: In this paper, we intend to discuss if and in what sense semiosis (meaning process, cf. C. S. Peirce) can be regarded as an "emergent" process in semiotic systems. It is not our problem here to answer when or how semiosis emerged in nature. As a prerequisite for the very formulation of these problems, we are rather interested in discussing the conditions which should be fulfilled for semiosis to be characterized as an emergent process. The first step in this (...) work is to summarize a systematic analysis of the variety of emergence theories and concepts, elaborated by Achim Stephan. Along the summary of this analysis, we pose fundamental questions that have to be answered in order to ascribe a precise meaning to the term "emergence" in the context of an understanding of semiosis. After discussing a model for explaining emergence based on Salthe's hierarchical structuralism, which considers three levels at a time in a semiotic system, we present some tentative answers to those questions. (shrink)

Peirce’s beta graphs are roughly equivalent to our first-order predicate logic. However, Bellucci and Pietarinen have recently argued that the beta graphs are not well-equipped to handle asymmetric relative terms. I survey four proposed solutions to the problem and find them all wanting. I offer a fifth solution according to which Peirce’s beta graphs function at three different levels of abstractness from natural language. I diagnose the problem of asymmetric relative terms as arising when we transition from the first to (...) the second level of abstractness. Making grammatical information encoded in natural language explicit at the first level of abstractness and interpreting graphs at the second level of abstractness as shorn of grammatical information resolves the problem. The solution is both well-motivated by Peirce’s own commitments and increases the expressiveness of the beta graphs. (shrink)

In “An ‘Entirely Different Series of Categories,’” I argue that aside from Peirce’s formal categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, Peirceans should acknowledge a second set of categories I call the material categories. I also argue that the material categories are irreducible to the formal categories. However, in that article I offer no account of what the material categories are. Moreover, Peirce himself never provides a clear and explicit account of them. The present essay attempts to provide an account of (...) the Peircean material categories. Like Peirce’s “Guess at the Riddle,” which sought to elucidate his formal categories, this is a guess at the other riddle, his material categories, with.. (shrink)