"Roger Garaudy was for many years at the centre of the French Communist Party but was eventually expelled for his liberal views. In the Seventies he developed a project to bring Marxism and Christianity together, to include all humanity in a project to set all people free. What emerges from Garaudy's project is a very modern Marxism, with its emphasis on the individual, its ecological politics, and in its insistence on religion as central to human emancipation. Although Garaudy himself became (...) frustrated by the West and converted to Islam in 1982, ending his life discredited in the West, it is certainly possible that Garaudy's project represents a good, perhaps even the best, starting point for Marxism in today's world"--. (shrink)

Discussion of Alexander Bogdanov as a Marxist revisionist has largely centred on his philosophy of being and cognition and on Plekhanov’s and Lenin’s accusation that Bogdanov was an idealist renegade from Marxism. However, the real issue of revisionism at the time was not materialism but determinism: the question of whether socialism would appear by the working of the objective laws of nature or the subjective will of human beings. Bogdanov did indeed revise Marxism, but he did so in order to (...) defend it as a natural science. He conceived of society as a form of life subject to biological laws of nature: the need to assimilate energy from the environment and the need to adapt to the environment in the struggle to survive. He reinterpreted the key elements of scientific socialism – the idea that existence determines consciousness and the labour theory of value – in terms of this worldview. (shrink)

Brzozowski’s ‘philosophy of labour’—to which he devoted a number of writings starting in 1902—presents problems of interpretation. A conceptual approach to his conception shows it to be a sometimes uneasy mix of realist and anti-realist notions. Brzozowski appears to have thought that labour is not first of all about the things it supposedly transforms, but rather about itself. I suggest that Brzozowski can be read in the spirit of Nelson Goodman’s nominalist constructionalism (“worldmaking”). On this account, labour in Brzozowski’s idiom (...) turns out to be the constitution of forms of symbolizing sufficient unto themselves and the needs they satisfy. However, that Brzozowski was not entirely consistent in the views I impute to him—he forever sought for some ‘external’ measure of the rightness of labour/symbolizing—can be explained at least in part by his ‘humanism’, that is, his commitment to the task he assigns humankind, that of creating the one meaningful world attesting to virtually unrestricted human power. (shrink)

At the end of 1907 within a couple of months Lunačarskij met both Gor’kij and Brzozowski in Italy and found many important points of contact with each. To compare Lunačarskij’s thought at that time with Brzozowski’s “philosophical program” of 1907 casts some new light on the great variety of interpretations that enlivened Easter European Marxism at the beginning of the twentieth century. On the one hand, it explains Lunačarskij’s “economism” as distinct both from Brzozowski’s extreme anthropologism and Gor’kij’s “cosmism”; on (...) the other, it shows that Lunačarskij’s “philosophy of labour” promoted a violent attitude of conquest and humankind’s domination of nature. Although he criticized Brzozowski’s sympathies with German Idealism, Lunačarskij shared with him a deep appreciation of human creative power, which is evident in his peculiar form of collectivism as well. (shrink)

There is little agreement about Marx's aims, or even his basic claims, in his Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy and Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. Marx has been read as an idealist, or as a materialist; as praising Epicurus, or as criticizing him. Some have read Marx as using ancient philosophers as proxies in a contemporary debate, without demonstrating how he does so in detail. I show that Marx's dialectical reading of Epicurus's atomism aims at transcending the (...) dichotomy between idealism and materialism; that on Marx's reading Epicurus deserves praise for thinking through atomism to its “highest” conclusion, but criticism for not embracing this conclusion; and that Marx's intervention in contemporary debates takes the form of revealing a dialectical relationship between “liberal” and “positive” philosophers. I conclude that the importance of these texts is to be located in their original stance on the problematic of the relation of thought to reality, common to what Marx finds in ancient philosophy and in his contemporary environment. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that historical materialism was first developed by Karl Marx, whose philosophy is often equated with this idea. The following paper challenges this opinion by showing that historical materialism, understood as a general position within the philosophy of history, can be traced back to two generally unheralded Chinese thinkers: Liu Zongyuan (773–819) and Li Gou (1009–1059). Historical materialism is here understood as a standpoint built on three tenets: (1) a belief in the dependence of culture on the (...) material fundaments of social life; (2) the interpretation of human history through the prism of structural transformations; and (3) understanding political and economic relationships in terms of antagonism between social groups. After elaborating upon the presence of these tenets in the thought of Liu and Li, the paper analyzes the influence of their ideas and, finally, points out the main differences between the premodern and modern forms of historical materialism. (shrink)

The geography of contemporary bohemia is integral to Richard Florida’s thesis of the rise of a new creative class in the USA. The strong correlation between the presence of bohemians and innovative high-tech industries in a number of American cities stands in sharp contrast to the historical image of a bohemian subculture of artists and intellectuals, defined by their antagonistic relationship to bourgeois society. Rather than a sign of social marginality, bohemian life-styles have now become a marker of the ‘new (...) economy’, variously labeled the creative, the cultural or the aesthetic economy. In my paper I want to compare and contrast these two opposed images of bohemia – the 19th-century idea of bohemia as the libertarian other of liberal-bourgeois society and the new, highly topical economic geography of bohemia – with the following questions in mind: How and why does the 19th-century artistic critique of capitalism mutate into an expression of the new spirit of capitalism? Does this change from an antagonistic to an affirmative relationship signal the emergence of a new spirit of art that can be related to the new spirit of capitalism? (shrink)

This paper argues that the Marxist theory of the proletariat in many ways projects a romanticized self-description or 'false shadow' of its revolutionary spokesmen, and hence more proximately describes the missionary complex and Bohemian life-style of marginalized political intellectuals than a 'really existing' working class. This 'mistaken iden tity play' between spokespersons and their favourite sociological con stituency, which is already alluded to in various historical left-wing and right-wing 'farewells to the proletariat', is more systematically criti cized in recent reassessments (...) by, for example, Bahro, Gouldner, Gorz, or Bauman. Next to its psychological and sociological infrastructure, classical proletarian standpoint theory has also attracted critical atten tion because of its suggestive epistemological linkage between the con dition of estrangement and claims for scientific objectivity. This connection is reasserted by recent feminist and postcolonial standpoint epistemologies - which, however, also tend to repeat the logic of classi cal Marxism's metonymic 'identity play'. The paper concludes with a defence\of the idea of 'situated knowledges', which wishes to preserve the classical liaison between objectivity, distanciation and marginality, while simultaneously rendering it more reflexive in critical confron tation with the ubiquitous 'spokesperson problem'. (shrink)

This article addresses the ideological context of twentieth-century history of science as it emerged and was discussed at the threshold of the Cold War. It is claimed that the bifurcation of the discipline into a socio-economic strand and a technical-intellectual one should be traced back to the 1930s. In fact, the proposal of a Marxist-oriented historiography by the Soviet delegates at the International Congress of History of Science and Technology led by Nikolai Bukharin, set off the ideological and methodological opposition (...) that characterised the later years. Bukharin’s views on science are closely considered, as well as those of his Marxist critics, György Lukács and Antonio Gramsci. It is argued that, despite the fluidity of the positions of the 1920s and 1930s, these theories soon crystallized as demonstrated by the leftist reception of Bukharin’s and his associates’ perspective in the history of science, especially in Great Britain, as well as by the anti-communist reactions. Intellectualist approaches renouncing socio-economic factors, typically those by Alexandre Koyré and Thomas Kuhn, are reconsidered in the light of the ideological confrontation of the Cold War era. Reflection on the political-cultural embedding of the history of science has often been overshadowed by claims about the objectivity and neutrality of science and its historiography. Thus, the seminal discussion of the 1930s remains one of the most lucid moments of reflection about the role of science and history of science as cultural phenomena shaped by political struggles. (shrink)

Gramsci belonged in a tradition which stemmed from Antonio Labriola, not from Croce and idealist philosophy. This tradition saw Marxism as a philosophy of praxis, a new and original philosophy distinct from both idealism and materialism. Gramsci took his lead from Labriola but also further expanded upon the latter’s approach by seeking the fundamental concepts of the new philosophy in theTheses on Feuerbach. In particular, Gramsci recovered both the concept of praxis and the concept of human nature from theTheses. With (...) the concept of human nature, he expanded even upon Marx’s formulation, by including the individual within it in a way that lays the foundation for modern social sciences based on the notion of the individual, which was, in Gramsci’s case, a socially-rich notion. (shrink)

In this article I examine what I term epistemic arguments against epistocratic dictatorships against the background of Harry Frankfurt’s claim that truth is a fundamental governing notion, and some key reflections of Václav Havel and Leszek Kolakowski. Some of the key epistemic arguments offered by Karl Popper, Robert A. Dahl and Ross Harrison are outlined and endorsed. They underscore the insurmountable problems involved in choosing and maintaining a state of allegedly perfectly wise and efficient rulers. Such rule by virtue of (...) supposed supreme knowledge and expertise denies a truthful recognition of the inevitable fallibility of the state, and of government policies. Moreover, the repression of both citizens’ commitment to truthfulness and their attempts at political falsification will necessarily render dictatorships both continually prone to error and inevitably oppressive. Fallibilistic epistemology is thus seen as a formidable philosophical arsenal for anti-totalitarian and democratic thought, alongside ethical and historical arguments against dictatorship. (shrink)

In this article I aim to bring to the fore a problematic trait of Polish philosopher Stanisław Brzozowski’s thinking, which is his insistence on the metaphysical importance of human domination of nature through work, technology, and maximization of production. The focal point of the article is Brzozowski’s interpretation of Georg Sorel, with an emphasis on Reflections on Violence and the concept of the social myth. I argue that Brzozowski considers the primary strength of the social myth to lie in its (...) contribution to such domination, because its principal trait is to provide man with a sublime feeling of elevation above nature. Furthermore, this feeling becomes a motive force for struggle against nature. In conclusion, I suggest that the perspective of the sublime is a fruitful path for future critical encounters with Brzozowski’s work. The first part of the article stresses the importance of the sublime in Reflections on Violence. Sorel uses this concept throughout his main work to describe the affective nature of the violence of the social myth, which coordinates the inclinations of the masses towards emancipation. The second part discusses how Brzozowski understands the social myth, law, and nationhood from the perspective of human domination of elemental nature. (shrink)

Présentation:L’année 2015 marque le dixième anniversaire de la mort de Raymond Klibansky, philosophe et historien des idées canadien. La revueDialoguelui rend hommage en publiant le texte qui suit de Mme Ethel Groffier, veuve de Raymond Klibansky et chercheure émérite au Centre de recherche Paul-André Crépeau en droit privé et comparé de l’Université McGill. Dans cette intervention, Mme Groffier rappelle l’importance de l’engagement dans la vie et l’œuvre de ce remarquable philosophe.Né en France au mois d’octobre 1905 dans une famille allemande, (...) éduqué en Allemagne à partir de la Première guerre, exilé en Angleterre en 1933, Raymond Klibansky s’installa à Montréal dès 1946, à l’invitation de l’Université McGill. Sa carrière académique au Canada et à l’étranger fut admirable et reconnue par de nombreux hommages. Il laisse derrière lui une œuvre imposante, tant en philosophie qu’en histoire des idées modernes; parmi ces idées, il s’attacha particulièrement à la tolérance et à la liberté, qui inspirèrent toute sa vie.Luc LangloisPresentation:The year 2015 marked the 10thanniversary of Raymond Klibansky’s death. As a tribute to this prominent Canadian philosopher and historian of ideas,Dialogueis proud to publish the following intervention by Ethel Groffier, Raymond Klibansky’s widow and Emeritus scholar at McGill University’s Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative Law. Groffier reminds us of the importance of engagement—understood in the strong, philosophical sense—in this philosopher’s life and works.Born in France in October 1905 to a German family, raised in Germany from World War I to 1933, and then forced to move to the United Kingdom, Klibansky settled in Montreal in 1946 following an invitation from McGill University. His academic career in Canada and abroad is admirable and has been acclaimed on numerous occasions. He left behind an impressive body of work in philosophy and in the history of modern ideas; among these ideas, freedom and tolerance inspired his entire life.Luc Langlois. (shrink)

Sociologists, economists, historians, anthropologists, political theorists, and literary critics have all turned their attention to the study of capitalism. But philosophers remain much less engaged. Why is this? And what could philosophy bring to the study of capitalism? Could it help in the development of a general theory? My main argument here is that philosophy does have an important role to play in the study of capitalism, particularly if we want to develop a general theory. Philosophers must describe something that (...) is peculiar to capitalism, in philosophical terms, which has not been explained by sociological, economic, or psychological means. This subject matter does exist: it is the nature of rationality within capitalism. I suggest that this can best be explained by using the theory of the space of reasons, which helps to show how rational human practices shape social and economic institutions, and how our form of rationality is in turn shaped by those practices and institutions. (shrink)

Sociologists, economists, historians, anthropologists, political theorists, and literary critics have all turned their attention to the study of capitalism. But philosophers remain much less engaged. Why is this? And what could philosophy bring to the study of capitalism? Could it help in the development of a general theory? My main argument here is that philosophy does have an important role to play in the study of capitalism, particularly if we want to develop a general theory. Philosophers must describe something that (...) is peculiar to capitalism, in philosophical terms, which has not been explained by sociological, economic, or psychological means. This subject matter does exist: it is the nature of rationality within capitalism. I suggest that this can best be explained by using the theory of the space of reasons, which helps to show how rational human practices shape social and economic institutions, and how our form of rationality is in turn shaped by those practices and institutions. (shrink)

Sociologists, economists, historians, anthropologists, political theorists, and literary critics have all turned their attention to the study of capitalism. But philosophers remain much less engaged. Why is this? And what could philosophy bring to the study of capitalism? Could it help in the development of a general theory? My main argument here is that philosophy does have an important role to play in the study of capitalism, particularly if we want to develop a general theory. Philosophers must describe something that (...) is peculiar to capitalism, in philosophical terms, which has not been explained by sociological, economic, or psychological means. This subject matter does exist: it is the nature of rationality within capitalism. I suggest that this can best be explained by using the theory of the space of reasons, which helps to show how rational human practices shape social and economic institutions, and how our form of rationality is in turn shaped by those practices and institutions. (shrink)

I suggest that we can read Marx in the light of recent analytic, neo-Hegelian thought. I summarize the Pittsburgh School philosophers’ claims about the myth of the given, the claim that human experience is conceptual all the way out, and that we live in a space of reasons. I show how Hegel has been read in those terms, and then apply that reading of Hegel to Marx’s argument that capital is akin to what Hegel called Geist, or spirit. We can (...) understand capitalism as a space of reasons that is contradictory: while the space of reasons is supposed to make human freedom possible, our space of reasons makes freedom impossible. Reading Marx in this way is helpful, because it avoids the flaws of analytical Marxism, existentialism and structuralism. However, it raises a large problem of its own: Can the theory of the space of reasons be applied to a society that is not free of alienation? I argue that it can, but only in ways that would not satisfy the analytic neo-Hegelians themselves. (shrink)

A review essay of key works and trends in the political thought of Central and Eastern Europe, before and after 1989. The topics examined include the nature of the 1989 velvet revolutions in the region, debates on civil society, democratization, the relationship between politics, economics, and culture, nationalism, legal reform, feminism, and “illiberal democracy.” The review essay concludes with an assessment of the most recent trends in the region.

We undertake the comparison between Ludwig von Bertalanffy's General Systems Theory and Alexandr Bodganov's Tektology as two theories proposing a holistic interpretation of reality and claiming to solve problems which are unsolvable via conventional philosophic and scientific theories and methodologies. Basic misunderstandings by some Soviet authors regarding the nature of these theories — especially in the case of Tektology — are pointed out. The comparison is made in what concerns the general origins and purposes of the theories, their approaches to (...) the problem of organization, their treatment of mathematics and their understanding of the cybernetic concept of regulation.We contend that Tektologycontains — some 15 years earlier — all the basic concepts which will be later developed by the General Theory of Systems. As we shall see, Tektology is the ultimate expansion of any theory of systems. This fact is widely ignored in contemporary specialized literature. (shrink)

This article presents the most important strands of the philosophical debate about markets. It offers some distinctions between the concept of markets and related concepts, as well as a brief outline of historical positions vis-à-vis markets. The main focus is on presenting the most common arguments for and against markets, and on analyzing the ways in which markets are related to other social institutions. In the concluding section questions about markets are connected to two related themes, methodological questions in economics (...) and the topics of business ethics and corporate social responsibility. (shrink)

This is a book of interpretation, not of fact. It studies the major discourses in African political thought throughout the last one and a half centuries, rendering new interpretations of a number of important theorists. Subsequently, this book analyzes paradigmatic models of thought that recur in pre-colonial, colonial, as well as post-colonial political discourses. This in depth analysis allows for a critical inventory of African political thought at the close of the twentieth century.

The article deals with the destruction of the widespread myth about Karl Marx as a “Promethean thinker”. Under Prometheism/Prometheanism is the point of view according to which nature is considered as a quantitatively “inexhaustible storehouse”, which must be known and conquered on the basis of scientific and technical knowledge in order to be used to meet constantly growing human needs through continuous growth of production and, accordingly, a permanent increase in the degree of aggressive exploitation of nature while completely ignoring (...) the consequences of this exploitation both for the environment and for human society itself. Since the myth of the “prometheanism” of Marx, which is very tenacious to this day, was previously dispelled in the field of political economy, sociology, ecology, political science, then in the proposed study the author focused only on some of the philosophical aspects of the problem. In the first part of the article it is shown that Marx is mistakenly criticized by many thinkers for anti-environmentalism; in the second, relying on the texts of Marx himself, it is proved that these fragments torn from the general context of his philosophy are mostly false, because Marx, often praising technological progress, nevertheless, was not a Promethean, as he subjected the social and environmental consequences of the capitalist application of technology and science to radical scientific criticism; Finally, in the third part, through the reconstruction of Marx’s philosophical-anthropological and socio-philosophical ideas, Marx’s true attitude to environmental issues is shown. The author’s arguments are as follows. According to Marx, the ontological basis for the existence of any human society is social metabolism, i.e. the exchange of substances between man and nature through transformative activity, during the deployment of which all the “worlds” in which man exists are drawn into metabolic exchange. Each socio-historical stage of development has its own specific type of metabolism, i.e. its own special form of ecological interaction between all “worlds”. Based on this method, Marx shows that metabolic rifts, i.e. disturbances in the processes of normal, balanced flow of social metabolism in the totality of all these “worlds” are most characteristic of capitalism due to its structural Promethean intentions. And in this sense, Marx’s philosophical ecology not only fully corresponds to the modern level of understanding of ecological/environmental problems, but also offers a holistic methodology not only for “explaining” these problems, but also for their “practical solution”. (shrink)