Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 9, September 2022.

Núñez et al (2019) argue (1) that the field of Cognitive Science has failed, in that it has not arrived at a cohesive theory, and (2) that this is contrary to the intentions of the founders. Their survey of publication and citation patterns bears out the lack of a cohesive theory and also provides corroboration for (3) the concern that the field is becoming unbalanced, with psychology overweighted (Gentner, 2010). I will argue against points (1) and (2), but agree with (...) point (3). My central claim is that cognitive science was never meant to have one unified theoretical framework, nor should it have. (shrink)

This paper considers the past and future of Psychology within Cognitive Science. In the history section, I focus on three questions: (a) how has the position of Psychology evolved within Cognitive Science, relative to the other disciplines that make up Cognitive Science; (b) how have particular Cognitive Science areas within Psychology waxed or waned; and (c) what have we gained and lost. After discussing what’s happened since the late 1970s, when the Society and the journal began, I speculate about where (...) the field is going. (shrink)

Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 650-651, October 2022.

In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action”, I argue that computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. I also argue that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are (...) semiotic systems. Finally, I suggest that minds can be considered as virtual machines implemented in certain semiotic systems, primarily the brain, but also AI computers. In doing so, I take issue with Fetzer’s arguments to the contrary. (shrink)