The technological literacy of students has recently become one of the primary goals of education in countries such as the USA, England, New Zealand, Australia, and so forth. However the question here is whether these educations - their long-term policy documents as well as the standards they provide in particular - address sufficient learning about the nature of technology. This seems to be an important concern that through taking advantage of the philosophy of technology (the arena which affords a bountiful (...) ground of various reflections on the nature of technology) is intended to be discussed throughout this study. In the first place, the paper presents a relevant framework based upon Mitcham's (1994) four-aspect account of technology, i.e., technology as objects, knowledge, activities, and volition. Then it categorizes the main relevant concepts and concerns put forward by many other philosophers of technology into this framework; this will yield a concrete model (tool) to analyze any intended standard such as the above mentioned ones. Afterwards, to show how this model works, the well-known case of the USA - Standards for Technological Literacy (ITEA, 2007) - will be used as an example for inspection; the results will disclose the points where the current American case needs to be modified. (shrink)

New Zealand’s curriculum, in terms of its approach to technological literacy, attempts to deliver a sound, philosophy-­based understanding of the nature of technology. The curriculum’s main authors claim that it conforms well to Mitcham’s (2014) categorization of different aspects of technology’s nature. Nevertheless, taking advantage of the existing literature of the philosophy of technology, this paper will reveal that the intended urriculum, though an admirable approach, still has a number of points needing improvement, and there are also certain gaps to (...) be bridged in the claimed conformity. This analysis primarily makes use of the method initiated by Nia and De Vries (2016a), based upon Mitcham’s suggested framework and other philosophers’ opinions as to the nature and various features of technology. (shrink)

Animals and TechnoscienceThe essays in the section “Animals in technoscientific developments” have been collected from the submissions to the 3rd European Conference of Critical Animal Studies that I organized in Karlsruhe on 28–30 November 2013. The aim of the conference was to stimulate critical scholars to engage on the multifaceted relationships between animals and technosciences, an under-researched topic.Technoscience has become an important concept in the current debate on the epistemic and normative changes taking place in how scientific and technological research (...) is currently being conducted. Although there are different modes of describing technoscience , generally speaking the term refers to a means of developing knowledge in which it is not possible to separate the scientific from the technological . In contrast to the “traditional mode o .. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to a discussion in philosophy of technology by focusing on the epistemological status of the example. Of the various developments in the emerging, inchoate field of philosophy of technology, the “empirical turn” stands out as having left the most enduring mark on the trajectory contemporary research takes. From a historical point of view, the empirical turn can best be understood as a corrective to the overly “transcendentalizing” tendencies of “classical” philosophers of technology, such as Heidegger. (...) Empirically oriented philosophy of technology emphasizes actual technologies through case-study research into the formation of technical objects and systems and how they, for example, transform our perceptions and conceptions or pass on and propagate relations of power. This paper explores the point of convergence of classical and contemporary approaches by means of the notion of the “example” or “paradigm.” It starts with a discussion of the quintessential modern philosopher of technology, Martin Heidegger, and his thinking about technology in terms of the ontological difference. Heidegger’s framing of technology in terms of this difference places the weight of intelligibility entirely on the side of being, to such an extent that his examples become heuristic rather than constitutive. The second part of the paper discusses the methodological and epistemological import of the “example” and the form of intelligibility it affords. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, Foucault, and Agamben, we argue that the example offers an alternative way of understanding the study of technologies from that of empirical case studies. (shrink)