Metaphysics often has an important role in deciding ethical questions. Specifically, in the realm of bioethics, metaphysical questions such as the nature of persons, diseases, and properties in general can be crucial to determining what is right or wrong. In this article, I tie together various metaphysical themes that recur throughout the rest of the issue: rationality as an element of human nature, ontological classifications, and kinds of action. I will explain that each has ethical implications. Actions that contravene reason (...) will be morally problematic, whereas our classification of illnesses will have important implications for how we ought to respond to ill persons. Metaphysical questions appear, or are at least suggested, in each article, pointing to the need for metaphysics in answering bioethical questions. (shrink)

Since the 1960s, it has been recognized that “medical ethics,” the area of inquiry about the obligations of practitioners of medicine, is inadequate for capturing and addressing the complexities associated with modern medicine, human health, and wellbeing. Subsequently, a new specialty emerged which involved scholars and professionals from a variety of disciplines who had an interest in healthcare ethics. The name adopted is variously biomedical ethics or bioethics. The practice of bioethics in clinical settings is clinical ethics and its primary (...) aim is to resolve patient care issues and conflicts. Nurses are among these clinical ethicists. They are drawn to the study and practice of bioethics and its applications as way to address the problems encountered in practice. A significant number are among the ranks of clinical ethicists. However, in the role of bio- or clinical ethicist, some retained the title of their original profession, calling themselves nurse ethicists, and some did not. In this article, we explore under which conditions it is permissible or preferable that one retains one’s prior profession’s nomenclature as a prefix to “ethicist,” under which conditions it is not, and why. We emphasize the need for transparency of purpose related to titles and their possible influence on individual and social good. (shrink)

Given intractable moral pluralism, what ought one to make of the bioethics that arose in the early 1970s, grounded as it was in the false assumption that there is a common secular morality that secular bioethics ought to apply? It is as if bioethics developed without recognition of the crisis at the heart of secular morality itself. Secular moral rationality cannot of itself provide the foundations to identify a particular morality and its bioethics as canonical. One is not just confronted (...) with intractable moral and bioethical pluralism, but with the absence of a secular ground that can show why one should act morally rather than self-interestedly. The result is not merely the deflation of much of traditional Western morality to life-style and death-style choices, but the threat of deflating to political slogans the now-dominant secular morality, including its affirmation of human autonomy, equality, social justice, and human dignity. All of this invites one critically to reconsider the meaning and force of secular bioethics. (shrink)

This article analyzes certain aspects of the structure of bioethics as a discipline. It begins by arguing that bioethics is an academic discipline of a pragmatic nature and then puts forward a classification of the main problems, issues, and concerns in bioethics, using this classification as a way to outline the limits and framework of the field. Pushing further, it contends that comprehensive treatment of any topic in bioethics requires that three normative dimensions be taken into account. It concludes that (...) the classification of the issues and analysis of each issue's normative dimensions can provide valuable contributions toward understanding the sui generis structure of bioethics as a pragmatic discipline. (shrink)