In diesem Buch geht es um eine Philosophie, die aus einer unermüdlichen Kritik entstand: Die Philosophie, die ihre Konstitution überhaupt dem Verbinden der Kritiken an anderen Philosophien zu verdanken scheint. Es ist die Hegels. Hegel ist bekannt als ein Denker, der die für seine Philosophie konstitutiven und wichtigen Ansätze aus der kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit seinen Vorgängern, deren monumentale Leistungen in der Geschichte der Philosophie anerkannt wurden, gewonnen hat. Ausgehend von dieser Überzeugung rekonstruiert dieses Buch Hegels Sittlichkeitsidee durch die intensive Analyse (...) seiner zweistelligen Kritiken an den ethischen Gesetzesmodellen (bei Kant und Antigone), neuzeitlichen Naturrechtstheorien (von Hobbes und Fichte), und politischen Regierungsformen (der antiken Ungleichheitsidee und der modernen abstrakten Gleichheitsidee). (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to show that and how animal organisms are appropriate subjects of normative evaluation, on Hegel's view. I contrast my reading with the interpretive positions of Sebastian Rand and Mark Alznauer. I disagree with Rand and agree with Alznauer that animal organisms are normatively evaluable for Hegel. I substantiate my disagreement with Rand, and supplement Alznauer's interpretation, by spelling out the role that the ‘generic process’ or ‘genus process [Gattungsprozess]’ plays within Hegel's account of animal (...) organisms and their normative evaluability. In the course of my discussion, I highlight the main differences that Hegel purports to identify between animal and vegetable organisms and suggest that the upshot of those differences is that some but not all plants are normatively evaluable, by his lights. I also situate Hegel's discussion of theGattungsprozesswithin the debate on biological functions in the philosophy of biology over the last few decades. (shrink)

The paper develops a conception of marital love as a complex recognitive relation, which I articulate by juxtaposing it against other recognitive relations that figure in Hegel's theory of modern civil society (i.e., respect and esteem). Drawing on Hegel's early writings, I argue that, if love is to provide its unique sort of recognition, it must obtain between “living beings who are equal in power”—a peculiar form of equality that I name (drawing on Stanley Cavell's work) “dynamic equality.” I conclude (...) that it is by Hegel's own lights that we should reject his notorious conception of the sexual difference. However, I also offer reasons why, from Hegel's early 19th century perspective, he could consider the following two conditions as compatible: (1) equality within marriage and (2) sexual hierarchy outside marriage, namely, in civil society. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the specific ways in which Hegel's account of life and organisms advances upon Kant's account of natural purposes in the third Critique. First of all, I argue that it is essential for Hegel's account that it contains two levels. The first level is that of logical life, the discussion of which does not depend on any empirical knowledge of natural organisms. I provide my reconstruction of this logical account of life that answers to the objection (...) made by a number of Hegel scholars to the effect that Hegel does in fact rely on empirical knowledge at this place in the logic. The second level is that of natural organisms themselves. I argue that it is with the help of this separation of the logical and natural levels, as well as his doctrine of the impotence of nature, that Hegel, unlike Kant, (a) is able to claim that not everything in natural organisms is purposive, and (b) provide a philosophical, and not merely empirical, account of the distinction between plants and animals. In both of these respects, Hegel's position can be seen as a welcome advance over Kant. (shrink)

In the second half of the third Critique, Kant develops a new form of judgment peculiar to organisms: teleological judgment. In the Appendix to this text, Kant argues that we must regard the final, unconditioned end of creation as human freedom, due to reason's demand that we regard nature as a system of ends. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of this argument, according to which judgments of freedom within nature are possible as instances of teleological judgment. Just (...) as individual organisms are to be regarded as governed by supersensible teleological laws, so too is nature as a whole to be regarded as given laws from a supersensible ground. This supersensible ground in the case of nature as a whole is freedom. Freedom and teleological judgments are to be regarded as unifiable with mechanism in the supersensible, and we are to subordinate mechanical explanations to teleological judgments as well as to freedom. This interpretation makes sense both of Kant's claim that he overcomes the “incalculable gulf” between nature and freedom in the third Critique, and also of the location of this argument, as following after and relying on the results of the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment. (shrink)

Nada más habitual que el hábito. Y, sin embargo, de seguir a Aristóteles, no existirían virtudes entre nosotros, o sea: aptitudes y habilidades que acaban por configurar la existencia humana. En este ensayo se examina el desarrollo dialéctico del hábito en Hegel, desde la Antropología hasta la Eticidad : en el plano individual, desde el estado fetal y el desvarío en el alma sentiente hasta el autosentimiento de sí y el nacimiento del Yo; en el plano colectivo, se atiende más (...) bien a la génesis del hábito y sus fautores: las corporaciones, las instituciones estatales y la opinión pública, hasta desembocar en el extraño estadio del hábito como deshabituación de todo hábito, en el fenómeno de la guerra. Se pone así de relieve el modo en que el hábito es el modo crucial de ser entre la individualidad animal y el cuerpo sociopolítico como aparato mecánico que promete vida y amenaza muerte. (shrink)

While the Hegelian struggle for recognition is often taken to be the systematic point at which rational humanity differentiates itself from mere animality, Hegel more thoroughly expounds on the relationship between rational and nonrational animals in his Encyclopedia: humans diverge from nonrational animals through a process of habituation. While one might assume that Hegel takes this power of habituation to be sufficient for rationality, this assumption is complicated by Hegel’s attribution of habituation to non-human animals as well. Against readings of (...) the Encyclopedia that separate human and non-human animal habituation, I argue that a coherent interpretation must treat habituation as the same power in human and non-human animal life. My interpretation demonstrates Hegel’s proximity to Matthew Boyle’s transformative conception of rationality, which portrays rationality as a unique realization of animality. Hegel takes the realization of rational animal life to be thoroughly habitual, contra the instinctual basis of nonrational animal life. (shrink)

Are we responsible for the unintended consequences of our actions? The ethical significance of this question becomes clear when we concede that sometimes we unknowingly fail to meet an obligation, think through the consequences of a decision, or reflect on how habits influence what we do. To posit an answer, I turn to the thought of G. W. F. Hegel in order to develop an account of self-determination that incorporates the heterogeneous conditions necessary for an agent to commit herself to (...) an end, and a corresponding account of responsibility that is attributed in virtue of what the agent commits herself to. The first part of the argument contrasts two ways that we often think about human action. I identify a first (broadly Kantian) conception as individualistic, and a second (broadly Hegelian) conception as holistic. Where the Kantian agent acts freely in spite of inclinations, habits, second nature, and social commitments, the Hegelian agent acts freely only in virtue of these conditions. From these considerations, I conclude that the Hegelian approach offers a more realistic conception of agency. Expounding on this, the second part investigates how human beings are determinative of what they do. The possibility to act arises in the convergence between external conditions and our own potentials to act. These potentials (comprised of biological attributes, habituation, and education) combine to orient practical life by influencing what we notice, what we neglect, what reasons we have, what occurs to us, and so forth. While these potentials ground the possibility of acting, they also delimit what an agent is attentive to when she acts. In light of this inclusive view of self-determination, the third part argues that an agent is responsible for what is expressed in her actions even if she was blind to these consequences. Restricting responsibility to what an agent is consciously aware of when she acts consigns us to a solipsistic ethics where ignorance exculpates the agent. To avoid this, I claim that mature human agency necessitates committing oneself to ideas, projects, and other people; and consequently, that an agent is responsible when her action contravenes her commitments. (shrink)