Investigates, by way of Derrida's engagements with Kant, how the foundations of modern constitutionalism can be differently conceived to address some of the challenges of the twenty-first century.

1795 erschien die 1. Auflage von Kants Schrift Zum ewigen Frieden. Zu einer der vordringlichsten, von der Philosophie aber häufig vernachlässigten Aufgaben der Politik stellt sie bis heute den wichtigsten klassischen Text dar. Kant entfaltet in ihm die philosophischen Grundlagen für eine internationale Rechts- und Friedensgemeinschaft. Gleichzeitig stellt er sich aber auch die Frage nach einer Vermittlung von normativer Theorie und politischer Praxis. In 12 Beiträgen wird Kants Text in diesem Band 'entschlüsselt', interpretiert, auf seine systematische Überzeugungskraft und auf seine (...) politische Tragweite hin untersucht und in seinen und unseren sozialgeschichtlichen Kontext gestellt. Der kooperative Kommentar wurde anlässlich des 300. Jubiläums Immanuel Kants überarbeitet und auf den neuesten Forschungsstand gebracht. Mit Beiträgen von Reinhard Brandt, Monique Castillo, Michael W. Doyle, Volker Gerhardt, Otfried Höffe, Wolfgang Kersting, Pierre Laberge, Jean-Christophe Merle, Hans Saner. (shrink)

This paper deals with the so-called “external history” of the origin of Critique of the power of judgment that is based primarily on the philosopher’s correspondence in the period between May 1787 and October 1789. Two letters from Kant to Reinhold (28.12.1787 and 12.05.1789) as well as modifications in the interpretation of the term “aesthetics” in the first Critique (KrVA 22, B 35-36) are crucial for the evolution of the project Critique of Taste in the book Critique of the Power (...) of Judgment. Special attention was paid to the debate between some modern scholars and editors about the importance of the reports on ‘Grundlegung’ / ‘Grundlage’ of Critique of Taste in the initial phase of work on the text. However, the available evidence does not allow us to reconstruct the “internal history” of the development of Kant’s thought during the period of writing the third Critique. Some modern scholars try to establish other objective criteria for this kind of reconstruction by identification in the text of Critique direct or hidden hints or citations to the literature of the 18th century. The author considers that the use of so-called “reflections” from the philosopher’s manuscript heritage, which can be seen as the formation and development of certain concepts of Kant’s theory, can be fruitful. The well-known problem of dating the reflections can be partially solved if terminus a quo will be not the published works, but Kant’s lectures on anthropology and logic taught at that time. (shrink)

Na Crítica da Razão Pura e em outros lugares, Kant apresenta uma aguda distinção entre natureza e razão prática. De acordo com Kant, não é possível deduzir ou derivar todos os sentidos dos imperativos morais dos conhecimentos empíricos sobre o mundo. Alguns intérpretes (como John MacDowell) argumentam que a concepção de razão prática em Kant pode ser ilusória se baseada em uma visão da natureza indefinida, decorrente de um ponto de vista newtoniano. Nesse texto discutirei a relação entre razão prática (...) e natureza na Crítica da faculdade de julgar de Kant. Argumentarei que na segunda parte da obra, Kant introduz um conceito de natureza muito mais rico que as críticas lhe têm atribuído. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article examines the under-researched figure A.W. Rehberg in his exchange with Kant over the relationship between theory and practice in the philosophy of right. I argue that Rehberg raises, what I call, two problems of political matter which attempt to show that Kant's overly formal approach to political theory cannot justifiably determine political practice. The first problem is the problem of positive determinations of right, rather than merely negative prohibitions. Rehberg takes this to mean that Kant cannot determine (...) us to a specific form of constitution. I argue that Kant's innovation of intelligible property functions as a response to this critique in that it provides the possibility of synthetic propositions of right a priori. Second, Rehberg insists that an a priori system of right cannot relate to already formed historical communities. Here Kant's response comes close to agreeing with Rehberg as Kant takes prudential or historical reasoning to harmonize with the demands of a priori right in order to applied to the sensible world. Kant, in this instance, comes closer to Rehberg by denying centralized enlightened monarchy and the reliance on natural and historical development for the application of right. (shrink)

Kant’s 1795 essay on perpetual peace has been lauded as one of his most important and influential political texts as well as one of the most important texts on peace. Kant’s text was largely forgotten until the 1980s and 1990s, with numerous commentaries appearing around the time of its 200 years existence. The French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s interest in Kant’s text appears to have arisen around the same time, and his analyses of this text continued after the turn of the (...) century. The references to Kant’s essay in Derrida’s texts appear mostly in the context of a discussion of the concept of hospitality. The latter concept is understood by Derrida as including both a demand for absolute hospitality, that is, hospitality without the imposition of any limitations, as well as a demand, in the interests of survival, for such limitations or conditions. A negotiation between these dimensions of hospitality is ultimately required. The aim of this article is to elucidate Derrida’s analysis of Kant’s essay, specifically his recasting of the concept of peace as absolute hospitality, as well as to briefly outline its implications for international and cosmopolitan law. (shrink)

Die „Prinzipien des öffentlichen Rechts“, welche Kant im zweiten Teil des Anhangs zur Friedensschrift darstellt, wurden sehr unterschiedlich interpretiert. Sind sie wirklich gleichzeitig ethisch und juridisch, a priori und empirisch? Warum „transzendental“ und wie wird es begründet? Was wird als „Publikum“ gemeint? Den Ort der Publizitätsprinzipien in Kants Rechtssystem zu bestimmen, ist keine leichte Aufgabe, die manch neue Frage bezüglich der zulässigen und gewünschten Anwendung jener Prinzipien stellt. Kants Überlegungen zur politischen Publizität folgen einem komplizierten Gang und sind in einer (...) Reihe von Schriften und Vorlesungen dargestellt. Sie führen uns in den Bereich empirischer Praktiken und anthropologischer Beobachtungen. Diese aber erweisen sich entweder als Anlässe zur Suche nach solchen Prinzipien, oder als Beispiele der Anwendung der Rechtsprinzipien, die sich zugleich an einen bestimmten Kreis von Lesern richten. Dementsprechend folgen wir schließlich einer gemäßigten Interpretation und bringen die Publizitätsprinzipien als Prinzipien der Rechtsschöpfung und der Rechtsanwendung in Einklang mit dem Kern der kantischen Rechtslehre und Tugendlehre. (shrink)

The coherence of Kant’s socalled third Critique is ambiguous despite the task that Kant undertakes to solve in it. As the title suggests and Kant’s analyses show it is the aim of the work to determine the transcendental conditions of reflective judgment including the application of its principles on aesthetic and natural phenomena which do not fall under scientific investigations but which are still based on the cognitive powers of the mind. It is commonly agreed that an inner connection of (...) the two parts of the work – the critique of aesthetic and teleological judgment respectively - is unlikely and that any attempt to argue that they form a unity is risqué2. Despite its relation to the powers of cognition the reflective judgment excersises its activity in two respects, namely in relation to aesthetic phenomena – the beauty of nature and of fines arts – and in relation to organic nature. These phenomena belong to strictly separate areas. Judgments about organic nature are teleological in the sense that they project a concept of purpose at the basis of the object for cognitive reasons; they aim at knowledge of how organic processes work. Against that, the aesthetic judgment is – Kant says – indifferent to the knowledge of its object; it concerns the beauty of the object just focusing on the object’s sensible form in so far as the judgment of this form occasions a feeling of delight in us. Whereas the teleological judgment thus claims to be objective, the aesthetic judgment expresses the subjective affection we experience via the judgment of the form of the object. It is this separation that I intend to question. I suggest that both aesthetic and teleological judgment respectively express ways of cognizing the world that do not exclude but rather supplement each other. More specifically, I argue that all through his third Critique Kant tries to keep separate what are really two different aspects of one and the same issue, namely the cognition of organic nature through a conceptual and through a sensous approach. (shrink)