This article re-examines Ned Block‘s ( 1997 , 2007 ) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block’s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in (...) light of empirical evidence. Finally, his claim that there can be phenomenology without cognitive accessibility is at odds with his endorsement of the 'same-order-theory' of consciousness. (shrink)

Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A ‘perfect experiment’ illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.

Phenomenal overflow has garnered significant attention in the field of consciousness research due to its potential to shed light on the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, it postulates that the phenomenal consciousness of individuals may exceed their differential access consciousness, because of a phenomenon observed in certain scientific psychological experiments where subjects claim to perceive all that is presented to them but are only able to report part of it. This phenomenon has been challenged by critics who argue (...) that the apparent perceptual richness is merely an illusion. However, upon a reexamination of relevant experimental data, it is evident that the illusory interpretation is at least partially unreasonable, as it is facing similar issues to those of overflow, and the debate goes on and on. (shrink)