Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial (...) in itself and in attribution to Kant, it promises to make sense of central claims within his critical philosophy. (shrink)

Elżbieta Walerich The Nature of an Idea according to A. Arnauld’s On True and False IdeasIn the work On True and False Ideas Arnauld attacks, above all, the part of Malebranche’s theory which concerns the ontological status of ideas. The French Jansenist claims that in this doctrine the perceiving mind is completely cut off from the real world created by God. The most important aim of the book is to prove, using geometrical method, the falsity of ideas if one understands (...) them as representative beings where the term representative being signifies a representative archetype different from the act of perception. Arnauld also criticizes the doctrine of seeing ideas in God. Nevertheless, he does not attack the representative standpoint in general but rather its radical version. He does not negate the division into an idea understood as mental perception and a physical thing being perceived. Like René Descartes, the French Jansenist thinks that all objects are known by means of perceptions which are modifications of our mind and, moreover, that we have the idea of God and the idea of the soul. Ideas are then our soul’s modifications and are the same thing as our perceptions. These are psychological beings having representative character, they make objects present to our intellect. So there are not two different entities but only one entity in two relations. When Arnauld claims that representative ideas are the same thing as the acts of perception, he means that modifications of our mind stay in relation to our mind which they modify and, at the same time, in relation to objects which they represent. The term perception underlines the ontological status: it is the modification of the mind. And the term idea indicates that it relates to external objects. The acts of perception represent external things but they do not imitate these objects like pictures do; their objective existence in the mind is different from the real existence of physical objects. When a thing is present to the mind in an objective manner, it does not mean that it is present as an object immanent to our mind but that it is known by our intellect, so that it is the object of the act of perception. The thing is present in our mind objectively when it is represented by the act of perception and then it becomes the intentional object of this act. Keywords: idea, perception, representation, representative being, modification of the mind, representationalism, objective existence. (shrink)