do not diminish across time, and that we should accordingly be neutral between the interests of present people and future people. This allows them to make the plausible claim that we should not discount the interests of future generations when making decisions about things like consuming scarce resources.1 However, when this outlook is combined with a small number of fairly weak assumptions, it becomes (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Slote on rational dilemmas and rational supererogation.Joe Mintoff - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (1):111-126.
    The so-called optimising conception of rationality includes (amongst other things) the following two claims: (i) that it is irrational to choose an option if you know there is a better one, and (ii) there are no situations in which an agent, through no practical fault of her own, cannot avoid acting irrationally. As part of his ongoing attempt to explain why we need to go beyond the optimising conception, Michael Slote discusses a number of examples in which it seems that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Confinement Problem: How to Terminate Your Mom with Her Trust.Paul McNamara - 1995 - Analysis 55 (4):310 - 313.
    Cliff Landesman provides a vivid description of a case where we have no best outcome available to us. He poses this as a problem for utilitarians who advise us to do the best we can. This does indeed make such advice impractical. I begin by contrasting older versions of utilitarianism with newer ones that have appeared in deontic logic and that were designed precisely to accommodate Landesman's sort of scenario. (I cast matters in terms of the Limit Assumption and world-theoretic (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding.Frank Arntzenius, Adam Elga & John Hawthorne - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):251 - 283.
    We pose and resolve several vexing decision theoretic puzzles. Some are variants of existing puzzles, such as 'Trumped' (Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997), 'Rouble trouble' (Arntzenius and Barrett 1999), 'The airtight Dutch book' (McGee 1999), and 'The two envelopes puzzle' (Broome 1995). Others are new. A unified resolution of the puzzles shows that Dutch book arguments have no force in infinite cases. It thereby provides evidence that reasonable utility functions may be unbounded and that reasonable credence functions need not be countably (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • What is the upper limit of value?David Manheim & Anders Sandberg - manuscript
    How much value can our decisions create? We argue that unless our current understanding of physics is wrong in fairly fundamental ways, there exists an upper limit of value relevant to our decisions. First, due to the speed of light and the definition and conception of economic growth, the limit to economic growth is a restrictive one. Additionally, a related far larger but still finite limit exists for value in a much broader sense due to the physics of information and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Rationality and Moral Risk: A Moderate Defense of Hedging.Christian Tarsney - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Maryland
    How should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain not just about morally relevant empirical matters, like the consequences of some course of action, but about the basic principles of morality itself? This question has only recently been taken up in a systematic way by philosophers. Advocates of moral hedging claim that an agent should weigh the reasons put forward by each moral theory in which she has positive credence, considering both the likelihood that that theory is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations