Aristotle tells us that in order to develop virtue, one needs to come to love and hate the right sorts of things. However, his description of the virtuous person clearly privileges love to hate. It is love rather than hate that is the main driving force of a good life. It is because of her love of knowledge, truth and beauty that the virtuous person organizes her life in a certain way and pursues these rather than other things (such as (...) pleasure). When hate comes into the picture, it is merely an unavoidable consequence of loving those noble and beautiful things. The virtuous person hates things that are contrary to her values, but does not concentrate on them, much less constructs her life in the pursuit of their destruction. But why privilege love over hate in this way? Why could not a good (happy) and virtuous life be a life driven primarily by hate (in particular, one aimed at eradicating what one (correctly) considers shameful and evil)? Without appealing to any consequences or harmful effects that hate might have on other People, the paper gives two answers to this question. First, allowing hate (rather than love) to dominate one’s life would undermine the right relationship between the two parts of the soul (the rational and the non-rational one) that Aristotle recognizes. Virtue involves establishing the right kind of internal ordering of one’s soul and this cannot be done if one’s soul is dominated by hate. Second, hate has negative cognitive effects insofar as it renders one insensitive to the beauty of human nature and behavior and actively precludes one from acquiring knowledge and understanding. Accordingly, if a good life is a life that involves virtue and knowledge, a life fueled by hate cannot but fall short of that ideal. (shrink)

Although sometimes forgotten in current uses of the term, ?hatred? is a notoriously complex and ambiguous phenomenon. Analyzing and identifying what characterizes hatred and articulating a concept that helps us think more clearly about hatred is difficult. It is not even clear whether hatred is an emotion, an attitude, a sentiment or a passion. This essay departs from the idea that perhaps hatred is analyzable as a retributive reactive attitude. More precisely, it presents a philosophical exploration of what happens if (...) one puts a messy bundle of notions and examples of hatred into the more clear conceptual framework offered by Strawson in ?Freedom and Resentment?. The question whether hatred can be seen as a retributive reactive attitude is examined both with respect to Strawson's division between participant and objective attitudes and with respect to the seemingly most closely related participant attitude, resentment. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that a certain kind of envy is not only morally permissible, but also, sometimes, more fitting and productive than admiration. Envy and admiration are part of our emotional palette, our toolbox of evolutionary adaptations, and they play complementary roles. I start by introducing my original taxonomy of envy, which allows me to present emulative envy, a species of envy sometimes confused with admiration. After reviewing how the two emotions differ from a psychological perspective, I focus (...) in particular on the distinct and complementary roles they play in the ethical and political domains. (shrink)

Research on this topic in Europe and North America has reached a new stage. Prior to 1970, historians told a story of progress in which modern individuals gradually gained mastery of emotions. After 1970 this older approach was put into doubt. Since 1990 research into the history of emotions has increasingly relied on a new methodology, based on the assumption that emotion is a domain of effort, and that it is possible to document variance between emotional standards, on the one (...) hand, and the greater or lesser success of individuals in conforming to them, on the other. Emotional standards are now assumed to display a history that is not progressive, but reflects distinctive features of each period. (shrink)

Seit Dodds’ Anwendung des Begriffs „Schamkultur“ auf die griechische Kultur genießt das Thema Scham die besondere Aufmerksamkeit der Gräzisten. Basierend auf einer detaillierten Analyse der relevanten Belegstellen im gesamten platonischen Corpus und einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit den vorherigen einschlägigen Forschungen, versucht die vorliegende Arbeit Platons Konzeption der Scham systematisch zu erläutern, und zwar thematisch unter den folgenden vier Perspektiven: dem sokratischen elenchos, der Wahrheitsliebe, dem Moralverständnis sowie der Moralerziehung im Staat. Die Studie zielt einerseits darauf ab, aufzuzeigen, dass Platons Verständnis (...) von Scham nicht so unreif ist, wie man bislang dachte; andererseits möchte sie vor Augen führen, dass Platon Scham nicht, wie traditionell angenommen, als nur negativ erachtet, sondern ihre positive Rolle in verschiedenen Gebieten durchaus anerkennt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Scham und die ihr verwandten Emotionen von Bedeutung sowohl für den platonischen Sokrates als auch für die platonische Philosophie im Ganzen sind, auch wenn der Begriff „Schamkultur“ wohl keine zutreffende Bezeichnung für seine Zeit darstellt. (shrink)

Topical Themes in Argumentation Theory brings together twenty exploratory studies on important subjects of research in contemporary argumentation theory. The essays are based on papers that were presented at the 7th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation in Amsterdam in June 2010. They give an impression of the nature and the variety of the kind of research that has recently been carried out in the study of argumentation. The volume starts with three essays that provide stimulating (...) theoretical perspectives on argumentation. Subsequently, some views are explained on the intriguing topics of ‘dissensus’ and ‘deep disagreement’. After a discussion of three different approaches to the treatment of types of argumentation some classical themes from antique argumentation theory are revisited. The new research area of visual argumentation is explored in the next part. The volume concludes with three reports of experimental studies concerning argumentative discourse. The volume starts with three essays that provide stimulating theoretical perspectives on argumentation. Subsequently, some views are explained on the intriguing topics of ‘dissensus’ and ‘deep disagreement’. After a discussion of three different approaches to the treatment of types of argumentation some classical themes from antique argumentation theory are revisited. The new research area of visual argumentation is explored in the next part. The volume concludes with three reports of experimental studies concerning argumentative discourse. The volume starts with three essays that provide stimulating theoretical perspectives on argumentation. Subsequently, some views are explained on the intriguing topics of ‘dissensus’ and ‘deep disagreement’. After a discussion of three different approaches to the treatment of types of argumentation some classical themes from antique argumentation theory are revisited. The new research area of visual argumentation is explored in the next part. The volume concludes with three reports of experimental studies concerning argumentative discourse. (shrink)

Empathizing with others is thought to be a useful, if not necessary, skill for a wise person to possess. Beyond this general conceptual assonance, however, there have been few systematic attempts to conceptualize this relationship. This paper aims to address this issue by investigating what role empathy is said to play in phronesis and whether there is a legitimate place for it in Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) accounts of practical wisdom. First, after a brief overview of Aristotle’s account of phronesis, I (...) will try to define three different ways in which empathy is thought to contribute to it according to the existing literature, based on a conceptual distinction between affective empathy, cognitive empathy, and sympathy. Second, I will ask whether empathy is the best conceptual candidate for Aristotle’s account of phronesis and, more generally, whether the wise person should always rely on empathy in order to deliberate and act well. My tentative answer will be that empathy does not seem to be perfectly compatible with the concept of phronesis, nor is it its best ally. (shrink)

In this article I argue that characterizations of anger as a hostile emotion may be mistaken. My project is empirically informed and is partly descriptive, partly diagnostic. It is descriptive in that I am concerned with what anger is, and how it tends to manifest, rather than with what anger should be or how moral anger is manifested. The orthodox view on anger takes it to be, descriptively, an emotion that aims for retribution. This view fits well with anger being (...) a hostile emotion, as retribution is punitive. I will argue that a different view of anger deserves our attention. On this alternative view, anger aims for recognition of harms done, rather than for the punishment of those who have committed them. I argue that we have reason to favour a strong view that excludes retribution from anger’s main aims. In addition, I offer a diagnosis of the reasons that led the retributive view of anger to become, and remain, orthodoxy. This diagnosis provides indirect reason to give my descriptive proposal serious consideration, for it highlights that the orthodox view has dominated folk and philosophical conceptions of anger for reasons that do not speak in favour of the view’s veracity. The view that anger is a hostile emotion will therefore emerge as in need of serious scrutiny. (shrink)

Este artículo explora el potencial persuasivo de los imperativos y las preguntas en los discursos de Esquines y Demóstenes. Los imperativos tienen una fuerza directiva volitiva en que invitan a la audiencia a tomar medidas, ya sea bloqueando al adversario del orador para que no haga una declaración o votando en contra de él. El uso de una alta concentración de preguntas retóricas en momentos específicos en los discursos se convierte en una herramienta poderosa: tanto al articular un ataque implacable (...) contra el oponente, como al no dar al público un respiro en el cual considere defectos en la posición del hablante. (shrink)

This article aims to draw attention to the way in which a subset of reactive attitudes make us less free. Vasubandhu’s explanation of reactive attitudes shows us how they make us less free...

One of three basic types of desire, claims Aristotle, is thumos (‘spirit,’ ‘passion,’ ‘heart,’ ‘anger,’ ‘impulse’). The other two are epithumia (‘appetite’) and boulêsis (‘wish,’ ‘rational desire’). Yet, he never gives us an account of thumos; it has also received relatively little scholarly attention. I argue that thumos has two key features. First, it is able to cognize what I call ‘social value,’ the agent’s own perceived standing relative to others in a certain domain. In human animals, shame and honor (...) are especially important manifestations of social value. Second, thumos provides non-rational motivation to pursue what affirms the agent’s social value and avoid what denies it. Interpretations that hold thumos just is anger, or that its object is the fine (kalon), I argue, are mistaken. My account also explains the role of thumos in moral education. In a virtuous agent thumos will be affectively attuned to the correct social rankings; it will take the practically wise, the lovers of the fine, or moral exemplars, as authorities. (shrink)

The “problem of emotions,” that is, that many of them are both meaningful and corporeal, has yet to be resolved. Western thinkers, from Augustine to Descartes to Zajonc, have handled this problem by employing various forms of mind–body dualism. Some psychologists and neuroscientists since the 1970s have avoided it by talking about cognitive and emotional “processing,” using a terminology borrowed from computer science that nullifies the meaningful or intentional character of both thought and emotion. Outside the Western-influenced contexts, emotion and (...) thought are not seen as distinct kinds of things. Here a solution of sorts is proposed by thinking of emotional expression as a dynamic activity that declares and stirs emotions at the same time. As such, its dynamism may help historians to understand the dramatic changes and trends they investigate. (shrink)

Modern honor appears to be distinguished by two contradictory impulses, a neglect or even disdain of honor, and an ambition to elevate and promote it as dignity, self-esteem, and recognition. The article argues that these tensions can be traced to a foundational difference regarding the political importance of the passion of honor, evident in the seminal and contending formulations by Machiavelli and Hobbes. In recovering and articulating the bases of these competing modern conceptions of honor and tracing the influence of (...) their divergent trajectories, the article seeks to show the importance of honor for understanding contemporary politics. (shrink)

Current discussions of hermeneutical injustice, I argue, poorly characterise the cognitive state of victims by failing to account for the communicative success that victims have when they describe their experience to other similarly situated persons. I argue that victims, especially when they suffer moral wrongs that are yet unnamed, are able (1) to grasp certain salient aspects of the wrong they experience and (2) to cultivate the ability to identify instances of the wrong in virtue of moral emotions. By moral (...) emotions I mean emotions like indignation that reflect an agent’s ethical commitments and bear on her ethical assessments. Further, I argue that victims can impart their partial understanding of the wrong they suffer to others who are not similarly situated by eliciting moral emotions such as pity that are tied to broad notions of justice and fairness. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 2, pp 117 - 147 I argue that Plato, in the _Timaeus_, draws deep theoretical distinctions between sensation and affect, which comprises pleasure, pain, desire and emotion. Sensation is both ‘fine-grained’ and ‘immediate’. Emotions, by contrast, are mediated and coarse-grained. Pleasure and pain are coarse-grained but, in a range of important cases, immediate. The _Theaetetus_ assimilates affect to sensation in a way the _Timaeus_ does not. Smell frustrates Timaeus because it is coarse-grained, although unlike pleasure (...) and pain it is so by accident of physiology. (shrink)

The history of the emotions first developed as a field of inquiry in Europe. It took root in the United States only in the 1980s. Today, the field has expanded dramatically. Historians of the emotions share the conviction that culture gives some shape to emotional life and that consequently, feelings vary across time and culture. Working on that assumption, recent historical works have investigated the changing role of emotions in politics, economics, and private life. There are a number of contentious (...) issues within the field, including the much debated relationship between words and feelings, the pace and direction of change in emotional culture, and the question of the continuity of emotional experience and categories over centuries. (shrink)

In the Philebus, Socrates argues that pleasures can be false in the same way that beliefs can be false. On the basis of Socrates' analysis of malicious pleasure, a mixed pleasure of the soul and a passion, I defend the view that, according to Socrates, pleasures can be false when they represent as pleasant something that is not worthy of our enjoyment, where that means that they represent as pleasant something that is not pleasant in its own right because it (...) is not fine. Since these pleasures misrepresent the value of their objects, they involve an evaluative error. In contrast, a pleasure is true when it correctly represents the actual value of things. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to offer a mitigated moral justification of a much maligned emotional trait, pity, in the Aristotelian sense of ‘pain at deserved bad fortune’. I lay out Aristotle's taxonomic map of pity and its surrounding conceptual terrain and argue – by rehearsing modern accounts – that this map is not anachronistic with respect to contemporary conceptions. I then offer an ‘Aristotelian’ moral justification of pity, not as a full virtue intrinsically related to eudaimonia but as (...) a positive moral quality that has instrumental value in developing and sustaining a certain intrinsically valuable state of character – namely compassion. The justification offered is mitigated in the sense that it does not elevate pity to a virtuous disposition, constitutive of the good life; yet it does offer a crucial counterweight to Aristotle's own denunciation of pity. (shrink)

Taking as its starting point a previous work by the author which reviewed early philosophical sources on jealousy and proposed both a conceptual and moral account of this much-maligned emotion, the present article reviews the relevant philosophical literature from the last decade or so. Most noticeable is how scarce those sources still are. Special attention is given, however, to a new conceptual model proposed by Purshouse and Fredericks which rejects the standard architectonic of jealousy as a three-party compound emotion. While (...) the essential contours of the new model are rejected, Fredericks is shown to offer some powerful misgivings about putative instrumentalist defences of jealousy. In addition to this new model, a number of other recent writings about jealousy – historical, conceptual and moral – are subjected to critical scrutiny in this overview article. (shrink)

Taking as its starting point a previous work by the author which reviewed early philosophical sources on jealousy and proposed both a conceptual and moral account of this much-maligned emotion, the present article reviews the relevant philosophical literature from the last decade or so. Most noticeable is how scarce those sources still are. Special attention is given, however, to a new conceptual model proposed by Purshouse and Fredericks which rejects the standard architectonic of jealousy as a three-party compound emotion. While (...) the essential contours of the new model are rejected, Fredericks is shown to offer some powerful misgivings about putative instrumentalist defences of jealousy. In addition to this new model, a number of other recent writings about jealousy – historical, conceptual and moral – are subjected to critical scrutiny in this overview article. (shrink)

This article has three interrelated aims. The first is to analyze the concept of grief; the second is to argue for the putative rationality of grief (against Donald Gustafson’s contention to the contrary); and the third is to offer a moral justification of grief along broadly Aristotelian lines as an intrinsically valuable trait of character—a virtue. With regard to this third and ultimate aim, I argue not only that grief plays an unappreciated positive role in our moral experiences but flesh (...) out a case for what exactly that positive moral role is. More precisely, I argue that grief is best justified as an Aristotelian desert-based emotional trait, incorporating two distinct desert-motivated desires, one specifically directed at the memory of the dead person as deserving of homage, the other more cosmically focusing on the general undeservingness of good people passing away. The argument goes against the grain of most previous instrumental justifications of grief and palpably violates David Konstan’s contention that grief involves “no reference to desert.”. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to provide a critical review of recent writings about jealousy in psychology, as seen from a philosophical perspective. At a more general level of inquiry, jealousy offers a useful lens through which to study generic issues concerned with the conceptual and moral nature of emotions, as well as the contributions that philosophers and social scientists can make to understanding them. Hence, considerable space is devoted to comparisons of psychological and philosophical approaches to emotion research (...) in general. It turns out that although arguments about the necessary conceptual features of jealousy qua specific emotion, do carry philosophical mileage, they may fail to cut ice with psychologists who tend to focus on jealousy as a broad dimension of temperament. The review reveals a disconcerting lack of cross-disciplinary work on jealousy: the sort of work that has moved the discourse on other emotions forward in recent years. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer a reconstruction of gratitude as an Aristotelian virtue. The account I propose is meant to be essentially Aristotelian although it is clearly not Aristotle’s own account. I start in section “Current Discourses on Gratitude” with an overview of recent discourses on gratitude in philosophy and psychology. I then proceed, in section “Putting the Aristotelian Pieces Together”, to spell out a formal characterisation of gratitude as an Aristotelian emotional virtue. Section “Reappraising Aristotle on (...) megalopsychia and Gratitude” pauses to explore how such a characterisation can be squared with Aristotle’s apparently unambiguous remarks about gratitude as a non-component of the virtuous makeup of the megalopsychoi. Finally, I conclude in section “Gratitude and Poetic Justice” by demonstrating the virtuosity of gratitude—what makes it intrinsically valuable as part of eudaimonia—by elucidating its association with the overarching emotional virtue of nemesis. (shrink)

This paper shows the close relationship between morality and emotions, as emotions were defined and understood by classical Greek and Roman philosophers. Particular attention is paid to the nature of anger, and also to the distinction between full-fledged emotions, which depend on rational judgments and which, accordingly, only human beings are capable of experiencing, and what the Stoics called “pre-emotions,” which were common to human beings and other animals.

Emotion Review, Volume 13, Issue 4, Page 282-288, October 2021. Efforts to identify in the expression “being moved” a new emotion have found a hospitable environment in the recent turn to the body in emotion and cognitive studies, exemplified herein affect theory, with a particular focus on the effects of music. Although classical Greek and Latin had comparable expressions, however, they did not single out a specific emotion. Given that music played an important role in ancient educational theories, and was (...) imagined as having arousing powerful reactions, this might seem a curious absence. The reason, at least in part, maybe the strong cognitive conception of emotions characteristic of classical theories. But this should not discourage the search for emotions that are not included in the ancient canons. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore the ways in which the engagement with Greek tragedy may contribute fruitfully to the unfolding of empathy in medical students and practitioners. To reappraise the general view that classical texts are remote from modern experience because of the long distance between the era they represent and today, I propose an approach to Greek tragedy viewed through the lens of historical empathy, and of the association between past situations and similar contemporary experiences, in (...) particular. After a brief examination of the concept of empathy, its links with literary reading, and the discussion of these interrelations within the training of narrative medicine, and narrative ethics in particular, the focus turns to selected parts of Sophocles’ Philoctetes, such as the disease scene—an ancient example of pathography. Here Neoptolemus’ empathy for Philoctetes’ situation and its consequences are explored with specific interest in the modern readers’ affective response in connection with their own experiences in medical practice. Neoptolemus’ ethical conflict, which is resolved by his decision to care for Philoctetes, and the problematic nature of this attitude are both indicative of the aim of Greek tragedy to problematize universal issues and thus to point towards the instability of human life and the fluidity of human nature. Realizing through historical empathy the precariousness of human existence may lead to a better understanding and hence better care for others and open new perspectives in the development of empathy within the context of contemporary medical education and practice. (shrink)

The master narrative of a profound crisis in traditional faith leading to a hardening of authority and religious persecution in late fifth-century Athens has a long scholarly history, one that maintains a persistent presence in current research. This paper proposes to reexamine some aspects of religious authority in late fifth-century Athens through one case-study: the trial of Andocides in 400 BCE. Instead of proposing a new reconstruction of the events that led to this trial, it will compare and contrast the (...) rival rhetorics of authority deployed by Andocides in De mysteriis and Ps.-Lysias in In Andocidem and attempt to locate them in their respective social and cultural contexts. (shrink)

Chariton’s novel, Chaereas and Callirhoe, is intensely interested not only in the emotional experience of the protagonists but also in the emotional effect the narrative has on readers. Among the many emotions depicted within the text, one stands out for its architectonic function: jealousy. Jealousy articulates the plot and propels it forward. Jealousy is also represented as a fundamentally “readerly” emotion: scenes of reading focus on the potential of written texts to stir jealous emotions. Similarly, scenes of embedded narration focus (...) on the jealous reactions of narratees. The plot achieves closure when Chaereas learns to manage his jealousy as narratee and narrator. His experience, however, has implications also for Chariton and his readers. The text’s representation of jealousy as a narrative and textual force speaks both to the experience of writing in a culture that prizes the imitation of prestigious models and to the experience of reading a text that self-consciously hybridizes those models. (shrink)

The passing of Nelson Mandela and other figures of contemporary importance may prompt the interesting question of how we might or should understand the psychological, social and moral function of lamentation in human life. This paper aims to show that such responses are not just of emotional and interpersonal significance, but also of serious moral import. To this end, the paper proceeds via exploration of conceptually and morally suggestive correspondences or resonances between the logical grammar of lamentation—which, to be sure, (...) has received almost no latter day analytical attention—and that of gratitude or thankfulness in which there has been an enormous explosion of academic interest in recent years. The paper argues that there is no less case for a moral virtue of lamentation, than for a virtue of gratitude. (shrink)

De toutes les émotions, la colère est l’une des plus puissantes. Elle s’accompagne de nombreux autres affects – indignation, culpabilité, amertume, ressentiment, haine, désir de vengeance – devenus les dénominateurs communs d’une globalisation confuse. Violences politiques et terrorismes transnationaux, soulèvements populaires et protestations « indignées » à travers le monde, insurrections armées au long cours, montée des populismes et reflux des nationalismes, regains et consolidations autoritaires, haine de l’« autre », interminables guerres civiles et conflits gelés, rancœurs sociétales nouvelles comme (...) plus anciennes, belligérances numériques inédites… Inexorablement, sous nos yeux, c’est la colère qui semble dévorer une globalisation que d’aucuns qualifiaient autrefois d’« heureuse ». Cet article analyse ce qu’est « être en colère » et tente d’en saisir les rapports complexes au « global ». Assiste-t-on à un phénomène passager ou cet emportement général, visible partout, a-t-il déjà mué en logique durable? De quelle « globalisation » la colère est-elle le nom? (shrink)

The paper argues that thumos, which is never explicitly mentioned as a part of the soul in the Symposium, plays a major role in the dialogue. In light of the Republic’s characterization of thumos as the source of emotions such as of love of honor, love of victory, admiration for courage, shame, anger, and the propensity to become indignant at real or imaginary wrongs, the paper argues that both Phaedrus’ speech and the speech of Alcibiades are shaped by thumoeidetic motivations. (...) While Phaedrus’ stress on shame, honor, glory and courage aims at proving that Eros inspires virtue, the speech of Alcibiades shows that thumoeidetic motivations are not sufficient to shape a noble character. The dependence on recognition, the ambiguous role played by shame, and the tension between what is admirable and what just happens to be admired are implicit shortcomings in Phaedrus’ speech. When the same themes come back in Alcibiades’ speech they work as negative counterpoints to Phaedrus’ main arguments. Alcibiades’ obsession with power and victory dominates his ambivalent encomium of Socrates. The speech does not reveal who Socrates really is. Rather, it shows how the philosophical life can be misunderstood when reason’s best ally takes over in the souls of men. (shrink)

This dissertation provides a thorough examination of the role of aeschynē (as distinct from aidōs) in Aristotle’s conception of human nature by illuminating the political and ethical implications of shame and shamelessness and the effect of these implications in his treatises. It is crucial, both to one’s own personhood and eudaimonia as well as to the existence of a just and balanced state, that aeschynē be understood and respected because of the self-evaluating ability that it maintains. The aim of this (...) work is to show that a recognition and appreciation of aeschynē as understood in Aristotle’s conception of human nature simultaneously leads to eudaimonia and away from the dangerous state of anaeschyntia (shamelessness). Aeschynē is required in order to create a better existence both on the personal level and on the larger level of social community. The function and responsibility of aeschynē in Aristotle’s work is recognized in its full potential as a civic virtue: specifically, metriopatheia. Metriopatheia, which is aeschynē properly energized through phronesis, acts as a tool allowing one to moderate her passions. It is essential to recognize Aristotle’s use of aeschynē as metriopatheia because it sheds new light on Aristotle’s conception of human nature. The rational human soul, according to Aristotle, is always striving for full actuality. The goal of human life, like all life for Aristotle, is proper function with excellence. Aeschynē as metriopatheia is responsible for the moderation of one’s passions thus promoting aretē. Aeschynē offers insight into the opinions of those who are ethical and thus produces right reason in actions. One who is anaeschyntia cannot reach her full potentiality nor can she be a contributing member of the political community, the koinōnia. (shrink)

According to Aristotle there may be times when the virtuous person is justified in taking revenge. Many commentators claim that revenge, on Aristotle’s account, aims at restoring the honor and reputation of the avenger, but I will show that this cannot be why the virtuous person seeks revenge. I argue, instead, that the virtuous person seeks revenge when she is slighted in order to prove her worth. Aristotle claims that we slight those we think are neither good nor bad nor (...) capable of producing good or bad things. Although the virtuous person will ignore most slights, Aristotle thinks there may be times when even a virtuous person will have to take revenge in order to prove her worth, not because she is insecure or requires honors, but because she cannot function to the best of her abilities within her society if those she interacts with fail to recognize her worth. (shrink)