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  1. One Over Many: The Unitary Pluralism of Plato's World.Necİp Fİkrİ Alİcan - 2021 - Albany: State University of New York Press.
    Corrective intervention in Plato's metaphysics replacing the standard view of Plato as a metaphysical dualist with a novel and revolutionary paradigm of unitary pluralism in a single reality built on ontological diversity.
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  • Ontological Separation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.Emily Katz - 2017 - Phronesis 62 (1):26-68.
    Ontological separation plays a key role in Aristotle’s metaphysical project: substances alone are ontologically χωριστόν. The standard view identifies Aristotelian ontological separation with ontological independence, so that ontological separation is a non-symmetric relation. I argue that there is strong textual evidence that Aristotle employs an asymmetric notion of separation in the Metaphysics—one that involves the dependence of other entities on the independent entity. I argue that this notion allows Aristotle to prevent the proliferation of substance-kinds and thus to secure the (...)
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  • Mathematical Substances in Aristotle’s Metaphysics B.5: Aporia 12 Revisited.Emily Katz - 2018 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100 (2):113-145.
    : Metaphysics B considers two sets of views that hypostatize mathematicals. Aristotle discusses the first in his B.2 treatment of aporia 5, and the second in his B.5 treatment of aporia 12. The former has attracted considerable attention; the latter has not. I show that aporia 12 is more significant than the literature suggests, and specifically that it is directly addressed in M.2 – an indication of its importance. There is an immediate problem: Aristotle spends most of M.2 refuting the (...)
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  • The Platonist Absurd Accumulation of Geometrical Objects: Metaphysics Μ.2.José Edgar González-Varela - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (1):76-115.
    In the first argument of Metaphysics Μ.2 against the Platonist introduction of separate mathematical objects, Aristotle purports to show that positing separate geometrical objects to explain geometrical facts generates an ‘absurd accumulation’ of geometrical objects. Interpretations of the argument have varied widely. I distinguish between two types of interpretation, corrective and non-corrective interpretations. Here I defend a new, and more systematic, non-corrective interpretation that takes the argument as a serious and very interesting challenge to the Platonist.
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