Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Expansion View of Thick Concepts

Noûs 54 (4):914-944 (2020)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Thick Ethical Concepts.Pekka Väyrynen - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    [First published 09/2016; substantive revision 02/2021.] Evaluative terms and concepts are often divided into “thin” and “thick”. We don’t evaluate actions and persons merely as good or bad, or right or wrong, but also as kind, courageous, tactful, selfish, boorish, and cruel. The latter evaluative concepts are "descriptively thick": their application somehow involves both evaluation and a substantial amount of non-evaluative description. This article surveys various attempts to answer four fundamental questions about thick terms and concepts. (1) A “combination question”: (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Conventional Evaluativity.Julia Zakkou - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):440-454.
    Some expressions, such as ‘generous’ and ‘stingy’, are used not only to describe the world around us. They are also used to evaluate the things to which they are applied. In this paper, I suggest a novel account of how this evaluation is conveyed—the conventional triggering view. It partly agrees and partly disagrees with both the standard semantic view and its popular pragmatic contender. Like the former and unlike the latter, my view has it that the evaluation is conveyed due (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Separating the evaluative from the descriptive: An empirical study of thick concepts.Pascale Willemsen & Kevin Reuter - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):135-146.
    Thick terms and concepts, such as honesty and cruelty, are at the heart of a variety of debates in philosophy of language and metaethics. Central to these debates is the question of how the descriptive and evaluative components of thick concepts are related and whether they can be separated from each other. So far, no empirical data on how thick terms are used in ordinary language has been collected to inform these debates. In this paper, we present the first empirical (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • The polarity effect of evaluative language.Lucien Baumgartner, Pascale Https://Orcidorg Willemsen & Kevin Https://Orcidorg Reuter - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology.
    Recent research on thick terms like “rude” and “friendly” has revealed a polarity effect, according to which the evaluative content of positive thick terms like “friendly” and “courageous” can be more easily canceled than the evaluative content of negative terms like “rude” and “selfish”. In this paper, we study the polarity effect in greater detail. We first demonstrate that the polarity effect is insensitive to manipulations of embeddings (Study 1). Second, we show that the effect occurs not only for thick (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Aesthetic Judgments, Evaluative Content, and (Hybrid) Expressivism.Jochen Briesen - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Aesthetic statements of the form ‘X is beautiful’ are evaluative; they indicate the speaker’s positive affective attitude regarding X. Why is this so? Is the evaluative content part of the truth conditions, or is it a pragmatic phenomenon (i.e. presupposition, implicature)? First, I argue that semantic approaches as well as these pragmatic ones cannot satisfactorily explain the evaluativity of aesthetic statements. Second, I offer a positive proposal based on a speech-act theoretical version of hybrid expressivism, which states that, with the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•