RESUMEN El objetivo del presente artículo será sostener que la memoria impedida, carente de una dimensión simbólica y ‘sustraída del tiempo', tratada en "La memoria, la historia, el olvido" plantea un límite originalmente no contemplado a la solución narrativa de la aporía del tiempo presentada en "Tiempo y narración". Sin embargo, observamos varios elementos que llevan a desdibujar la diferencia entre la memoria impedida y la manipulada. Nuestra hipótesis es que el recurso a la metapsicología freudiana, y específicamente, su concepto (...) de trabajo, le impiden a Ricoeur desarrollar cabalmente este límite. Recurriremos a las tesis de Certeau acerca de la escritura histórica como gesto sepultural, para ahondar en este límite y determinar las vías para superarlo. ABSTRACT The objective of this paper is to argue that an impeded memory, devoid of a symbolic dimension and "subtracted from time", treated in "Memory, History, Forgetting" poses a limit not originally contemplated in the narrative solution of the aporia of time, as presented in "Time and Narrative". However, we find several elements that lead to blur the difference between impeded and manipulated memory. Our hypothesis is that by resourcing to Freudian metapsychology, and specifically its concept of work, prevents Ricoeur from fully developing this limit. We turn to Certeau's theses about historical writing as a sepulture gesture, to develop this limit and determine the ways to overcome it. (shrink)

(2000). Isaiah Berlin, William Morris, and the politics of Utopia. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: Vol. 3, The Philosophy of Utopia, pp. 56-86.

In this thesis I outline a view of primary legislation from a systems perspective. I suggest that systems theory and, in particular, autopoietic theory, as modified by field theory, is a mechanism for understanding how society operates. The description of primary legislation that I outline differs markedly from any conventional definition in that I argue that primary legislation is not, and indeed cannot be, either a law or any of the euphemisms that are usually accorded to an enactment by a (...) parliament. I cite two reasons for such a conclusion. The primary reason for my conclusion is that I see primary legislation as being an output of a particular subsystem of society, while the law is the output of another subsystem of society. I argue that these outputs are the discrete products of separate subsystems of society. I argue that primary legislation should be viewed as a trinity. The first state of this trinity is that, upon enactment, primary legislation is a brute fact in that it is but a thing and the only property of this thing is that of being a text. The second state of this trinity is that following the act of enactment, the thing enacted will be reproduced and this reproduction is a separate thing that will sit in some repository until used. The third state of this trinity is that, upon use, this thing that is primary legislation will be transformed into an object and the user will attribute such functions and attributes to that object as are appropriate to the context within which the object is used. The thing has therefore become an object and an institutional fact. The second reason for my conclusion that primary legislation is not a law relates to the fact that the thing that is primary legislation is a text and the only function of a text is that it is available to be read. That is to say, of itself, a text is incapable of doing anything: it is the reader who defines the status of the text and attributes functions and attributes. Upon use, primary legislation thus becomes a censored input for future action and one of these actions may be some statement by a court of law. I assert that the view of primary legislation that has been accepted within the body politic is the product of the discourse of a particular subsystem of society that I have designated 'the legal practice', and I outline why and how this has occurred. Outlining a view about primary legislation also necessitates outlining a view as to the nature of the law. I assert that the law is a myth and I see this myth as a product of the discourse of the legal practice. I have asserted that although it is the judges that state the law, such statements flow from the discourse of those who practise the law. (shrink)

Varios intérpretes han reconocido la importancia de la imaginación productiva en la obra de Ricœur, aunque la mayoría de ellos ha dedicado sus investigaciones a las obras del filósofo francés de las décadas de los setenta y ochenta. En lo que sigue quisiera sostener que la imaginación también tiene un papel central en La memoria, la historia, el olvido. Mi hipótesis es que esta facultad articula los distintos momentos de esta obra, fundamentalmente los relacionados con la fenomenología de la memoria (...) y la epistemología de la historia. Asimismo quisiera relativizar parcialmente la tesis de que a partir de Tiempo y narración Ricœur enfatiza el carácter sintético de la imaginación, y así mostraré que en la obra que abordo hay una fuerte presencia de la función libre. Several interpreters have recognized the importance of productive imagination in Ricœur's work, but most of them have focused their research on his works of the 1970s and 1980s. I want to argue that imagination has also a central role in Memory, History, Forgetting. My hypothesis is that this notion articulates the different moments of the work, mainly those related to phenomenology of memory and epistemology of history. I also wish to relativize the argument that after Time and Narrative Ricœur emphasized synthetic imagination, by showing the presence of free imagination in Memory, History, Forgetting. (shrink)