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  1. The information inelasticity of habits: Kahneman’s bounded rationality or Simon’s procedural rationality?Elias L. Khalil - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-40.
    Why would decision makers adopt heuristics, priors, or in short “habits” that prevent them from optimally using pertinent information—even when such information is freely-available? One answer, Herbert Simon’s “procedural rationality” regards the question invalid: DMs do not, and in fact cannot, process information in an optimal fashion. For Simon, habits are the primitives, where humans are ready to replace them only when they no longer sustain a pregiven “satisficing” goal. An alternative answer, Daniel Kahneman’s “mental economy” regards the question valid: (...)
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  • When Econs Are Human.John R. Welch - 2020 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (3):212-225.
    Econs are presumed to be unboundedly rational, while Humans are boundedly rational. Nevertheless, in certain conditions, Econs aiming to optimize would choose like Humans trying to satisfice. The conditions are imposed by Knightian uncertainty. Although expected utilities are incalculable in these conditions, an Econ could still optimize by relying on a comparative version of decision theory that takes inputs of comparative plausibility and desirability and produces outputs of plausibilistic expectation. The paper shows that comparative decision theory is a special case (...)
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  • Uncertainty, Decision Science, and Policy Making: A Manifesto for a Research Agenda.David Tuckett, Antoine Mandel, Diana Mangalagiu, Allen Abramson, Jochen Hinkel, Konstantinos Katsikopoulos, Alan Kirman, Thierry Malleret, Igor Mozetic, Paul Ormerod, Robert Elliot Smith, Tommaso Venturini & Angela Wilkinson - 2015 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 27 (2):213-242.
    ABSTRACTThe financial crisis of 2008 was unforeseen partly because the academic theories that underpin policy making do not sufficiently account for uncertainty and complexity or learned and evolved human capabilities for managing them. Mainstream theories of decision making tend to be strongly normative and based on wishfully unrealistic “idealized” modeling. In order to develop theories of actual decision making under uncertainty, we need new methodologies that account for how human actors often manage uncertain situations “well enough.” Some possibly helpful methodologies, (...)
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  • Nudge Versus Boost: How Coherent Are Policy and Theory?Till Grüne-Yanoff & Ralph Hertwig - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (1-2):149-183.
    If citizens’ behavior threatens to harm others or seems not to be in their own interest, it is not uncommon for governments to attempt to change that behavior. Governmental policy makers can apply established tools from the governmental toolbox to this end. Alternatively, they can employ new tools that capitalize on the wealth of knowledge about human behavior and behavior change that has been accumulated in the behavioral sciences. Two contrasting approaches to behavior change are nudge policies and boost policies. (...)
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  • What is Mechanistic Evidence, and Why Do We Need It for Evidence-Based Policy?Caterina Marchionni & Samuli Reijula - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 73:54-63.
    It has recently been argued that successful evidence-based policy should rely on two kinds of evidence: statistical and mechanistic. The former is held to be evidence that a policy brings about the desired outcome, and the latter concerns how it does so. Although agreeing with the spirit of this proposal, we argue that the underlying conception of mechanistic evidence as evidence that is different in kind from correlational, difference-making or statistical evidence, does not correctly capture the role that information about (...)
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  • Nudge, Boost or Design? Limitations of Behavioral Policy Under Social Interaction.Samuli Reijula, Jaakko Kuorikoski, Timo Ehrig, Konstantinos Katsikopoulos & Shyam Sunder - 2018 - Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy 2 (1):99-105.
    Nudge and boost are two competing approaches to applying the psychology of reasoning and decision making to improve policy. Whereas nudges rely on manipulation of choice architecture to steer people towards better choices, the objective of boosts is to develop good decision-making competences. Proponents of both approaches claim capacity to enhance social welfare through better individual decisions. We suggest that such efforts should involve a more careful analysis of how individual and social welfare are related in the policy context. First, (...)
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  • Pluralism in Economics: Its Critiques and Their Lessons.Claudius Gräbner & Birte Strunk - 2020 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (4):311-329.
    This paper starts with an evaluation of three common arguments against pluralism in economics: the claim that economics is already pluralist, the argument that if there was the need for gre...
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  • A Cognition Paradigm Clash: Simon, Situated Cognition and the Interpretation of Bounded Rationality.Enrico Petracca - 2017 - Journal of Economic Methodology 24 (1):20-40.
    Simon’s notion of bounded rationality is deeply intertwined with his activity as a cognitive psychologist and founder of so-called cognitivism, a mainstream approach in cognitive psychology until the 1980s. Cognitivism, understood as ‘symbolic information processing,’ provided the first cognitive psychology foundation to bounded rationality. Has bounded rationality since then fully followed the development of cognitive psychology beyond symbolic information processing in the post-Simonian era? To answer this question, this paper focuses on Simon’s opposition during the 1990s to a new view (...)
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