The aim of this paper is to show firstly why Kant believes we should hang on to teleology, and, secondly, that his views on the matter are still relevant to contemporary epistemology despite the fact that theories of evolution now allow purely mechanical explanations of organic processes. By considering Kant’s account in light of that of Daniel Dennett, I elucidate what I believe to be the strength of Kant’s theory, namely, the pragmatic role it assigns to reflective teleological principles. (edited).

A comprehensive and practical study tool, introducing Kant's thought and key works and exploring his continuing influence.

This dissertation concerns the methodology Kant employs in the first two sections of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Groundwork I-II) with particular attention to how the execution of the method of analysis in these sections contributes to the establishment of moral metaphysics as a science. My thesis is that Kant had a detailed strategy for the Groundwork, that this strategy and Kant’s reasons for adopting it can be ascertained from the Critique of Pure Reason (first Critique) and his (...) lectures on logic, and that understanding this strategy gains us interpretive insight into Kant’s moral metaphysics. At the most general level of methodology, Kant says there are four steps for the establishment of any science: 1) make distinct the idea of the natural unity of its material 2) determine the special content of the science 3) articulate the systematic unity of the science 4) critique the science to determine its boundaries The first two of these steps are accomplished by the genetically scholastic method of analysis, paradigmatically the method whereby confused and obscure ideas are made clear and distinct, thereby logically perfecting them and transforming them into possible grounds of cognitive insight that are potentially complete and adequate to philosophical purposes. The analysis of Groundwork I is a paradigmatic analysis that makes distinct what is contained in common understanding, i.e. its Inhalt or intension, making distinct the higher partial concepts that together define the concept of morality. The analysis of Groundwork II is an employment more specifically of the method of logical division, which makes distinct what is contained under the concept, i.e. its Umfang, by which the extension or object of morality is determined. Part I introduces Kant’s conception of moral metaphysical science and why he took it to be in need of establishment, explains the general method for establishing science and the scholastic method of analysis by which its first two steps are to be accomplished, then provides an interpretation of Groundwork I as an execution of this method. Part II details Kant’s determination of the special content of moral science in Groundwork II in relation to the central problem for moral metaphysics – how synthetic a priori practical cognition is possible. (shrink)

In Kant’s moral theory, he describes two levels of highest good as sensible and supersensible. He mentions to these concepts in all his works, without shedding light on fundamental conflict and dispute inherited in the simultaneousness of these two. In accordance with the first level of this concept, have been known as a theological reading of the highest good concept, comparison, and accompaniment of two component of the highest good, that is happiness and virtue, only is achieved with the help (...) of God. In addition to the postulate of God, this subject needs two other reasonable ideas of immortality and freedom. Besides, in accordance with the second level of this concept known as the secular and political reading of the highest good, the comparison is achieved with the help of human activity in this world in form of civil society. This content conflict, contrary to the view of some scholars, refers to two complementary forms in Kant’s thought and it corresponds with the general principles of his critical thinking. While explains Kant’s twofold positions on the highest good, this paper tries to demonstrate how these two forms need to another and otherwise, the complementary component cannot be explained. (shrink)