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  1. Thomas Aquinas on Reprobation.Adam Wood - 2022 - Res Philosophica 99 (1):1-23.
    Given certain anti-Pelagian assumptions he endorses, Aquinas faces an “arbitrariness problem” explaining why God predestines and reprobates the particular individuals he does. One response to the problem that Aquinas offers—biting the bullet and conceding God’s arbitrariness—has a high theoretical cost. Eleonore Stump proposes a less costly alternative solution on Thomas’s behalf, drawing on his notion that our wills may rest in a state of “quiescence.” Her proposal additionally purports to answer the general question why God reprobates anyone at all. I (...)
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  • Divine Universal Causality and the Particular Problem of Hell: A Quiescence Solution.Adam Wood - 2021 - Scientia et Fides 9 (2):181-199.
    I call the Particular Problem of Hell the problem of explaining why God allows a certain set of created persons to populate hell, as opposed to allowing some other set of created persons to do so. This paper proposes a solution to PPH on behalf of proponents of Divine Universal Causality — the view, roughly, that God causes everything distinct from himself to exist at any time it exists. Despite initial appearances, I argue, proponents of DUC can adopt a version (...)
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  • Blameworthiness, Love, and Strong Divine Sovereignty.Peter Furlong - 2017 - Sophia 56 (3):419-433.
    In this paper, I explore some problems faced by those who endorse what I will call strong divine sovereignty. According to this view, every worldly event is guaranteed by God’s causal activity. The first problem this view faces is that it seems to make God morally blameworthy. I explore several possible ways for defenders of SDS to avoid this conclusion. Unfortunately, however, each of these solutions leaves another problem intact: if SDS is true, then it appears that God is not (...)
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  • Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    “Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (And what a fuss it has been: philosophers have debated this question for over two millenia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it.) Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very (...)
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  • Grounding and Creaturely Participation in God.Ross Inman - forthcoming - In Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Theology of Nature.
    This chapter aims to explore the intersection of Christian theism, a neo-Aristotelian gloss on metaphysical grounding, and creaturely participation in God. In section one, I aim to de- velop several core tenets at the heart of a theistic participatory ontology as it is found in the Christian tradition, what I call minimal participatory ontology. In section two, I examine the contemporary notion of metaphysical grounding, namely the formal and structure features of the grounding relation, and offer a grounding-theoretic framework for (...)
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  • Moral Agents in a Moral World: A New Account of Moral Realism and Moral Perception.Lanell Maria Mason - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Reading
    The purpose of this thesis is to provide a metaphysic for moral realism and moral perception. This thesis is in two parts. The first is concerned with basic ontology. I begin in chapter 1 with an analysis of causation, demonstrating that substance theory is superior to Humeanism at accounting for our observations; thus I defend a substance ontology. In chapter 2, I address human agency, demonstrating that reasons internalism does not allow for incompatibilist freedom; hence, I affirm reasons are states (...)
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  • Dependence, Transcendence, and Creaturely Freedom: On the Incompatibility of Three Theistic Doctrines.Aaron Segal - forthcoming - Mind.
    In this paper I argue for the incompatibility of three claims, each of them quite attractive to a theist. First, the doctrine of deep dependence: the universe depends for its existence, in a non-causal way, on God. Second, the doctrine of true transcendence: the universe is wholly distinct from God; God is separate and apart from the universe in respect of mereology, modes, and mentality. Third, the doctrine of robust creaturely freedom: some creature performs some act such that he could (...)
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