In this essay, I argue that the idea that there is a most fundamental discipline, or level of reality, is mistaken. My argument is a result of my experiences with the “science wars”, a debate that raged between scientists and sociologists in the 1990s over whether science can lay claim to objective truth. These debates shook my faith in physicalism, i.e. the idea that everything boils down to physics. I outline a theory of knowledge that I first proposed in my (...) 2015 FQXi essay on which knowledge has the structure of a scale-free network. In this theory, although some disciplines are in a sense “more fundamental” than others, we never get to a “most fundamental” discipline. Instead, we get hubs of knowledge that have equal importance. This structure can explain why many physicists believe that physics is fundamental, while some sociologists believe that sociology is fundamental. This updated version of the essay includes an appendix with my responses to the discussion of this essay on the FQXi website. (shrink)

: It is generally accepted that skeptical scenarios must be possible to raise legitimate skeptical doubt. I argue that if the possibility in question is supposed to be genuine metaphysical possibility, the skeptic's reasoning does not straightforwardly succeed. I first motivate the metaphysical possibility requirement on skeptical scenarios : it's a plausible position that several authors accept and that a family of prominent views—sensitivity, safety, relevant alternatives—are committed to. I argue that plausible constraints in modal epistemology show that justification for (...) believing that certain global skeptical scenarios are metaphysically possible rests on some justified beliefs about the external world, and that this undermines the skeptical argument. While there may still be local skeptical challenges, skeptics cannot appeal to the metaphysical possibility of skeptical scenarios to generate global external world skepticism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The focus of this essay is Kant's argument in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals III that regarding oneself as rational implies regarding oneself as free. After setting out an interpretation of how the argument is meant to go, I argue that Kant fails to show that regarding oneself as free is incompatible with accepting universal causal determinism. However, I suggest that the argument succeeds in showing that regarding oneself as rational is inconsistent with accepting universal causal determinism (...) if one accepts a certain, plausible view of the explanation of events. RESUMEN El ensayo se enfoca en el argumento de Kant en la Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres III según el cual considerarse racional implica verse a uno mismo como libre. Se interpreta la forma en que debe entenderse el argumento y se afirma que Kant no logra demostrar que considerarse libre es incompatible con la aceptación del determinismo casual universal. No obstante, se sugiere que el argumento sí logra demostrar que considerarse a uno mismo como racional es incompatible con la aceptación del determinismo casual universal, si se acepta una cierta versión plausible de la explicación de los eventos. (shrink)

Recent discussion of Vogel-style “bootstrapping” scenarios suggests that they provide counterexamples to a wide variety of epistemological theories. Yet it remains unclear why it’s bad for a theory to permit bootstrapping, or even exactly what counts as a bootstrapping case. Going back to Vogel's original bootstrapping example, I note that an agent who could gain justification through the method Vogel describes would have available a “no-lose investigation”: an investigation that can justify a proposition but has no possibility of undermining it. (...) The main suggestion of this article is that an epistemological theory should not permit no-lose investigations. I identify necessary and sufficient conditions for such investigations, then explore epistemological theories that rule them out. If we want to avoid both skepticism and no-lose investigations, we must eschew either Closure or epistemic externalism. (shrink)

Over time, various thematic classifications have been put forward to organize science into a coherent system of specialized areas of research. From an analysis of the historical evolution of the criteria used to distinguish the sciences from one another, I propose in this paper a quadripartite typology for the different thematic classification systems propounded by scholars throughout the centuries. Basically, I argue that the criteria used to differentiate the sciences have been alternately drawn from their respective subject matters, kinds of (...) knowledge, methods and aims. Then, I show that several reclassifications occurred in the thematic structure of science. Finally, I argue that such changes in the structure of learning displaced the modalities of contact between the objects, knowledge, methods and aims of the various branches of science, with the result of outlining reshaped intellectual territories conducive to the emergence of new areas of research. (shrink)

V tejto stati je najprv predstavená filozofia informácie (FI) a demarkácia jej predmetu v metodologicky ucelenej forme, to nadviazaním na koncepciu FI L. Floridiho. V porovnaní s jeho návrhom je vyčlenený i predmet metafilozofie informácie, a takisto je ujasnené aj označenie,,filozofie prima“. Floridi tvrdí, že jeho koncepcia FI ho môže voči iným filozickým disciplínam nadobudnúť. Problém chápania FI ako filozofie prima sa však ani po dvadsiatich rokoch od jeho uvedenia výraznejšej priamej reflexie nedočkal. V tejto štúdii je zodpovedaná otázka, či (...) je tento problém stále otvoreným problémom FI a ak áno, v akom zmysle. Je obhajovaná téza, že problém chápania FI ako filozofie primaje otvoreným problémom metafilozofie informácie, pričom vzhľadom na výsledky práce v FI sú identifikované niektoré oblasti, relatívne ku ktorým v súčasnosti môžeme, nemôžeme a nedokážeme FI označiť ako prima. (shrink)

Experience, it is widely agreed, constrains our thinking and is also thoroughly theory-laden. But how can it constrain our thinking while depending on what it purports to constrain? To address this issue, I revisit and carefully analyze the account of observation provided by Norwood Russell Hanson, who introduced the term ‘theory-ladenness of observation’ in the first place. I show that Hanson’s account provides an original and coherent response to the initial question and argue that, if suitably developed, his account provides (...) a distinctive, powerful, and attractive alternative to relationalist and standard representationalist conceptions of experience. (shrink)

Philosophers of science diverge on the question what drives the growth of scientific knowledge. Most of the twentieth century was dominated by the notion that theories propel that growth whereas experiments play secondary roles of operating within the theoretical framework or testing theoretical predictions. New experimentalism, a school of thought pioneered by Ian Hacking in the early 1980s, challenged this view by arguing that theory-free exploratory experimentation may in many cases effectively probe nature and potentially spawn higher evidence-based theories. Because (...) theories are often powerless to envisage workings of complex biological systems, theory-independent experimentation is common in the life sciences. Some such experiments are triggered by compelling observation, others are prompted by innovative techniques or instruments, whereas different investigations query big data to identify regularities and underlying organizing principles. A distinct fourth type of experiments is motivated by a major question. Here I describe two question-guided experimental discoveries in biochemistry: the cyclic adenosine monophosphate mediator of hormone action and the ubiquitin-mediated system of protein degradation. Lacking underlying theories, antecedent data bases, or new techniques, the sole guides of the two discoveries were respective substantial questions. Both research projects were similarly instigated by theory-free exploratory experimentation and continued in alternating phases of results-based interim working hypotheses, their examination by experiment, provisional hypotheses again, and so on. These two cases designate theory-free, question-guided, stepwise biochemical investigations as a distinct subtype of the new experimentalism mode of scientific enquiry. (shrink)

16. ve 17. yüzyıllarda, dirimselci Yeni Platoncu kimya felsefesi doğa araştırmalarında deneysel yönteme taraftar iken, mantıksal ve matematiksel yöntemlere karşı çıkmıştı. Örneğin, Jan Baptist van Helmont, Aristoteles’in yöntemine matematiksel olduğunu söyleyerek karşı çıkmış ve de Aristoteles’in ilk hareket ettirici düşüncesinin onun matematiksel yönteminin bir sonucu olduğunu ileri sürmüştü. Bu yazıda, Francis Bacon’ın da, van Helmont’a benzer şekilde, ilk hareket ettirici düşüncesini Aristoteles’in tasımsal yönteminin bir sonucu olarak gördüğü ileri sürülecektir.

Philosophers of information, according to Luciano Floridi (The philosophy of information. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p 32), study how information should be “adequately created, processed, managed, and used.” A small number of epistemologists have employed the concept of information as a cornerstone of their theoretical framework. How this concept can be used to make sense of seemingly intractable epistemological problems, however, has not been widely explored. This paper examines Fred Dretske’s information-based epistemology, in particular his response to radical epistemological (...) skepticism. We discuss the relationship between information, evidence and knowledge in relation to the problem of skepticism and the options available to an information-based epistemology for dealing with it. (shrink)