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  1. Purpose as a Moral Virtue for Flourishing.Hyemin Han - 2015 - Journal of Moral Education 44 (3):291-309.
    Positive psychology has significantly influenced studies in the fields of moral philosophy, psychology and education, and scholars in those fields have attempted to apply its ideas and methods to moral education. Among various theoretical frameworks, virtue ethics is most likely to connect positive psychology to moral educational studies because it pursues eudaimonia (flourishing). However, some virtue ethicists have been concerned about whether the current mainstream concept of positive psychology can apply directly to moral education because it focuses on subjective aspects (...)
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  • The Meaning of Role Modelling in Moral and Character Education.Wouter Sanderse - 2013 - Journal of Moral Education 42 (1):28-42.
    Character education considers teachers to be role models, but it is unclear what this means in practice. Do teachers model admirable character traits? And do they do so effectively? In this article the relevant pedagogical and psychological literature is reviewed in order to shed light on these questions. First, the use of role modelling as a teaching method in secondary education is assessed. Second, adolescents? role models and their moral qualities are identified. Third, the psychology of moral learners is critically (...)
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  • Private Feelings, Public Expressions: Professional Jealousy and the Moral Practice of Teaching.Yen-Hsin Chen & Kristján Kristjánsson - 2011 - Journal of Moral Education 40 (3):349-358.
    This paper explores the issue of personal factors that impinge upon education. More specifically, it addresses professional jealousy among teachers and how it affects the moral practice of teaching. Our focus is teachers? emotions in general and teachers? jealousies in particular, in the context of the ideal of the moral teacher. We identify and criticise three common dichotomies that tend to mar explorations of teachers? emotions. We illustrate issues of professional jealousy as revealed in an interview with a headteacher in (...)
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  • Is Moral Education Working? Extracts From the Diary of a Twenty-First Century Moral Educator.J. Mark Halstead - 2011 - Journal of Moral Education 40 (3):339-347.
    This article takes the form of a set of edited diary entries containing reflections on incidents drawn mainly from the author?s professional life as a university professor and as a consultant to a disadvantaged multi-ethnic secondary school in the north of England. The form of the article allows a wide range of issues to be touched on, including respect, equality, authority, discipline, postmodernism, multicultural education, complexities in the concept of teaching by example and tensions between the enforcement of morality and (...)
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  • Jalousie.Frédéric Minner - 2018 - Encyclopédie Philosophique.
    On conçoit souvent la jalousie comme une émotion ayant pour objet les relations de proximité (amour, amitié, fratrie, etc.). Elle a généralement mauvaise presse et est typiquement envisagée comme une émotion moralement condamnable, voire comme un vice. Or, la jalousie ne porte pas uniquement sur les relations de proximité : elle peut également porter sur divers biens (prestige, richesses, biens matériels, privilèges, etc.). Par ailleurs, certains auteurs soutiennent que des cas de jalousie pourraient être moralement justifiés, voire que la jalousie (...)
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  • The Rational Appropriateness of Group-Based Pride.Mikko Salmela & Gavin Brent Sullivan - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    This article seeks to analyze the conditions in which group-based pride is rationally appropriate. We first distinguish between the shape and size of an emotion. For the appropriate shape of group-based pride, we suggest two criteria: the distinction between group-based pride and group-based hubris, and between we-mode and I-mode sociality. While group-based hubris is inappropriate irrespective of its mode due to the arrogant, contemptuous, and other-derogating character of this emotion, group-based pride in the we-mode is appropriate in terms of shape (...)
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  • The Educational Challenges of Agape and Phronesis.Stein M. Wivestad - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (2):307-324.
    Children as learners need adults who love them, even when the children are unable to give anything in return. Furthermore, adults should be able to make wise judgements concerning what is good for the children. The clarification of these principles and of their educational import has to start within our own cultural tradition. Agape (unconditional love, neighbour-love or charity) is a basic concept in the Christian tradition. Phronesis (moral wisdom, practical judgement or prudence) has a key position in the Aristotelian (...)
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  • Measuring Self-Respect.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2007 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 (3):225–242.
    Can “self-respect” supplant the now much-maligned “global self-esteem” in psychological research and therapy? The aim of the present paper is to examine this suggestion and develop it further. It is argued that there are two distinct philosophical concepts of self-respect abroad in the literature, Kantian and Aristotelian, between which psychologists need to choose. The main components of Aristotelian self-respect are then worked out. The paper concludes by exploring how, in order to make those components objectively measurable, certain methodological pitfalls must (...)
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  • Justified Self-Esteem.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 41 (2):247–261.
  • There is Something About Aristotle: The Pros and Cons of Aristotelianism in Contemporary Moral Education.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 48 (1):48-68.
    The aim of this article is to pinpoint some of the features that do—or should—make Aristotelianism attractive to current moral educators. At the same time, it also identifies theoretical and practical shortcomings that contemporary Aristotelians have been overly cavalier about. Section II presents a brisk tour of ten of the ‘pros’: features that are attractive because they accommodate certain powerful and prevailing assumptions in current moral philosophy and moral psychology—applying them to moral education. Section III explores five versions of the (...)
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  • Can We Teach Justified Anger?Kristjan Kristjansson - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 39 (4):671-689.
    The question of whether there is such a thing as teachable justified anger encompasses three distinct questions: the psychological question of whether the emotions in general, and anger in particular, are regulatable; the moral question of whether anger can ever be morally justified; and the educational question of whether we have any sound methods at our disposal for teaching justified anger. In this paper I weave Aristotelian responses to those questions together with insights from the current psychology literature on emotion (...)
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  • Smoothing It: Some Aristotelian Misgivings About the Phronesis‐Praxis Perspective on Education.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2005 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (4):455-473.
    A kind of ‘neo‐Aristotelianism’ that connects educational reasoning and reflection to phronesis, and education itself to praxis, has gained considerable following in recent educational discourse. The author identifies four cardinal claims of this phronesis‐praxis perspective: that a) Aristotle's epistemology and methodology imply a stance that is essentially, with regard to practical philosophy, anti‐method and anti‐theory; b) ‘producing’, under the rubric of techné, as opposed to ‘acting’ under the rubric of phronesis, is an unproblematically codifiable process; c) phronesis must be given (...)
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  • On the Very Idea of "Negative Emotions".Kristjan Kristjansson - 2003 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (4):351–364.
    Kristján Kristjánsson, On the Very Idea of Negative Emotions, pp. 351364 As attention has shifted towards the emotions in general, the notion of so-called negative emotions has come in for renewed interest. The author explores this notion and argues that its invocation cannot be done without cost to our understanding since it obscures all sorts of relevant complexities. There are thus no emotions around to which we can helpfully refer collectively as negative, although there are of course painful emotions, emotions (...)
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  • Virtuous Emotions, Written by Kristján Kristjánsson. [REVIEW]Pilar Lopez-Cantero - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (4):457-460.
    Honouring a career-long commitment to interdisciplinarity which has guided a prolific publication history on character, virtue, and emotion, Kristjánsson leads by example in this book. Although he is clearly a philosopher, firmly pro-Aristotelian and devotes a large proportion of the book to look at the original source, Kristjánsson is happy to question or even downright abandon Aristotelian tradition if he has to–and to push the boundaries of philosophical thought on emotions. As a result, Virtuous Emotions has something to offer to (...)
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  • Awe: An Aristotelian Analysis of a Non-Aristotelian Virtuous Emotion.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):125-142.
    While interest in the emotion of awe has surged in psychology, philosophers have yet to devote a single self-standing article to awe’s conceptual contours and moral standing. The present article aims to rectify this imbalance and begin to make up for the unwarranted philosophical neglect. In order to do so, awe is given the standard Aristotelian treatment to uncover its conceptual contours and moral relevance. Aristotelianism typically provides the most useful entry point to ‘size up’ any emotion – more problematically (...)
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  • Emotion Education Without Ontological Commitment?Kristján Kristjánsson - 2010 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (3):259-274.
    Emotion education is enjoying new-found popularity. This paper explores the ‘cosy consensus’ that seems to have developed in education circles, according to which approaches to emotion education are immune from metaethical considerations such as contrasting rationalist and sentimentalist views about the moral ontology of emotions. I spell out five common assumptions of recent approaches to emotion education and explore their potential compatibility with four paradigmatic moral ontologies. I argue that three of these ontologies fail to harmonise with the common assumptions. (...)
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  • Von Gutmenschen, guten Menschen und geflüchteten Menschen: Dankbarkeit als Supererogation oder Pflicht?Marie-Luise Raters - 2021 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 4 (1):121-141.
    ZusammenfassungViele Menschen erwarten Dankbarkeit von den Geflüchteten, die in Europa aufgenommen werden. Nun kann mit dem Satz „Geflüchtete sollen dankbar sein“ eine moralische Pflicht oder ein Ratschlag gemeint sein. Mein Essay zeigt in einem ersten Schritt, dass es keine Pflicht zur Dankbarkeit geben kann. Dankbarkeit ist vielmehr Supererogation, nämlich eine moralisch wertvolle Handlungsweise, die keine Pflicht sein kann. Das gilt auch für Geflüchtete. Anschließend zeige ich, dass Dankbarkeit als sympathischer Ausdruck einer Tugendhaltung jedermann anzuraten ist. Wer sich für erwiesene Wohltaten (...)
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  • Jüngste Arbeiten zum Begriff der Dankbarkeit in Philosophie und Psychologie.Kristján Kristjánsson, Blaire Morgan & Liz Gulliford - 2021 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 4 (1):169-199.
    ZusammenfassungDer Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die philosophische und psychologische Literatur zum Begriff der Dankbarkeit bis ins Jahr 2013. Geprüft werden die in beiden Wissenschaften veröffentlichten Arbeiten vor allem hinsichtlich ihrer begrifflichen Grundlagen und der ethischen Bewertung von Dankbarkeit, etwa als Pflicht, Tugend oder Supererogation. Die Analyse zeigt, dass jeweils mit einer Reihe untereinander unvereinbarer Begriffsverständnisse gearbeitet wird, sodass die Debatte von einem komplexen Netzwerk sich überschneidender und überkreuzender Begriffe geprägt ist. Der Beitrag endet mit Vorschlägen für die weitere Forschung. (...)
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  • Is Contempt Redeemable?Ronald de Sousa - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):23-43.
    In this essay, I will focus on the two main objections that have been adduced against the moral acceptability of contempt: the fact that it embraces a whole person and not merely some deed or aspect of a person’s character, and the way that when addressed to a person in this way, it amounts to a denial of the very personhood of its target.
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  • Forgiveness and the Multiple Functions of Anger.Antony G. Aumann & Zac Cogley - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):44-71.
    This paper defends an account of forgiveness that is sensitive to recent work on anger. Like others, we claim anger involves an appraisal, namely that someone has done something wrong. But, we add, anger has two further functions. First, anger communicates to the wrongdoer that her act has been appraised as wrong and demands she feel guilty. This function enables us to explain why apologies make it reasonable to forgo anger and forgive. Second, anger sanctions the wrongdoer for what she (...)
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  • Emotion, Cognition Et Sentiment.Stephen Grant - 2008 - Synthesis Philosophica 23 (1):53-71.
    Le texte examine les recherches récentes et le développement de la théorie cognitive des émotions, et cherche à développer une théorie originale dans le cadre de cette approche. L e texte s’oriente particulièrement sur la critique qui réduit ces théories des émotions trop intellectualisées à des attitudes selon des propositions et exclue les sentiments. Je tiens que quelques cognitivistes seulement ont représenté ladite théorie, et qu’il est possible d’affirmer que les émotions sont partiellement constituées de sentiments et qu’elles restent à (...)
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  • Ten Myths About Character, Virtue and Virtue Education – Plus Three Well-Founded Misgivings.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2013 - British Journal of Educational Studies 61 (3):269-287.
    ABSTRACT Initiatives to cultivate character and virtue in moral education at school continue to provoke sceptical responses. Most of those echo familiar misgivings about the notions of character, virtue and education in virtue ? as unclear, redundant, old-fashioned, religious, paternalistic, anti-democratic, conservative, individualistic, relative and situation dependent. I expose those misgivings as ?myths?, while at the same time acknowledging three better-founded historical, methodological and practical concerns about the notions in question.
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  • The Development of Justice Conceptions and the Unavoidability of the Normative.Kristja´N. Kristja´Nsson - 2003 - Journal of Moral Education 32 (2):183-194.
    This article spells out the way in which normative concerns unavoidably enter into the design and interpretation of empirical research on children's development of justice conceptions, with special emphasis on Damon's well-known stage theory of such development. Normative considerations provide assumptions not only about what counts as a conception of justice in the first place but also what counts as a better or a worse conception. Damon, for one, relies on the questionable normative premise that all distributive choices are choices (...)
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  • Is Shame an Ugly Emotion? Four Discourses—Two Contrasting Interpretations for Moral Education.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2014 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 33 (5):495-511.
    This paper offers a sustained philosophical meditation on contrasting interpretations of the emotion of shame within four academic discourses—social psychology, psychological anthropology, educational psychology and Aristotelian scholarship—in order to elicit their implications for moral education. It turns out that within each of these discourses there is a mainstream interpretation which emphasises shame’s expendability or moral ugliness (and where shame is typically described as guilt’s ugly sister), but also a heterodox interpretation which seeks to retrieve and defend shame. As the heterodox (...)
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  • An Aristotelian Virtue of Gratitude.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):499-511.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a reconstruction of gratitude as an Aristotelian virtue. The account I propose is meant to be essentially Aristotelian although it is clearly not Aristotle’s own account. I start in section “Current Discourses on Gratitude” with an overview of recent discourses on gratitude in philosophy and psychology. I then proceed, in section “Putting the Aristotelian Pieces Together”, to spell out a formal characterisation of gratitude as an Aristotelian emotional virtue. Section “Reappraising Aristotle on (...)
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  • Justice and Desert-Based Emotions.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):53-68.
    A number of contemporary philosophers have pointed out that justice is not primarily an intellectual virtue, grounded in abstract, detached beliefs, but rather an emotional virtue, grounded in certain beliefs and desires that are compelling and deeply embedded in human nature. As a complex emotional virtue, justice seems to encompass, amongst other things, certain desert-based emotions that are developmentally and morally important for an understanding of justice. This article explores the philosophical reasons for the rising interest in desert-based emotions and (...)
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  • Emulation and the Use of Role Models in Moral Education.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2006 - Journal of Moral Education 35 (1):37-49.
    This article is about (1) the ancient (Aristotelian) emotional virtue of emulation, (2) some current character?education inspired accounts of the use of role models in moral education and, most importantly, (3) the potential relevance of (1) for (2). The author argues that the strategy of role?modelling, as explicated by the character?education movement, is beset with three unsolved problems: an empirical problem of why this method is needed; a methodological problem of how students are to be inspired to emulation; and a (...)
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  • Children and the Belief in a Just World.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2004 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 23 (1):41-60.
    This essay subjects to philosophicalscrutiny a well-known theory in socialpsychology, the theory of a belief in a justworld (BJW-theory). What are theimplications of the theory for moralphilosophy, in general, and moraleducation/schooling, in particular? Shouldparents and teachers discourage or encouragechildren to believe in a just world, in thesense given to such a belief in this theory?The intricacies of BJW-theory areexplored, with special emphasis on the strangecase of ``victim derogation.'' The authorconcludes that the theory remains, for variousreasons, unilluminating, both morally andeducationally, unless (...)
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  • Virtue Ethics, Positive Psychology, and a New Model of Science and Engineering Ethics Education.Hyemin Han - 2015 - Science and Engineering Ethics 21 (2):441-460.
    This essay develops a new conceptual framework of science and engineering ethics education based on virtue ethics and positive psychology. Virtue ethicists and positive psychologists have argued that current rule-based moral philosophy, psychology, and education cannot effectively promote students’ moral motivation for actual moral behavior and may even lead to negative outcomes, such as moral schizophrenia. They have suggested that their own theoretical framework of virtue ethics and positive psychology can contribute to the effective promotion of motivation for self-improvement by (...)
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  • How Should We Foster the Professional Integrity of Engineers in Japan? A Pride-Based Approach.Tetsuji Iseda - 2008 - Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (2):165-176.
    I discuss the predicament that engineering-ethics education in Japan now faces and propose a solution to this. The predicament is professional motivation, i.e., the problem of how to motivate engineering students to maintain their professional integrity. The special professional responsibilities of engineers are often explained either as an implicit social contract between the profession and society (the “social-contract” view), or as requirements for membership in the profession (the “membership-requirement” view). However, there are empirical data that suggest that such views will (...)
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  • Putting Emotion Into the Self: A Response to the 2008 Journal of Moral Education Special Issue on Moral Functioning.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2009 - Journal of Moral Education 38 (3):255-270.
    This paper takes as its starting point the Journal of Moral Education Special Issue (September, 2008, 37[3]) ?Towards an integrated model of moral reasoning?. Although explicitly post?Kohlbergian, the authors in this Special Issue do not, I argue, depart far enough from Kohlberg?s impoverished notion of the role of the affective in moral life?or when they do so depart, they incorporate emotions as mere intuitive thrusts in an essentially polarised two?system view of the moral self. Prior to that complaint, I sketch (...)
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  • Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):148 – 154.
    The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally "negative" emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions. In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.
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  • Jealousy Revisited: Recent Philosophical Work on a Maligned Emotion.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (3):1-14.
    Taking as its starting point a previous work by the author which reviewed early philosophical sources on jealousy and proposed both a conceptual and moral account of this much-maligned emotion, the present article reviews the relevant philosophical literature from the last decade or so. Most noticeable is how scarce those sources still are. Special attention is given, however, to a new conceptual model proposed by Purshouse and Fredericks which rejects the standard architectonic of jealousy as a three-party compound emotion. While (...)
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  • The Trouble with Ambivalent Emotions.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2010 - Philosophy 85 (4):485-510.
    Mixed or ambivalent emotions have long intrigued philosophers. I dissect various putative cases of emotional ambivalence and conclude that the alleged 'psychological problem' surrounding them admits of a solution. That problem has, however, often been conflated with 'moral problem' - of how one should react morally to such ambivalence — which remains active even after the psychological one has been solved. I discuss how the moral problem hits hardest at virtue ethics, old and new. I distinguish between particularist and generalist (...)
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  • Comment Comprendre les Émotions Morales.Christine Clavien - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):601.
    The two main goals of this paper are to question the possibility of the existence of moral emotions and to decipher the notion of moral emotion. I start with a brief critical analysis of various philosophical understandings of moral emotions before setting out an evolutionary line of approach that seems promising at first glance: according to the functional evolutionary approach, moral emotions have the evolutionary function of sustaining cooperation. It turns out ultimately that this approach has its own drawbacks. I (...)
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