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Game Theory and Economic Modelling

Oxford University Press UK (1990)

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  1. Evolutionary Game Theory.Alexander J. McKenzie & Edward N. Zalta - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Integrating Soft Factors Into the Assessment of Cooperative Relationships Between Firms: Accounting for Reputation and Ethical Values.Bernhard Hirsch & Matthias Meyer - 2010 - Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility 19 (1):81-94.
    Alliances and other forms of cooperation between firms often promise great benefits, for example, by the exchange of knowledge or co-specialization of resources. At the same time, the necessary actions to realize these benefits can augment vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour of partners. In addition to formal contracts to mitigate the resulting behavioural uncertainties, often, mechanisms, such as reputation or ethical values, are suggested as important supplements. However, when it comes to assessment of a specific cooperation opportunity, it is difficult to (...)
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  • Truthfulness in Accounting: How to Discriminate Accounting Manipulators From Non-Manipulators.Dan Cuzdriorean, Oriol Amat & Alina Vladu - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 140 (4):633-648.
    Accountants preparing information are in a position to manipulate the view of economic reality presented in such information to interested parties. These manipulations can be regarded as morally reprehensible because they are not fair to users, they involve in an unjust exercise of power, and they tend to weaken the authority of accounting regulators. This paper develops a model for detecting earnings manipulators using financial statements’ ratios in a sample of Spanish listed companies. Our results provide evidence that accounting data (...)
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  • Rational Choice and Moral Theory.Edward F. McClennen - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):521-540.
    Contemporary discussions of the positive relation between rational choice and moral theory are a special case of a much older tradition that seeks to show that mutual agreement upon certain moral rules works to the mutual advantage, or in the interests, of those who so agree. I make a few remarks about the history of discussions of the connection between morality and self-interest, after which I argue that the modern theory of rational choice can be naturally understood as a continuation (...)
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  • Rational Cooperation.Edward McClennen - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):65-93.
    The Nash-Harsanyi theory of bargaining is usually taken as the correct theory of rational bargaining, and, as such, as the correct theory for the basic political contract for a society. It grafts a theory of cooperation to a base that essentially articulates the perspective of non-cooperative interaction. The resultant theory is supposed make clear how rational bargaining can fully realize the mutual gains that cooperation can make possible. However, its underlying commitment to the concepts of non-cooperative interaction renders this doubtful. (...)
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  • Identification of a Princess Under Incomplete Information: An Amarna Story.Serdar Güner & Daniel Druckman - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (4):383-407.
    This article presents four analyses of an interaction between the middle-Bronze Age Pharaoh Nibmuarea and the Babylonian king Kadashman-Enlil as described in the Amarna letters (Moran [1992] The Amarna Letters, The Johns Hopkins Universiy Press, Baltimore, Maryland). Intent on denying the Pharaoh his daughter in marriage, the Babylonian king was faced with the choice of sending messengers who could (''dignitaries'') or could not identify (''non-dignitaries'') his missing sister in the Pharaoh's court. Intent on marrying the king's daughter, the Pharaoh was (...)
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  • What is Rational About Nash Equilibria?Mathias Risse - 2000 - Synthese 124 (3):361 - 384.
    Nash Equilibrium is a central concept ingame theory. It has been argued that playing NashEquilibrium strategies is rational advice for agentsinvolved in one-time strategic interactions capturedby non-cooperative game theory. This essaydiscusses arguments for that position: vonNeumann–Morgenstern's argument for their minimaxsolution, the argument from self-enforcingagreements, the argument from the absence ofprobabilities, the transparency-of-reasons argument,the argument from regret, and the argument fromcorrelated equilibrium. All of these argumentseither fail entirely or have a very limited scope.Whatever the use of Nash Equilibrium is, therefore,it is (...)
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  • Randomness, Game Theory and Free Will.J. Moreh - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (1):49 - 64.
    Libertarians claim that human behaviour is undetermined and cannot be predicted from knowledge of past history even in principle since it is based on the random movements of quantum mechanics. Determinists on the other hand deny thatmacroscopic phenomena can be activated bysub-microscopic events, and assert that if human action is unpredictable in the way claimed by libertarians, it must be aimless and irrational. This is not true of some types of random behaviour described in this paper. Random behaviour may make (...)
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  • Science Studies and the Theory of Games.Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla - 2006 - Perspectives on Science 14 (4):525-557.
    Being scientific research a process of social interaction, this process can be studied from a game-theoretic perspective. Some conceptual and formal instruments that can help to understand scientific research as a game are introduced, and it is argued that game theoretic epistemology provides a middle ground for 'rationalist' and 'constructivist' theories of scientific knowledge. In the first part , a description of the essential elements of game of science is made, using an inferentialist conception of rationality. In the second part (...)
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  • Innovative Therapies, Suspended Trials, and the Economics of Clinical Research: Facilitated Communication and Biomedical Cases.James R. Wible & Susan Dietrich - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):275-309.
    University of North Carolina at Greensboro Most approaches to the philosophy of the natural and social sciences are basedon completed scientific investigations. However, there are many importantcases in science in which testing is incomplete. These cases are termed suspendedtrials and are particularly significant in biomedical and allied health fields. Initially,the authors' interest in suspended trials was piqued by a controversialmethod for assisting autistic children known as facilitated communication. Thisarticle examines facilitated communication and other examples of suspendedtrials from the perspective of (...)
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  • Book Reviews : James Bohman, New Philosophy of Social Science: Problems of Indeterminacy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992. Pp. X, 273. $32.50. [REVIEW]James Johnson - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (3):385-390.
  • Games Machines Play.Wynn C. Stirling - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (3):327-352.
    Individual rationality, or doing what is best for oneself, is a standard model used to explain and predict human behavior, and von Neumann–Morgenstern game theory is the classical mathematical formalization of this theory in multiple-agent settings. Individual rationality, however, is an inadequate model for the synthesis of artificial social systems where cooperation is essential, since it does not permit the accommodation of group interests other than as aggregations of individual interests. Satisficing game theory is based upon a well-defined notion of (...)
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  • Folk Psychology is Not a Predictive Device.Adam Morton - 1996 - Mind 105 (417):119-37.
    I argue that folk psychology does not serve the purpose of facilitating prediction of others' behaviour but if facilitating cooperative action. (See my subsequent book *The Importance of Being Understood*.
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  • Mathematical Models: Questions of Trustworthiness.Adam Morton - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):659-674.
    I argue that the contrast between models and theories is important for public policy issues. I focus especially on the way a mathematical model explains just one aspect of the data.
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  • Complex Rhetoric and Simple Games.Jeffrey Goldberg & Livia Markoczy - 2000 - Emergence: Complexity and Organization 2 (1):72-100.
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  • What Can We Learn From a Theory of Complexity?Paul Cilliers - 2000 - Emergence: Complexity and Organization 2 (1):23-33.
  • Emergence: A Construct Amid a Thicket of Conceptual Snares.Jeffrey Goldstein - 2000 - Emergence: Complexity and Organization 2 (1):5-22.
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  • Towards a Useful Methodology Discipline.Lawrence A. Boland - 2001 - Journal of Economic Methodology 8 (1):3-10.
  • Integrating Soft Factors Into the Assessment of Cooperative Relationships Between Firms: Accounting for Reputation and Ethical Values.Bernhard Hirsch & Matthias Meyer - 2010 - Business Ethics: A European Review 19 (1):81-94.
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  • Game Theory and Knowledge by Simulation.Adam Morton - 1994 - Ratio 7 (1):14-25.
    I discuss how simulating another agent can be useful in some game-theoretical situations, particularly iterated games such as the centipede game.
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  • South-South Cooperation and Export.Sugata Marjit & Hamid Beladi - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (3):283-293.
    We study the possibility of cartel formation among primary exporters who face an inelastic world demand for their exports. The phenomenon of immiserizing export growth appears as a non-cooperative equilibrium in a two-country export game. With infinite repetitions of the one shot game, we show that `different country size' will be detrimental to the sustenance of the collusive behavior needed for eliminating the possibility of immiserization.
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  • Values in Decision-Making Processes: Systematic Structures of J. Habermas and N. Luhmann for the Appreciation of Responsibility in Leadership. [REVIEW]Eberhard Schnebel - 2000 - Journal of Business Ethics 27 (1-2):79 - 88.
    "Ethical Leadership" in modern multicultural corporations is first the consideration of different personal and cultural value systems in decision-making processes. Second, it is the assignment of responsibility either to individual or organisational causalities. The task of this study is to set the stage for a distinction between rational entities and the arbitrary preferences of individuals in economic decision making processes.Defining rational aspects of behaviour in economics will lead to the formal structures of organisational systems, which are independent of concrete but (...)
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  • Team Reasoning and the Rational Choice of Payoff-Dominant Outcomes in Games.Natalie Gold & Andrew M. Colman - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):305-316.
    Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group identifies. We compare team (...)
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  • Who Should Own Access Rights? A Game-Theoretical Approach to Striking the Optimal Balance in the Debate Over Digital Rights Management.Yu-Lin Chang - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):323-356.
    The development of access rights as, perhaps, a replacement for copyright in digital rights management (DRM) systems, draws our attention to the importance of ‚the balance problem’ between information industries and the individual user. The nature of just what this ‚balance’ is, is often mentioned in copyright writings and judgments, but is rarely discussed. In this paper I focus upon elucidating the idea of balance in intellectual property and propose that the balance concept is not only the most feasible way (...)
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  • On the Use (and Abuse) of Logic in Game Theory.Eric Pacuit - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):741-753.
    IntroductionA quick glance at the opening paragraphs in many of the classic logic textbooks reveals a common view: Logical methods highlight the reasoning patterns of a single agent engaged in some form of mathematical thinking.A sampling from my bookshelf: Shoenfield’s Mathematical Logic: “Logic is the study of reasoning; and mathematical logic is the study of the type of reasoning done by mathematicians”; Enderton’s A Mathematical Introduction of Logic: “Symbolic logic is a mathematical model of deductive thought”; and Chiswell and Hodges (...)
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  • The Invisible Foole.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):37-58.
    I review the classic skeptical challenges of Foole in Leviathan and the Lydian Shepherd in Republic against the prudential rationality of justice. Attempts to meet these challenges contribute to the reconciliation project (Kavka in Hobbesian moral and political theory , 1986 ) that tries to establish that morality is compatible with rational prudence. I present a new Invisible Foole challenge against the prudential rationality of justice. Like the Lydian Shepherd, the Invisible Foole can violate justice offensively (Kavka, Hobbesian moral and (...)
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  • Disciplined Stories in the Governance of the New Institutional Economics.Keith Acheson - 2000 - Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (3):341-371.
    The New Institutional Economics (NIE) occupies an important space in the rapidly expanding theory of organization. Traditional testing techniques have only been applied to less complex parts of the NIE. A rich body of evidence generated by the experiences of firms and other organizations lies fallow. The limited domain of traditional testing will persist because of the nature of the central concepts of the NIE, the difficulty posed for integrating transaction cost into an optimizing framework by self-reference, and the particularly (...)
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