RESUMO: Ao associar governo à téchne, Trasímaco estabelece que o governo também exige um conhecimento específico. Esse saber permitiria que o governante pudesse beneficiar-se dos governados, tirando proveito deles. Em sua definição de governo, ele aproximará essa téchne do governo ao governante injusto, mais especificamente o tirano. Neste trabalho, pretende-se analisar a relevância dos argumentos de Trasímaco para a filosofia política. ABSTRACT: By associating government with téchne, Thrasymachus states that government requires specific knowledge. This knowledge allows the ruler to benefit (...) from the governed and to take advantage of them. In his definition of government, he equates this téchne with government by an unjust ruler, specifically that of a tyrant. This article aims to analyze the relevance of Thrasymachus' arguments for political philosophy. (shrink)

RESUMO Em nosso artigo, pretendemos verificar as teses de Trasímaco sobre a justiça e se estas são consistentes entre si. Para isso, há de se observar a relação da justiça com o governo e a força que a determina. O intuito é reavivar as discussões hodiernas sobre as teses de Trasímaco dentro da filosofia platônica, assim como demonstrar sua importância para o âmbito da filosofia política. ABSTRACT This article aims to verify Thrasymachus' theses on justice and whether they are consistent (...) with one another. As such, it is necessary to observe the relation between justice and government, as well as the force which determines it. The objective is to revive in actual times the discussions about Thrasymachus' theses within Plato's philosophy, and to demonstrate its importance in the scope of political philosophy. (shrink)

A discussão entre Trasímaco e Sócrates no Livro I da República de Platão dá vigor à questão da justiça iniciada com Céfalo. Trasímaco é um personagem importante da obra, pois vai relacionar a justiça ao governo da cidade. Isso faz com que a justiça saia da esfera individual e entre na esfera pública. Em nosso artigo, pretendemos verificar as teses de Trasímaco sobre a justiça e se estas são consistentes entre si. O problema da consistência das teses é antigo entre (...) os comentadores e apresenta diferentes soluções. Nosso intuito é propor uma solução para o problema e relacionar isto à arte do governo proposta por Trasímaco. Isso nos permite verificar a maneira pela qual Sócrates e Trasímaco diferem entre si em suas propostas de governo e dos tipos de governante. Desse modo, nosso trabalho pretende contribuir com a literatura platonista sobre o papel ocupado por Trasímaco dentro da obra de Platão. (shrink)

This is an earlier version of a chapter from my book "Plato's Republic as a Philosophical Drama on Doing Well" (2014). The book analyses Plato’s Politeia (= Republic) as a philosophical drama in which the participants turn out to be models of various types of psychic constitution, and nothing is said by them which may be considered to be an opinion of Plato himself (with all that that entails for Platonism). The debate in Book I between Socrates and Thrasymachus serves (...) as a test case for the assumptions that the Socratic method involves searching for truth or examining the opinions of interlocutors and that Socrates is the mouthpiece of Plato. Socrates and Thrasymachus are usually assumed to be arguing about justice. In fact, they are going through the motions of an eristic debate, where the aim is not to discover the truth about the matter under discussion but to defeat the opponent by fair means or foul, but especially foul. The outrageous wordplay used by both men is not so obvious in translation, and in any case tends to be ignored or explained away by scholars who assume that Plato the philosopher was writing a philosophical treatise (an exposition of philosophical ideas) and not a philosophical drama (a presentation of philosophically interesting models, to be compared and contrasted by the reader). (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of the intellectual practice of the Platonic character, Socrates, with emphasis on the presentation of dialectical engagement with authority. I argue that authority, conceptually and in practice, constitutes a serious problem for Socrates. On my reading, the problems of authority are indicative of an inappropriate understanding of the soul and the ailing condition of the sociopolitical practices of Athenian culture. I suggest that Plato’s Socrates is devoted to the personal and political improvement of his fellow (...) citizens, and society at large, through dialectical engagement which seeks to undermine authority. I investigate Plato’s characterization of the Socratic practice of philosophy, taking seriously his frequent claims to ignorance and his reluctance to commit to clearly positive doctrine. I suggest that these problems can be collapsed into an analysis of the question of authority, and that the questioning of authority constitutes a positive force in dialectical practice. I attempt to develop an interpretive strategy of Plato’s work that commits us to neither wholly dogmatic nor wholly skeptical readings of Plato. There is an apparent dichotomy in the scholarship suggesting that Plato’s dialogues must be understood as either constructive (offering positive doctrine) on the one hand, or aporetic (purely refutational) on the other. In my reading, I lean closer to an aporetic interpretation; however, I attempt to show that Socrates is presented as anti-doctrinal because a hard commitment to doctrine establishes the conditions for aporia. I maintain that Socrates’ antiauthoritarian characterization is evidence of his dedication to the continued pursuit of wisdom. True knowledge would be ideal, but knowing nothing is preferable to false-positives. While I develop a picture of an antiauthoritarian Socrates within the nonauthoritative genre of Plato’s dialogues, I hope to retain the view that the Socratic pursuit of wisdom is aspirational. Through the discussion of the select dialogues in this dissertation, I hope to show that a Socratic progress towards knowledge requires a dedicated questioning of authority. In my reading I give special attention to the historical context in which Plato writes, and this includes the choices Plato makes in presenting the character of Socrates. I attend to questions of time and place in the narrative, the historical persons presented as dramatis personae, and the potential reception by the immediate audience. I take the position that the dialogue form itself is a challenge to authority, and that the format of a written dialogue is underscored by checks to authoritative grounding. Those who engage in dialogue, and those who write dialogues, enter into an agreement to challenge authority—and to enter into this agreement in good faith, one ought to be willing to suspend one’s own claims to authority. In my discussion of Plato’s choice to develop a characterization of Socrates at odds with the problems of authority, I hope to open the possibility that my reading identifies important consequences for understanding certain philosophical commitments expressed in the Socratic dialogues. My hope is that I have presented a reading of a selection of dialogues that draws out an image of an antiauthoritarian Socrates, and in so doing sketched a framework that might tentatively contribute some insightful, if nuanced, perspective to Platonic scholarship. (shrink)