In the literature on inclusion and inclusive education there is a frequent conflation of inclusion of diverse people, or people in all their diversity, inclusion of diverse worldviews, and inclusion of diverse epistemologies. Only the first of these is plausible—and perhaps even morally and politically mandatory. Of course, more needs to be said about inclusion and its possible difference from integration, conditions of access, etc. Regarding the second type of inclusion, not all worldviews merit inclusion. Moreover, worldviews and epistemologies are (...) not identical: everyone may have a worldview but not everyone has an epistemology. Finally, the idea of diverse epistemologies makes only limited sense, as do the associated notions of ‘indigenous knowledge’, ‘legitimation of knowledge’ and ‘epistemic marginalisation’. (shrink)

Feminists note an association of arguing with aggression and masculinity and question the necessity of this connection. Arguing also seems to some to identify a central method of philosophical reasoning, and gendered assumptions and standards would pose problems for the discipline. Can feminine modes of reasoning provide an alternative or supplement? Can overarching epistemological standards account for the benefits of different approaches to arguing? These are some of the prospects for argumentation inside and outside of philosophy that feminists consider. -/- (...) The further concern is that the academic study of argumentation – in philosophy and other disciplines – has failed to account for the type of reasoning needed for social justice movements. What resources for addressing these concerns can be found in informal logic and interdisciplinary argumentation theory? Since part of the perceived problem derives from assuming that arguing is a contest, are more collaborative epistemological frameworks better? Can regular politeness or civility hedge against undesirable tendencies of argumentation? Can “critical thinking” pedagogy involving argument educations answer the needs of social justice? (shrink)

I will connect the literature on deep disagreements with the literature on trust to construct a two-dimensional picture of the limits of argument. Argumentation and trust are important to the functioning of society, but each sets different expectations for when arguments can and should be used to resolve disagreements. When trust is factored in, we see a more nuanced picture of which disagreements will remain too deep for objective argument. Affective and social aspects of argument are not independent of procedure (...) and content. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that a “use-based” approach to narrative and narrative arguments provides the kind of conceptual architecture necessary for developing a much-needed intersectional analysis of arguers’ identities, their arguments, and the contexts that inform their positions. Without such an approach, we risk coming away with an understanding of narrative argument that, at best, fails to capture its dynamism, or, worse yet, risks being conditioned on methodologically ethnocentric grounds.

In academic contexts the appeal to authority is a quite common but seldom tested argument, either because we accept the authority without questioning it, or because we look for alternative experts or reasons to support a different point of view. But, by putting ourselves side by side an already accepted authority, we often rhetorically manoeuvre to displace the burden of the proof to avoid the fear to present our opinions and to allow face saving.