En este trabajo se defiende la tesis de que el liberalismo de corte individualista ha sido insuficiente como modelo teórico político para realizar el ideal liberal de libertad individual y, sobre esa base, se argumenta que lo determinante a la hora de realizar el ideal de libertad individual es la relación entre cultura y libertad. El liberalismo, sin que por ello ignore que hay culturas, se enfoca decididamente en el individuo y en su libertad. En ese desconocimiento relativo de la (...) diversidad cultural, concretamente del papel que la cultura juega frente al ideal de libertad individual, el liberalismo se ha conducido a un callejón sin salida: uno en el que esa relativa ignorancia afecta su propio ideal de libertad individual. (shrink)

Although there was never a consensus about multicultural policies for immigrants, at the beginning of this new millennium, multiculturalism found itself in cloudy water. Within a short period, politicians Merkel, Cameron, and Sarkozy all informed us that multiculturalism had failed. While this political statement drew many objections—How could these politicians claim we should abandon multiculturalism, given that multiculturally conscious notions of justice and their concomitant laws and policies for immigrants have never even been implemented in their respective countries? —political and (...) philosophical critique of multiculturalism have nonetheless become more vigorous (Vertovec and... (shrink)

Liberal political thought is underwritten by an enduring fear of civil and state violence. It is assumed within liberal thought that self?interest characterises relations between individuals in civil society, resulting in violence. In absolutist doctrines, such as Hobbes?, the pacification of private persons depended on the Sovereign's command of a monopoly of violence. Liberals, by contrast, sought to claim that the state itself must be pacified, its capacity for cruelty (e.g., torture) removed, its capacity for violence (e.g., war) reduced and (...) controlled. A core tension within liberal thought thus arises between containing civil violence by empowering the state and containing state violence by constraining the state. One result of this tension is the highly selective conception of ?pacification? within liberalism, which, historically, has accommodated indifference to endemic violence, both within civil society, and beyond civil society ? as in (past) arguments licensing imperialism and in (present) arguments for disciplining ?rogue? states. (shrink)

In this book I argue that school integration is not a proxy for educational justice. I demonstrate that the evidence consistently shows the opposite is more typically the case. I then articulate and defend the idea of voluntary separation, which describes the effort to redefine, reclaim and redirect what it means to educate under preexisting conditions of segregation. In doing so, I further demonstrate how voluntary separation is consistent with the liberal democratic requirements of equality and citizenship. The position I (...) defend is not opposed to integration but rather is a justified response to the daily experience of frustration and disappointment with a system that has failed members of marginalized groups for too long. I argue that most voluntary separation experiments in education, far from being motivated by a sense of racial, cultural or religious exclusion, are in fact driven among other things by a desire for a quality education, not to mention community membership and self respect. As such, voluntary separation represents a morally robust pragmatic strategy that is able to answer liberal challenges concerning involuntary stratification, ethnocentrism and democratic deliberation. (shrink)

Whether Aboriginal people should have special educational rights is a question that has simmered and occasionally boiled over during the past four decades. This dispute remains largely unresolved due to perceived tensions that exist between liberal values and minority rights. Will Kymlicka attempts to resolve this conflict by claiming that the liberal concept of autonomy can be used as a starting point for minority rights. However, there are several questions that are inadequately answered in his theory. Namely, why is autonomy (...) so important? What is the significance of a particular culture? Should a liberal society support cultures that are illiberal? In response to these questions I will demonstrate that the liberal concept of autonomy requires that adequately restrictive cultures be protected. From this it is possible to develop a cohesive theory of minority rights that can be used to defend Aboriginal control of formal education. (shrink)