In putting forth a view of economic agents as autonomous individuals driven by self-interest, mainstream economics precludes the possibility of gift. Gift could be found in non-market, “collectivist”, societies, where “informal” norms would include gift-giving. In this context, the paper argues that mainstream views regarding the impossibility of the concept of gift are inaccurate, via an analysis of conceptual and empirical contributions of other social sciences, notably sciences of mankind “par excellence” such as anthropology and philosophy. In particular, the paper (...) shows that critiques of mainstream views that are based on simple contrasts and qualifications do not provide conceptual instruments for a rigorous critique. This is also the case with the more “heterodox” views that underscore the unrealistic character of mainstream models of social interactions and norms. The mainstream arguments of self-interest and exchanges, based on expectations of future returns as universal traits of human beings, are indeed not easy to refute, including with the conceptual tools of other social sciences. This paper instead argues that a deeper analysis of concepts such as selfishness, interest, exchange, or the individual yields a more relevant critique of mainstream conceptions of gift—“the interest of whom?” and “exchange shaped by what?” being the pertinent questions. Other social sciences show that these concepts actually always presuppose the pre-existence of societies before that of individuals, and this is expressed by the many facets of the conceptualisations of the act of giving, whether societies are market or non-market ones. (shrink)

In criticizing communitarian views of justice, Amartya Sen argues that identity is not merely a matter of discovery but an object of reasoned choice subject to constraints. Distinguishing three notions of identity – self-perception, perceived identity and social affiliation – I claim that the relevant constraints implied by this argument are minimal. Some of Sen's arguments about perceived identity and social context do not establish any further constraints. Sen also argues that a model of multiculturalism and some forms of education (...) can restrict, or fail to promote, reasoned and informed identity choice. This argument is better understood in the light of Sen's work on capability and justice, notably his concern with ways in which underdogs can adapt and his emphasis on public reasoning. It highlights limitations on information and opportunities for reasoning. I suggest that these lead to genuine constraints on identity choice. The paper focuses on Sen's work, though its claims are also relevant to George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton's analysis of identity. (shrink)

Recently several authors have proposed proxies of welfare that equate some (as opposed to all) choices with welfare. In this paper, I first distinguish between two prominent proxies: one based oncontext-independent choicesand the other based onreason-based choices. I then propose an original proxy based on choices that individuals state they would want themselves to repeat at the time of the welfare/policy evaluation (confirmed choices). I articulate three complementary arguments that, I claim, support confirmed choices as a more reliable proxy of (...) welfare than context-independent and reason-based choices. Finally, I discuss the implications of these arguments fornudgesandboosts. (shrink)