Switch to: References

Citations of:

Learning from Words

Analysis 69 (3):572-574 (2009)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Trusting the Media? TV News as a Source of Knowledge.Nicola Mößner - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):205-220.
    Why do we trust TV news? What reasons might support a recipient’s assessment of the trustworthiness of this kind of information? This paper presents a veritistic analysis of the epistemic practice of news production and communication. The topic is approached by discussing a detailed case study, namely the characteristics of the most popular German news programme, called the ‘Tagesschau’. It will be shown that a veritistic analysis can indeed provide a recipient with relevant reasons to consider when pondering on the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Testimony and the Interpersonal.Jeremy Wanderer - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (1):92 - 110.
    Critical notice of Paul Faulkner, "Knowledge on Trust" (OUP 2011) and Benjamin McMyler, "Testimony, Trust, and Authority" (OUP 2011).
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Talking Like a Plant: Testimony and Justice.Tim Flanagan - 2022 - Angelaki 27 (2):85-99.
    Following the work of Barbara Cassin, this paper proposes to examine certain ways of speaking that Aristotle described as not so much human as plant-like [homoioi phutôi] and to consider whether th...
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Social Virtue Of Blind Deference.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - unknown
    Recently, it has become popular to account for knowledge and other epistemic states in terms of epistemic virtues. The present paper focuses on an epistemic virtue relevant when deferring to others in testimonial contexts. It is argued that, while many virtue epistemologists will accept that epistemic virtue can be exhibited in cases involving epistemically motivated hearers, carefully vetting their testimonial sources for signs of untrustworthiness prior to deferring, anyone who accepts that also has to accept that an agent may exhibit (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Testimony is Not Disjunctive.Peter J. Graham - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1).
    Jennifer Lackey argues that “testimony” in philosophy has one sense, but that sense—the concept expressed—is disjunctive. One disjunct she calls speaker-testimony and the other disjunct she calls hearer-testimony. A speaker then testifies simpliciter iff the speaker either speaker-testifies or hearer-testifies. Inadequate views of testimony, she argues, fail to recognize, distinguish and then disjoin these two “aspects” of testimony. I argue that her view about the semantics of “testimony” is mistaken and that her criticisms of two other views—mine included —are ineffective. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemic Buck-Passing and the Interpersonal View of Testimony.Judith Baker & Philip Clark - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):178-199.
    Two ideas shape the epistemology of testimony. One is that testimony provides a unique kind of knowledge. The other is that testimonial knowledge is a social achievement. In traditional terms, those who affirm these ideas are anti-reductionists, and those who deny them are reductionists. There is increasing interest, however, in the possibility of affirming these ideas without embracing anti-reductionism. Thus, Sanford Goldberg uses the idea of epistemic buck-passing to argue that even reductionists can accept the uniqueness of testimonial knowledge, and (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Speakers’ Intuitive Judgements About Meaning – The Voice of Performance View.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):177-195.
    Speakers’ intuitive judgements about meaning provide important data for many debates in philosophy of language and pragmatics, including contextualism vs. relativism in semantics; ‘faultless’ disagreement; the limits of truth-conditional semantics; vagueness; and the status of figurative utterances. Is the use of speakers intuitive judgments about meaning justified? Michael Devitt has argued that their use in philosophy of language is problematic because they are fallible empirical judgements about language that reflect speakers’ folk theories about meaning rather than meaning itself. In this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    If I were to say, “Agnes does not know that it is raining, but it is,” this seems like a perfectly coherent way of describing Agnes’s epistemic position. If I were to add, “And I don’t know if it is, either,” this seems quite strange. In this chapter, we shall look at some statements that seem, in some sense, contradictory, even though it seems that these statements can express propositions that are contingently true or false. Moore thought it was paradoxical (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • What Norm of Assertion?Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):51-67.
    I argue that the debates over which norm constitutes assertion can be abandoned by challenging the three main motivations for a constitutive norm. The first motivation is the alleged analogy between language and games. The second motivation is the intuition that some assertions are worthy of criticism. The third is the discursive responsibilities incurred by asserting. I demonstrate that none of these offer good reasons to believe in a constitutive norm of assertion, as such a norm is understood in the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Defeater Goes External.Mikael Janvid - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):701-715.
    This paper proposes a new externalist account of defeaters, in terms of reliable indicators, as an integral part of a unified externalist account of warrant and defeat. It is argued that posing externalist conditions on warrant, but internalist conditions on defeat lead to undesirable tensions. The proposal is contrasted to some rival accounts and then tested on some widely discussed cases, like the airport case. Misleading defeaters, where Laurence BonJour’s reliable clairvoyants serve as examples, also receive treatment, partly because they (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • On testimonial knowledge and its functions.Michel Croce - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.
    The problem of explaining how we acquire knowledge via testimony gives rise to a dilemma, according to which any theory must make testimonial knowledge either too hard or too easy, and therefore no adequate account of testimonial knowledge is possible. In recent work, John Greco offers a solution to the dilemma on behalf of anti-reductionism that appeals to Edward Craig’s functionalist epistemology. It is argued that Greco’s solution is flawed, in that his functionalist account provides wrong verdicts of ordinary cases (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Absolutely General Knowledge.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser & Beau Madison Mount - 2022 - Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):547-566.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 3, Page 547-566, November 2021.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Inference to the Best Explanation as a Theory for the Quality of Mechanistic Evidence in Medicine.Stefan Dragulinescu - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (2):353-372.
    Inference to the Best Explanation is usually employed in the Scientific Realism debates. As far as particular scientific theories are concerned, its most ready usage seems to be that of a theory of confirmation. There are however more uses of IBE, namely as an epistemological theory of testimony and as a means of categorising and justifying the sources of evidence. In this paper, I will present, develop and exemplify IBE as a theory of the quality of evidence - taking examples (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Encultured Mind: From Cognitive Science to Social Epistemology.David Alexander Eck - unknown
    There have been monumental advances in the study of the social dimensions of knowledge in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. But it has been common within a wide variety of fields--including social philosophy, cognitive science, epistemology, and the philosophy of science--to approach the social dimensions of knowledge as simply another resource to be utilized or controlled. I call this view, in which other people's epistemic significance are only of instrumental value, manipulationism. I identify manipulationism, trace its manifestations in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Happy Unhappiness.Franca D’Agostini - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-18.
    Stratified properties such as ‘happy unhappiness’, ‘ungrounded ground’, ‘fortunate misfortune’, and evidently ‘true falsity’ may generate dialetheias. The aim of the article is to show that if this is the case, then we will have a special, conjunctive, kind of dialetheia: a true state description of the form ‘Fa and not Fa’, wherein the two conjuncts, separately taken, are to be held untrue. The particular focus of the article is on happy unhappiness: people suffering from happy unhappiness cannot be truly (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is Memory Merely Testimony From One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.
    A natural view of testimony holds that a source's statements provide one with evidence about what the source believes, which in turn provides one with evidence about what is true. But some theorists have gone further and developed a broadly analogous view of memory. According to this view, which this essay calls the “diary model,” one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past judgments, and in turn about the truth. This essay (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Defeaters in Current Epistemology: Introduction to the Special Issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.
  • The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief.Allan Hazlett - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):131-151.
    We often prefer non-deferential belief to deferential belief. In the last twenty years, epistemology has seen a surge of sympathetic interest in testimony as a source of knowledge. We are urged to abandon ‘epistemic individualism’ and the ideal of the ‘autonomous knower’ in favour of ‘social epistemology’. In this connection, you might think that a preference for non-deferential belief is a manifestation of vicious individualism, egotism, or egoism. I shall call this the selfishness challenge to preferring non-deferential belief. The aim (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Being Sure of Each Other: An Essay on Social Rights and Freedoms, by Kimberley Brownlee.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):700-716.
  • Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness By David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill, Eds.J. Henry Taylor - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):108-111.
  • Spotting When Algorithms Are Wrong.Stefan Buijsman & Herman Veluwenkamp - forthcoming - Minds and Machines:1-22.
    Users of sociotechnical systems often have no way to independently verify whether the system output which they use to make decisions is correct; they are epistemically dependent on the system. We argue that this leads to problems when the system is wrong, namely to bad decisions and violations of the norm of practical reasoning. To prevent this from occurring we suggest the implementation of defeaters: information that a system is unreliable in a specific case or independent information that the output (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Knowledge Norm of Assertion: Keep It Simple.Max Lewis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12963-12984.
    The simple knowledge norm of assertion holds that one may assert that p only if one knows that p. Turri :37–45, 2011) and Williamson both argue that more is required for epistemically permissible assertion. In particular, they both think that the asserter must assert on the basis of her knowledge. Turri calls this the express knowledge norm of assertion. I defend SKNA and argue against EKNA. First, I argue that EKNA faces counterexamples. Second, I argue that EKNA assumes an implausible (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. [REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):159-162.
  • Epistemology of Testimony and Values in Science.Tihamér Margitay - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1539-1553.
    The paper has two interconnected objectives. It argues that the intrinsic epistemic value of testimonies can be reduced to their moral and social values, that is, to their competent, conscientious, and honest performance. Consequently, competence, conscientiousness, and honesty are intrinsic epistemic values in science. The second objective is to offer an answer to the questions why and under what conditions a hearer can rationally accept a testimony in science. The values and subsequent norms of testimony are espoused and strictly enforced (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Replies.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1577-1597.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Reverse Interpretation Model of Testimony.Hamid Vahid - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):85-102.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Risk, Doubt, and Transmission.Rachel Fraser - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2803-2821.
    Despite their substantial appeal, closure principles have fallen on hard times. Both anti-luck conditions on knowledge and the defeasibility of knowledge look to be in tension with natural ways of articulating single-premise closure principles. The project of this paper is to show that plausible theses in the epistemology of testimony face problems structurally identical to those faced by closure principles. First I show how Lasonen-Aarnio’s claim that there is a tension between single premise closure and anti-luck constraints on knowledge can (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • On Social Defeat.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):719-734.
    Influential cases have been provided that seem to suggest that one can fail to have knowledge because of the social environment. If not a distinct kind of social defeater, is there a uniquely social phenomenon that defeats knowledge? My aim in this paper is to explore these questions. I shall argue that despite initial appearances to the contrary, we have no reason to accept a special class of social defeater, nor any essentially social defeat phenomenon. We can explain putative cases (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Reading as a Source of Knowledge.René van Woudenberg - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):723-742.
    This paper argues that reading is a source of knowledge. Epistemologists have virtually ignored reading as a source of knowledge. This paper argues, first, that reading is not to be equated with attending to testimony, and second that it cannot be reduced to perception. Next an analysis of reading is offered and the source of knowledge that reading is further delineated. Finally it is argued that the source that reading is, can be both transmissive and generative, is non-basic, once was (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Assertion, Justificatory Commitment, and Trust.Fernando Rudy Hiller - 2016 - Análisis Filosófico 36 (1):29-53.
    This paper discusses the commitment account of assertion, according to which two necessary conditions for asserting that p are the speaker's undertaking a commitment to justify her assertion in the face of challenges and the speaker's licensing the audience to defer justificatory challenges back to her. Relying on what I call the "cancellation test," and focusing on Robert Brandom's version of the CAA, I show that the latter is wrong: it is perfectly possible to assert that p even while explicitly (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • How to Be an Anti-Reductionist.Mona Simion & Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2849-2866.
    One popular view in recent years takes the source of testimonial entitlement to reside in the intrinsically social character of testimonial exchanges. This paper looks at two extant incarnations of this view, what we dub ‘weak’ and ‘modest’ social anti-reductionism, and questions the rationales behind their central claims. Furthermore, we put forth an alternative, strong social anti-reductionist account, and show how it does better than the competition on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Cognitive Goods, Open Futures and the Epistemology of Education.J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - In David Bakhurst (ed.), Ethics and Epistemology of Education. Wiley-Blackwell.
    What cognitive goods do children plausibly have a right to in an education? In attempting to answer this question, I begin with a puzzle centred around Feinberg’s observation that a denial of certain cognitive goods can violate a child’s right to an open future. I show that propositionalist, dispositionalist and objectualist characterisations of the kinds of cognitive goods children have a right to run in to problems. A promising alternative is then proposed and defended, one that is inspired in the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Doubts About Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge From Disagreement.Thomas Grundmann - 2013 - In Tim Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Routledge. pp. 72-98.
    In philosophy, as in many other disciplines and domains, stable disagreement among peers is a widespread and well-known phenomenon. Our intuitions about paradigm cases, e.g. Christensen's Restaurant Case, suggest that in such controversies suspension of judgment is rationally required. This would prima facie suggest a robust suspension of judgment in philosophy. But we are still lacking a deeper theoretical explanation of why and under what conditions suspension is rationally mandatory. In the first part of this paper I will focus on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Elizabeth Fricker on Testimonial Justification: A Critical Review.Alireza Dorri Nogoorani & Reza Akbari - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 13 (26):147-168.
    Elizabeth Fricker’s writings on testimonial justification include some contrary ideas. In this paper, we propose Fricker’s theory of justification coherently and explain why she speaks of different ideas and which idea is more compatible with her general theory of knowledge. Fricker proposes three conditions for justification of testimonial beliefs for adults by appealing to commonsense world-picture and defining a paradigm case of testimony: justified belief of using speech act of telling, justified belief of the sincere of testifier and the competence (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Introducción. La epistemología y el derecho.Andrés Páez - 2015 - In Hechos, evidencia y estándares de prueba. Ensayos de epistemología jurídica. Ediciones Uniandes. pp. 1-12.
    Aunque el derecho probatorio y el derecho procesal se han dedicado desde siempre al estudio de los problemas relacionados con las pruebas y el establecimiento de los hechos en los procesos judiciales, el énfasis ha estado siempre en el aspecto formal, doctrinal y procedimental en detrimento de los fundamentos filosóficos y teóricos. Durante los últimos años ha habido un intento sostenido de explorar estos fundamentos combinando no sólo las herramientas tradicionales proporcionadas por la lógica, la gramática y la retórica, sino (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Norms of Credibility.Jennife Lackey - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):323-338.
    In this paper, I explore whether there is a need for a multiplicity of norms governing belief due to differences in the objects of those beliefs, particularly the difference between persons and nonpersons. I call the view according to which there is a single epistemic norm governing belief monism, and the view that there is more than one such norm pluralism. I consider three different kinds of objections to monism that stem specifically from considerations unique to assessing the credibility of (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Noninferentialism and Testimonial Belief Fixation.Tim Kenyon - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):73-85.
    An influential view in the epistemology of testimony is that typical or paradigmatic beliefs formed through testimonial uptake are noninferential. Some epistemologists in particular defend a causal version of this view: that beliefs formed from testimony (BFT) are generated by noninferential processes. This view is implausible, however. It tends to be elaborated in terms that do not really bear it out – e.g. that BFT is fixed directly, immediately, unconsciously or automatically. Nor is causal noninferentialism regarding BFT plausibly expressed in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Testimony, Transmission, and Safety.Joachim Horvath - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (1):27-43.
    Most philosophers believe that testimony is not a fundamental source of knowledge, but merely a way to transmit already existing knowledge. However, Jennifer Lackey has presented some counterexamples which show that one can actually come to know something through testimony that no one ever knew before. Yet, the intuitive idea can be preserved by the weaker claim that someone in a knowledge-constituting testimonial chain has to have access to some non-testimonial source of knowledge with regard to what is testified. But (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Vrijednosti u psihijatriji i pojam mentalne bolesti (Eng. Values in psychiatry and the concept of mental illness).Luca Malatesti & Marko Jurjako - 2016 - In Snježana Prijić-Samaržija, Luca Malatesti & Elvio Baccarini (eds.), Moralni, Politički I Društveni Odgovori Na Društvene Devijacije (Eng. Moral, Political, and Social Responses to Antisocial Deviation). Rijeka: University of Rijeka. pp. 153-181.
    The crucial problem in the philosophy of psychiatry is to determine under which conditions certain behaviors, mental states, and personality traits should be regarded as symptoms of mental illnesses. Participants in the debate can be placed on a continuum of positions. On the one side of the continuum, there are naturalists who maintain that the concept of mental illness can be explained by relying on the conceptual apparatus of the natural sciences, such as biology and neuroscience. On the other side (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Recent Work on Trust and Tesimony.Benjamin McMyler & Adebayo Ogungbure - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):217-230.
    Epistemologists have recently started appealing to the moral philosophy literature on interpersonal trust in order to help explain the epistemology of testimony. We argue that epistemologists who have given trust a significant role in their accounts of the epistemology of testimony have appealed to very different conceptions of the nature of trust, which have inevitably influenced the shape of their epistemological theorizing. Some have employed accounts of the nature of interpersonal trust according to which trust is a practical phenomenon subject (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Should One Care About the Intuitions of Others: Trying Out Intuition Solipsism.Thomas Grundmann - manuscript
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • In Defence of Virtue Epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):409-433.
    In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology's central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard's objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Criticism and Blame in Action and Assertion.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (2):76-93.
    In this paper, we develop a general normative framework for criticisability, blamelessness and blameworthiness in action. We then turn to the debate on norms of assertion. We show that an application of this framework enables champions of the so-called knowledge rule of assertion to offer a theoretically motivated response to a number of putative counterexamples in terms of blamelessness. Finally, we argue that, on closer inspection, the putative counterexamples serve to confirm the knowledge rule and disconfirm rival views.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • On Telling and Trusting.Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):875-902.
    A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences trust speakers to (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Knowledge From Scientific Expert Testimony Without Epistemic Trust.Jon Leefmann & Steffen Lesle - 2018 - Synthese:1-31.
    In this paper we address the question of how it can be possible for a non-expert to acquire justified true belief from expert testimony. We discuss reductionism and epistemic trust as theoretical approaches to answer this question and present a novel solution that avoids major problems of both theoretical options: Performative Expert Testimony (PET). PET draws on a functional account of expertise insofar as it takes the expert’s visibility as a good informant capable to satisfy informational needs as equally important (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Trust, Belief, and the Second-Personal.Thomas W. Simpson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):447-459.
    Cognitivism about trust says that it requires belief that the trusted is trustworthy; non-cognitivism denies this. At stake is how to make sense of the strong but competing intuitions that trust is an attitude that is evaluable both morally and rationally. In proposing that one's respect for another's agency may ground one's trusting beliefs, second-personal accounts provide a way to endorse both intuitions. They focus attention on the way that, in normal situations, it is the person whom I trust. My (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • On the Possibility of Knowledge Through Unsafe Testimony.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (5):513-526.
    If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe. Otherwise, will not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that hearer will lack knowledge? Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Goldberg (2005; 2007) argues that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two cases. Lackey (2008) and Pelling (2013) criticize Goldberg’s examples. But Pelling goes on to provide his own (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Elgin on Understanding: How Does It Involve Know-How, Endorsement and Factivity?Emma C. Gordon - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):4955-4972.
    In Chapter 3 of True Enough, Elgin outlines her view of objectual understanding, focusing largely on its non-factive nature and the extent to which a certain kind of know-how is required for the “grasping” component of understanding. I will explore four central issues that feature in this chapter, concentrating on the role of know-how, the concept of endorsement, Elgin’s critique of the factivity constraint on understanding, and how we might use aspects of Elgin’s framework to inform related debates on the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Lexical Norms, Language Comprehension, and the Epistemology of Testimony.Endre Begby - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):324-342.
    It has recently been argued that public linguistic norms are implicated in the epistemology of testimony by way of underwriting the reliability of language comprehension. This paper argues that linguistic normativity, as such, makes no explanatory contribution to the epistemology of testimony, but instead emerges naturally out of a collective effort to maintain language as a reliable medium for the dissemination of knowledge. Consequently, the epistemologies of testimony and language comprehension are deeply intertwined from the start, and there is no (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Epistemically Engineered Environments.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2783-2802.
    In other work I have defended the claim that, when we rely on other speakers by accepting what they tell us, our reliance on them differs in epistemically relevant ways from our reliance on instruments, when we rely on them by accepting what they “tell” us. However, where I have explored the former sort of reliance at great length, I have not done so with the latter. In this paper my aim is to do so. My key notions will be (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations