Der Perspektive der Betroffenen kommt im medizinethischen Fachdiskurs der Gegenwart eine grundlegende Bedeutung zu. Im Fall der Demenz wird der Zugang zu ihr allerdings durch krankheitsbedingte Abbauprozesse zunehmend erschwert. Neben anderen künstlerisch-ästhetischen Annäherungen ist in den letzten 15 Jahren auch eine Fülle an Spielfilmen zu verzeichnen, die sich mit der Erfahrung der Demenz beschäftigen. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwieweit solche filmischen Gestaltungen neue Zugänge zum Demenzerleben eröffnen und was Film als Medium und Kunstform somit für die ethische Auseinandersetzung (...) mit Demenz zu leisten vermag. Dabei werden drei prominente filmästhetische Zugangswege eingehender untersucht, an ausgewählten Beispielen erläutert und unter ethischen Gesichtspunkten erörtert. Es zeigt sich, dass die ethischen Potenziale eines reflektierten Umgangs mit filmischen Annäherungen an die Demenz längst nicht ausgeschöpft sind. (shrink)

“Ethics” is used as a label for a new kind of expertise in the field of science and technology. At the same time, it is not clear what ethical expertise consists in and what its political status in modern democracies can be. Starting from the “participatory turn” in recent social research and policy, we will argue that bioethical reasoning has to include public views of and attitudes towards biomedicine. We will sketch the outlines of a bioethical conception of “public understanding (...) of ethics,” addressing three different issues: the methodological relevance of moral questions and problems raised by lay persons in everyday life regarding biomedicine and technology, the normative relevance of such lay moralities for the justification of ethical decisions, and the necessity of public deliberation in this context. Finally, we draw conclusions in view of the concepts and methods such a conception of “public understanding of ethics” should employ. (shrink)

“Ethics” is used as a label for a new kind of expertise in the field of science and technology. At the same time, it is not clear what ethical expertise consists in and what its political status in modern democracies can be. Starting from the “participatory turn” in recent social research and policy, we will argue that bioethical reasoning has to include public views of and attitudes towards biomedicine. We will sketch the outlines of a bioethical conception of “public understanding (...) of ethics,” addressing three different issues: (a) the methodological relevance of moral questions and problems raised by lay persons in everyday life regarding biomedicine and technology, (b) the normative relevance of such lay moralities for the justification of ethical decisions, and (c) the necessity of public deliberation in this context. Finally, we draw conclusions in view of the concepts and methods such a conception of “public understanding of ethics” should employ. (shrink)

A communitarian approach to bioethics adds a core value to a field that is often more concerned with considerations of individual autonomy. Some interpretations of liberalism put the needs of the patient over those of the community; authoritarian communitarianism privileges the needs of society over those of the patient. Responsive communitarianism’s main starting point is that we face two conflicting core values, autonomy and the common good, and that neither should be a priori privileged, and that we have principles and (...) procedures that can be used to work out this conflict but not to eliminate it. This discussion uses the debate in the US over funding for entitlements as a case study to apply the values of communitarian bioethics. (shrink)

Communicable diseases, especially those that are highly contagious, are on the rise and each of us, no matter who we are or where we live, is equally at risk of transmitting contagious diseases to others as we are of contracting such diseases from others. Because contagious diseases are as readily passed state-to-state as person-to-person, we all have a stake in every country's ability to enact effective infectious disease control policies, while policies grounded in shared values are more likely to gain (...) widespread acceptance and thereby prove most effective. This paper suggests that principlism proved invaluable as an ethical framework for resolving hard medical cases and setting health care policy because it nicely “fits” dilemmas that arise in the context of the special relationship between doctors and patients or within family units. It then argues that communitarianism provides the better foundation for crafting infectious diseases control policies because contagious diseases, which often pass between perfect strangers, raise questions about the moral obligations we owe to (or are entitled to demand of) people with whom we share no “special” relationship. Accordingly, a socially embedded framework such as communitarianism may be a better fit for the more socially embedded ethical dilemmas of communicable diseases. (shrink)

Communicable diseases, especially those that are readily contagious, are on the rise as evidenced by the emergence of viruses like severe acute respiratory syndrome, the global resurgence of resistant forms of ancient mycobacteria such as extensively drug resistant tuberculosis, and the 2009 swine flu outbreak in Mexico. Moreover, each of us, no matter who we are or where we live, is just as likely to transmit contagious diseases to others as we are to contract such diseases from others. As cogently (...) described in the title of a recent book by Margaret Battin et al., we are all potential “victims and vectors.”Just as contagious diseases are readily passed person to person, so too can they readily be passed across local and national boundaries. We therefore all have a stake in the development of effective infectious disease control policies on a national scale, with “effective” being the operative term: regulations and statutes that are neither enforceable nor likely to be complied with may do more harm than good. (shrink)

Beauchamp and Childress’ biomedical principlism is nearly synonymous with medical ethics for most clinicians. Their four principles are theoretically derived from the “common morality”, a universal cache of moral beliefs and claims shared by all morally serious humans. Others have challenged the viability of the common morality, but none have attempted to explain why the common morality makes intuitive sense to Western ethicists. Here I use the work of Charles Taylor to trace how events in the Western history of ideas (...) made the common morality seem plausible and yet, ironically, underscore the cultural particularity of the so-called common morality. I conclude that the supposedly universal common morality is actually quite culturally contained. Importantly, this should give us pause about the global authority of principlism and Beauchamp and Childress’ claim to a global bioethics project. (shrink)