If earlier-than-necessary death is bad because it deprives individuals of additional good life, then why isn't later-than-necessary conception bad for the same reason? Deprivationists have argued that prenatal non-existence is not bad because it is impossible to be conceived earlier, but postmortem non-existence is bad because it is possible to live longer. Call this the Impossibility Solution. In this paper, I demonstrate that the Impossibility Solution does not work by showing how it is possible to be conceived earlier in the (...) same senses it is possible to live longer. I then offer a solution to the Asymmetry Problem by suggesting a novel way to separate the badness of each type of non-existence from the type, and frequency, of attitudes we should have towards each type of non-existence. Even if both types of non-existence are equally bad, certain contingent facts about our postmortem non-existence provide reason for the badness of early deaths to be more frequently salient than the badness of late conceptions. (shrink)

As the Roman philosopher Lucretius asked, why do we fear and regret death, but do not regret not having been born earlier, when death and prenatal nonexistence are mirror images? Both deprive us of goods we might have had, and this deprivation most plausibly explains the badness of death. This paper first considers and rejects explanations other than the deprivation of goods. It then suggests an explanation in terms of a state of which death deprives us, and which is itself (...) asymmetrical in regard to the future and the past. This sharp asymmetry in this one very important good helps to justify the difference in our attitudes, especially among those for whom death approaches. The paper departs from the usual rigid format in which a philosopher says what she is going to say, then says it, and then repeats it. In matching form to mystery content, the missing clue to the solution will not be revealed until later in the paper. (shrink)