In book VI of his Parmenides commentary, Proclus surveys the previous Neoplatonic interpretations of the “hypotheses” of Plato’s Parmenides, starting with Amelius, a disciple of Plotinus. This paper analyses Amelius’ exegesis of the hypotheses. After presenting the extant evidence about his Parmenides commentary, I explore three puzzling aspects of his interpretation: 1) unlike most Neoplatonists, Amelius distinguished eight hypotheses instead of nine. I argue that he considered the last section (Prm. 165e2-166c2) to be devoid of any positive content and merged (...) it with the previous one – contrary to the modern advocates of an eight-fold divisio textus. 2) Amelius assumed that each hypothesis deals with one layer of reality, but the precise meaning of some identifications is elusive: what are the three kinds of matter matched to hypotheses 5-7? I show that these three material layers probably correspond to three entities whose existence is posited on the basis of the Timaeus: the chōra/prime matter, the level of the element-traces, and the ordered universe. 3) In at least one point, Amelius’ exegesis disrupts the descending hierarchical ordering of the subject-matters of the hypotheses (i.e. from the highest to the lowest-ranked entity), which was an undisputed governing principle of the Neoplatonic interpretations. This irregularity depends, as I argue, on a further interpretative rule: the negative quality of a hypothesis (except for the first one) is taken to indicate some sort of debasement of the corresponding entity. Since, in the second part of the Parmenides, the negative hypotheses alternate with the positive ones, this further principle clashed with the linear downward arrangement implied by the hierarchical principle. In the conclusion of the paper, I sketch how the insights gained by this analysis can shed some light on the subsequent development of the ancient Parmenides exegesis. (shrink)

The main aim of this study is to explain passage 35b4-37a2 of Plato’s Timaeus which deals with three main topics: the mathematization of the world’s soul, its movement, and its binding to the world’s body. First, it is argued that the mathematical structure of the world-soul allows it to participate in and be sensitive to harmony, which is essential for the correct workings of its cognitive capacities. Second, the division of the world-soul to the circle of the same and the (...) circles of the different and its self-motion comes in. This allows it to ‘touch’ and cognize the forms and the material things, as well as rule the movement of the corporeal world and care for it. In this aspect, the world-soul continues the process that started with the original creative act of the demiurge. Third, it is argued that the description of the world-soul’s binding to the world-body entails its conception as a spatially extended entity, which, in turn, explains of the possibility of an interaction between the corporeal world and its soul. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a new reading of Plato’s precosmos (Ti. 52d2–53c3). More specifically, I shall argue that the precosmos is populated by bodies deriving from random complexes of properties, and that this is the effect of the Receptacle’s full precosmic participation in the Paradigm. This will turn out to be consistent with a robust notion of ‘precosmic generation’ and will reveal why Plato may have sought to refer to this otherwise puzzling scenario: representing the precosmos (...) in this way allows Plato to effectively justify why the Demiurge is responsible only for the goodness and perfection of the universe, and why it is properly the best possible cause. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Plato conceives self-motion as non-spatial in Laws X. I demonstrate this by focusing on the textual evidence and by refuting interpretations according to which self-motion either is a specific type of spatial motion or is said to require space as a necessary condition for its occurrence. Moreover, I show that this non-spatial understanding differs from the identification of the soul’s motion with locomotion in the Timaeus. Consequently, I provide an explanation for this difference between (...) the Timaeus and Laws X by considering developmentalist and contextualist viewpoints. (shrink)

Einfühlung wird ideengeschichtlich an das Konzept der Selbstperfektionierung geknüpft und insofern im Modus der Defizienz verhandelt. Dabei fungieren antike und mittelalterliche Diskurse um Gotteserkenntnis als historisch-konzeptionelle Vorläufer neuzeitlichmoderner Erklärungsfolien zwischenmenschlicher Alterität, mithin als semantische Vorform der zeitgenössischen Einfühlungs-Idee. In diesem Kontext ist eine ethisch-epistemologische Asymmetrie zu konstatieren, die Gott einerseits als den All-Empathischen beschreibt und zugleich die Erkenntnisbemühungen des Menschen als unabgeschlossen und prozessual vorstellt. Einfühlung produziert sich als regulative Idee im doppelten Sinne: Während Gott als empathische Transzendenz erscheint, bedarf (...) es unendlicher Annäherungsbewegungen, damit der Mensch sich in einem Akt transzendenter Empathie in Gott einfühlen kann. Durch die Etablierung dieser Vorstellungsverbindung hat das Innenleben des Anderen eine transzendente Aufladung erfahren. Das Fremdpsychische wurde zum modernen Mysterium. (shrink)

I argue that Plato thinks that the soul has location, surface, depth, and extension, and that the Timaeus’ composition of the soul out of eight circles is intended literally. A novel contribution is the development of an account of corporeality that denies the entailment that the soul is corporeal. I conclude by examining Aristotle’s objection to the Timaeus’ psychology and then the intellectual history of this reading of Plato.

The paper first discusses the metaphysical framework that allows the soul's integration into the physical world. A close examination of B36, supported by the comparative evidence of some other early theories of the soul, suggests that the word psuchê could function as both a mass term and a count noun for Heraclitus. There is a stuff in the world, alongside other physical elements, that manifests mental functions. Humans, and possibly other beings, show mental functions in so far as they have (...) a portion of that stuff. Turning to the physical characterization of the soul, the paper argues that B36 is entirely consistent with the ancient testimonies that say that psuchê for Heraclitus is exhalation. But exhalations cover all states of matter from the lowest moist part of atmospheric air to the fire of celestial bodies. If so, psuchê for Heraclitus is both air and fire. The fact that psuchê can manifest the whole range of physical properties along the dry-wet axis guarantees that souls can show different intellectual and ethical properties as well. Moreover, Sextus Empiricus, supported by some other sources, provides us with an answer how portions of soul stuff are individuated into individual souls. The paper closes with a brief discussion of the question whether, and if so with what qualifications, we can apply the term 'physicalism' to Presocratic theories of the soul. (shrink)

In Mabādi’ ārā’ ahl al-madīna al-fādila as well as other major political writings of al-Fārābī, politics is accompanied by metaphysics. However, the co-existence of politics and Neoplatonic metaphysics in al-Fārābī is usually refuted on the basis of two major arguments: one, the Neoplatonic argument, which denies al-Fārābī’s politics; and two, the Straussian argument, which denies al-Fārābī’s Neoplatonic metaphysics. However, this article would show that the two arguments against the co-existence of politics and Neoplatonic metaphysics in al-Fārābī are faulty, and that (...) politics and Neoplatonic metaphysics certainly co-exist in al-Fārābī’s philosophical thought. It would be shown that, in fact, Neoplatonic metaphysics plays an important role in al-Fārābī’s politics and distinguishes his theory of the virtuous city from that of Plato’s Republic. (shrink)

The article reconstructs the unfinished dialogue between Arnason and Castoriadis, with a particular emphasis on the problematic of world articulation. Arnason’s thought is situated as reconfiguring classical sociological constellations, especially as they pertain to the revitalization of the civilizational problematic and the emphasis on the philosophical dimension of sociological investigation. His interpretative framework is located within the nascent field of post-transcendental phenomenology, which he elaborates via the overlapping problematics of cultural articulations of the world as an inter-cultural horizon, and the (...) human condition as various modes of being-in-the-world. Arnason’s encounter with Castoriadis is considered. Despite the many points of fruitful contact, Castoriadis’ neglect of the phenomenological question of the world as a ‘shared horizon’ is, in Arnason’s view, too great to overcome; Arnason looks instead to Weber, Merleau-Ponty and, more recently, Patočka for interpretative resources. Although Castoriadis’ elucidation of the world proceeds ‘in fragments’, the article contends that hermeneutical reconstruction of his thought reveals openings onto the problematic of elemental world orders that can further the dialogue with Arnason. (shrink)

The following article reconstructs Plato’s argument for the existence of god in Laws X. The article starts with interpreting the argument for the priority of soul and continues with a discussion of the argumentation for rationality of the soul in charge of heavens . The view defended here is that Plato first defines the essential characteristics of the divine, namely self-motion and rationality, and then shows that there are entities which possess these characteristics and therefore deserve to be called gods (...) or divine. The article further shows that several sub-arguments mirror the structure of the overall proof. (shrink)

The paper examines the account of the mortal parts of the human soul in theTimaeus. What is their nature? What is their relationship to the immortal part of the soul and its inner structure on the one hand, and to the body and its organs and their functioning on the other? Are they incorporeal or corporeal? What kind of movement do they have? In what sense precisely are they ‘another kind of soul’ ?

In the present paper, I argue that in order to be in a position to understand what the World Soul thinks about, we need first to answer the question of whether the universe perceives and if so, of what it perceives. I shall first (section ) lay out the main reasons for suspecting that the universe has perception and some possible objections against this view. I will then (section ) make a case for my claim that the universe has perception (...) on the basis of my ‘minimalist’ account of perception, which identifies four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for having an instance of aisthēsis: 1) a body; 2) a soul; 3) affections which cause motion/change in the body and in the soul; 4) the cause of these affections. I will show that the universe composed of a World Body and a World Soul meets all four conditions. On the basis of this, I will claim that one can ascribe (self-) perception to the universe. Finally (section ), I will suggest that the universe perceives the polyhedra of its own body. (shrink)