- Conscious-state Anti-realism.Pete Mandik - 2015 - In Carlos Muñoz-Suárez & Felipe De Brigard (eds.), Content and Consciousness Revisited: With Replies by Daniel Dennett. Cham: Springer. pp. 184-197.details
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Self-Experience Despite Self-Elusiveness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1491-1504.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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Not in the Mood for Intentionalism.Davide Bordini - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):60-81.details
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Propositional Attitudes as Self-Ascriptions.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Kevin Corcoran (eds.), Common Sense Metaphysics: Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 54-74.details
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Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 137-166.details
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Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 214-233.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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A Short History of the Philosophy of Consciousness in the Twentieth Century.Tim Crane - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge.details
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Relationality of intentionality.Mohammad Saleh Zarepour - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-24.details
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The Limits of Adverbialism about Intentionality.Casey Woodling - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):488-512.details
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Adverbialism, the many-property problem, and inference: reply to Grzankowski.Casey Woodling - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):312-324.details
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Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):237-256.details
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There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.details
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Consequences of schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.details
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Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.details
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Extended Modal Realism — a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.Andrew D. Thomas - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1197-1208.details
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Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction.Hamid Taieb - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):120-132.details
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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality by Angela Mendelovici, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, ISBN 9780190863807, 275 Pages. [REVIEW]Christopher M. Stratman - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1805-1816.details
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Is so-called Phenomenal Intentionality Real Intentionality?Elisabetta Sacchi - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (4):687-710.details
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Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and experience.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (3):583-602.details
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Intentional and Phenomenal Properties: How not to be Inseparatists.Miklós Márton - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):127-147.details
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Recent work: Recent work on intentionality.Michelle Montague - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):765 - 782.details
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Sensory phenomenology and perceptual content.Boyd Millar - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):558-576.details
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Learning to see.Boyd Millar - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (5):601-620.details
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Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.details
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The geometry of visual space and the nature of visual experience.Farid Masrour - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1813-1832.details
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Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism.Farid Masrour - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):565-593.details
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A Radical Relationist Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.Andrea Marchesi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7509-7534.details
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The Phenomenal Character of Emotional Experience: A Look at Perception Theory.Anika Lutz - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):313-334.details
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In Defense of Cognitive Phenomenology: Meeting the Matching Content Challenge.Preston Lennon - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2391-2407.details
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Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character.Harold Langsam - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):375-389.details
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Naïve realism, sensory colors, and the argument from phenomenological constancies.Harold Langsam - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):74-85.details
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The Veil of Abstracta.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.details
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The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.details
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Real narrow content.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):304–328.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):347-373.details
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Intentionality and Normativity.Uriah Kriegel - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.details
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The determinable–determinate relation can’t save adverbialism.Alex Grzankowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):45-52.details
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Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.details
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Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism.Laura Gow - 2017 - Ratio 31 (S1):35-50.details
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Intentionality as intentional inexistence.Laura Gow - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1371-1385.details
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Beyond adverbialism: A new non‐relational theory of perceptual experience.Laura Gow - 2021 - Mind and Language 38 (1):2-19.details
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An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3831-3863.details
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A Neo-Searlean Theory of Intentionality.Nicholas Georgalis - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (7):475-495.details
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A Cognitive Theory of Empty Names.Eduardo García-Ramírez - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):785-807.details
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Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):665-692.details
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The many-property problem is your problem, too.Justin D’Ambrosio - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):811-832.details
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A New Perceptual Adverbialism.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (8):413-446.details
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The Significance of the Many Property Problem.Tim Crane & Alex Grzankowski - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):170.details
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