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There are no i-beliefs or i-desires at work in fiction consumption and this is why

In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: pp. 210-233 (2020)

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  1. Secret Charades: Reply to Hutto.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-5.
    In reply to Daniel Hutto's "Getting Real About Pretense," I defend my theory of pretense against his claim that it is subject to counterexamples by clarifying the value of the analysis. Then I argue that the central challenge still facing Hutto's "primacy of practice" approach, as well as other 4E approaches to pretense, is to explain the link between pretense and deception.
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  • ‘Truth in Fiction’ Reprised.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2022 - British Journal of Aesthetics 62 (2):307-324.
    The paper surveys recent appraisals of David Lewis’s seminal paper on truth in fiction. It examines variations on standard criticisms of Lewis’s account, aiming to show that, if developed as Lewis suggests in his 1983 Postscript A, his proposals on the topic are—as Hanley puts it—‘as good as it gets’. Thus elaborated, Lewis’s account can resist the objections, and it offers a better picture of fictional discourse than recent resurrections of other classic works of the 1970s by Kripke, van Inwagen (...)
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  • Are We Free to Imagine What We Choose?Daniel Munro & Margot Strohminger - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-18.
    It has long been recognized that we have a great deal of freedom to imagine what we choose. This paper explores a thesis—what we call “intentionalism (about the imagination)”—that provides a way of making this evident (if vague) truism precise. According to intentionalism, the contents of your imaginings are simply determined by whatever contents you intend to imagine. Thus, for example, when you visualize a building and intend it to be of King’s College rather than a replica of the college (...)
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  • Longings in Limbo: A New Defence of I-Desires.Luke Roelofs - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    This paper responds to two arguments that have been offered against the positing of ‘i-desires’, imaginative counterparts of desire supposedly involved in fiction, pretence, and mindreading. The Introspection Argument asks why, if there are both i-desires and desires, the distinction is so unfamiliar and hard to draw, unlike the relatively clear distinctions between perception and mental imagery, or belief and belief-like imagining. The Accountability Argument asks how it can make sense to treat merely imaginative states as revealing of someone’s psychology, (...)
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  • Why Pretense Poses a Problem for 4E Cognition.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    Whether a person is pretending, or not, is a function of their beliefs and intentions. This poses a challenge to 4E accounts of pretense, which typically seek to exclude such cognitive states from their explanations of psychological phenomena. Resulting tensions are explored within three recent accounts of imagination and pretense offered by theorists working in the 4E tradition. A path forward is then charted, through considering ways in which explanations can invoke beliefs and intentions while remaining true to 4E precepts. (...)
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