- Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals.J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128.details
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The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False).Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (2):219-242.details
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Luck, knowledge and value.Lee John Whittington - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1615-1633.details
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Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.details
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Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529.details
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A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth.Veli Mitova - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1911-1933.details
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Why can’t what is true be valuable?Jim Hutchinson - 2019 - Synthese (7):1-20.details
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Wisdom.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):1-16.details
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Hume on Curiosity.Axel Gelfert - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):711-732.details
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The value of minimalist truth.Filippo Ferrari - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1103-1125.details
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The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge.Julien Dutant - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):141-162.details
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Reducing Responsibility: An Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Blame.Trent Dougherty - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):534-547.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules.Marc-Kevin Daoust & Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1741-1765.details
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Is Epistemic Normativity Value-Based?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):407-430.details
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On Stanley’s Intellectualism.J. Adam Carter - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):749-762.details
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On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
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On behalf of a bi-level account of trust.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2299-2322.details
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Openmindedness and truth.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):207-224.details
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Kvanvig on Pointless Truths and the Cognitive Ideal.J. Adam Carter - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (3):285-293.details
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Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9243-9272.details
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De Minimis Normativism: a New Theory of Full Aptness.J. Adam Carter - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):16-36.details
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How understanding makes knowledge valuable.Ayca Boylu - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):591-609.details
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How Understanding Makes Knowledge Valuable.Ayca Boylu - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):591-609.details
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A eudaimonist approach to the problem of significance.Anne Baril - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):215-241.details
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Does luck have a place in epistemology?Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1391-1407.details
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Anti-luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief.Nathan Ballantyne - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.details
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