This paper seeks to address the question of schooling for democracy by, first, identifying at least one form of social character, dependent, after Marcuse, on the historical emergence of a “new sensibility.” It then explores one pedagogical thread related to the emergence of this form of subjectivity over the course of the last two centuries in the west, and traces its influence in the educational counter-tradition associated with philosophical anarchism, which is based on principles of dialogue and social reconstruction as (...) opposed to monologue and reproduction. The idea of a dialogical school has been made possible by a historical shift in adult views of child as interlocutor rather than “othered” object of adult formation—a shift that can be observed in an historical process of “closer approaches” between adult and child and a recognition of childhood and adulthood as forms of subjectivity that lie on a synchronous rather than a diachronic lifespan continuum. Finally the author identifies an archetype of “school” understood as a specific type of intentional community—an experimental zone in which participants are allowed and encouraged, through explicitly dialogical practice, to develop the personal and relational habits that make authentic democracy possible—a communal form that gives practical meaning to Dewey’s notion of school as “embryonic society”: a utopian space where natality is recognized as a fundamental cultural force, and where the evolutionary possibilities inherent in neoteny are taken as normative. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 55, Issue 1, Page 5-24, February 2021.

A major strand of opposition to the West's/Global North's scientificising hegemony has recently been retrieved through Santos’ reinterpretation of Cusanus’ 15th-century doctrine of learned ignorance. Though Cusanus has been marginalised, his doctrine imbues a profound epistemic humility conducive to our present need to reconfigure education. Contributing to this retrieval, I define learned ignorance as an epistemic principle of humility, adherence to which conduces towards reconditioning learning and teaching as non-finalised, processual activities within a genuinely intercultural pluriverse of knowledges. Agreeing with (...) Santos’ marginalisation thesis and his advocacy of recovering similarly silenced voices from within Western discourse, I argue that learned ignorance in some works of English literature and philosophy has also been marginalised. One of the most famous lines from Pope—‘A little Learning is a dang'rous Thing’—has been widely misunderstood through failing to recognise the poem's learned ignorance elements. My reinterpretation of Pope suggests a possibly more extensive literary form of opposition to the scientificisation of knowledge. I also examine another marginalised, educationally significant retrieval of learned ignorance by Hamilton. His learned ignorance standpoint fundamentally opposes the scientificisation and instrumentalisation of knowledge and learning. The discussion identifies the counterhegemonic status of this epistemic principle of humility and intimates its paradigm-shifting opportunities through some brief closing suggestions concerning how learned ignorance enriches Freire's emphases on the importance of ‘love, humility and faith’ as essential to the ‘horizontal relationship’ between teacher and student of an educational dialogue founded on trust. (shrink)

El reconocimiento de las y los niños es una tarea esencial en las sociedades actuales, sobre todo, en Occidente, para lo que se propone una renovación en su concepción que provoque un giro en la manera cómo se perciben, afirmándolos como sujetos activos y participativos. Una renovación que se creerá necesaria en todos los ámbitos, aunque, en estas páginas, se pondrá el énfasis en la esfera de la educación formal. Para promover el reconocimiento de las y los niños, en el (...) texto se recuperará el reconocimiento recíproco de Honneth, el cual se complementará con el reconocimiento mutuo de Ricoeur, según el que, mediante un estudio del amor como ágape, entenderá que el reconocimiento debe darse gratuitamente, no como respuesta a un reconocimiento previamente recibido o esperando algo a cambio. Esta interpretación es la que se aplicará, en estas páginas, al reconocimiento de las y los niños, con la que se avanzará desde la reciprocidad hacia la mutualidad. (shrink)

This paper offers a genealogy of dialogic education, tracing its origins in Romantic epistemology and corresponding philosophy of childhood, and identifying it as a counterpoint to the purposes and assumptions of universal, compulsory, state-imposed and regulated schooling. Dialogic education has historically worked against the grain of standardized mass education, not only in its view of the nature, capacities and potentialities of children, but in its economic, political and social views, for which childhood is understood as a promissory condition. Dialogic education (...) is oriented to what Dewey called “a future new society of changed purposes and desires,” made possible by an emergent form of social character. It has followed its own developmental trajectory from its origins in Pestalozzi’s Rousseau-inspired innovations, through anarchist theory and practice and the Progressive Education movement, to its current most salient formulation in the Democratic Education movement, whether as an enemy within the gates of standardized education or as expressed in innumerable alternative forms of schooling or unschooling. The paper highlights several key characteristics, gleaned from all those forms, of the dialogic school—identified as intentionality, transitionality, emergence, aesthetic temporality, interdisciplinarity and group governmentality--and argues further that community of philosophical inquiry theory and practice as a form of post-Socratic group dialogue that emerged in the 1970’s, is a pedagogical praxis that offers a grand operational template for dialogic education as a form of schooling. (shrink)

The practice of teaching links long-standing philosophical questions about the building blocks of a good life to daily judgments in the classroom; in the journey to becoming a person who teaches, we must seek different ways of understanding what “good” means in the context of different social practices and communities. This doctoral thesis examines the educational innovation known as Philosophy for Children as a platform for teachers and students to address such questions within a community of philosophical inquiry. Advocates of (...) PFC seek to promote radical change in our understanding of growth, teaching and the relationships formed in educational contexts. In addressing these issues, this thesis contributes to the ongoing conversation about the teacher’s role within the PFC movement. The thesis comprises four interrelated studies that examine the possibilities and limits of PFC ideas by considering them in the light of general educational theorising about pedagogical action. In addition to the PFC literature, the study’s main sources are 1) the Continental tradition of European educational discourse, especially in German-speaking regions, and 2) the writings of the contemporary educational thinker Gert Biesta. The former offers an opposing view to the idea of a symmetrical, communal emergent system that seems to inform second-generation understandings of philosophical dialogue in an educational context. Gert Biesta’s ideas, especially in relation to the purpose and aims of education, help in envisioning CPI as a structuring element in teaching as a whole and all aspects of classroom life. The four studies focus on pedagogical action, the nature and role of authority in CPI and teacher agency. The thesis contends that teaching and, in particular, building a community of classroom inquiry, requires a vision of teaching as a reflective practice, informed by subject-specific and educational judgments as key dimensions of teacher reflection and wisdom. (shrink)